错误定价与股权集中的公司治理效应——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-04-16 06:23

本文选题：证券市场 + 上市公司　；参考：《金融理论与实践》2016年02期

【摘要】：现有的股权结构治理效应理论和实证研究结论大多建立在资本市场有效的基础之上。考虑中国上市公司股权相对集中和普遍存在错误定价的背景,分析了市场错误定价对股权集中治理效应的可能影响,并利用中国上市公司2005—2013年的财务数据进行了实证检验。结论表明,我国上市公司的股权集中治理效应会受到投资者非理性行为下错误估价的影响,并且这种影响在高估和低估的情况下存在非对称效应。具体而言,公司价格被高估时股权结构的治理效率更高,这一点在非国有企业中尤其明显。
[Abstract]:Most of the existing theories and empirical conclusions of equity structure governance are based on the efficiency of capital market.Considering the background of the relative concentration of equity and the widespread mispricing of Chinese listed companies, this paper analyzes the possible influence of market mispricing on the governance effect of equity centralization, and makes an empirical test using the financial data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2013.The conclusion shows that the centralized governance effect of equity of listed companies in China will be affected by the wrong valuation under the irrational behavior of investors, and there is an asymmetric effect in the case of overestimation and undervaluation.Specifically, the governance efficiency of equity structure is higher when the company price is overvalued, which is especially obvious in non-state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;中国人民银行武汉分行;
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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