商业银行贷款损失准备、股利分配的信号传递效应关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-19 22:02

本文选题：贷款损失准备金 + 股利分配　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着世界经济一体化以及竞争的日益激烈,商业银行的业务品种以及关联性大大增强,银行管理者往往运用各种方法向外部投资者传递消息。由于中国商业银行近年来纷纷改革上市的趋势加强,经营风险也有所提高,上市商业银行对国民经济的健康发展具有举足轻重的作用,所以中国商业银行的发展备受关注。许多研究证明,贷款损失准备金是商业银行进行会计管理中可选择的政策,是商业银行为了防范可能出现的贷款风险,根据已经发生的贷款业务,判断未来发生损失的可能性,提取的银行储备基金。2001年,《金融企业会计制度》开始执行,该制度规定,每个会计期末,所有银行都应该充分调查借款人的还款实力以及考虑自身银行内部管理的实际需要,查出不可收回贷款的金额,判断未回收贷款的风险以及回收可能性。如果有贷款减值的客观证据,银行应该根据贷款计提贷款损失准备金。随着金融全球化的深化以及“巴塞尔协议Ⅲ"出台执行,各大商业银行开始关注对贷款损失准备金的管理。由于已计提的贷款损失准备金有多重影响和激励作用,所以很多银行操控可自主决策的贷款损失准备金,以缓解利润波动,向外界传递企业信息,即企业具有较低的营业风险和良好前景。在另一方面,股利分配的信号传递理论认为,企业管理者往往通过股利的变动向外部传递企业的利好消息。而商业银行的股息分派政策通常也具有很强的信号传递作用。同时,商业银行还会充分利用其他成本较低的信息披露渠道(譬如可选择的会计政策),减轻股利变动带来的负面影响,向外部投资者传递企业信息。因此,贷款损失准备金的水平和股利政策的变动都具有传递信号的工具。但值得我们注意的是,贷款损失准备金的水平决策属于会计政策的选择,而股息股利水平决策属于财务政策的范畴,那么商业银行的这两项政策信号之间是否存在着某种潜在的联系呢?计提贷款损失准备金信号与股利信号是补偿关系?还是替代关系?在本文中,我们将用实证研究方法探讨贷款损失准备金的信号传递问题以及其与股利分配之间的关系。本文选择中国15家上市商业银行为研究对象,以2006到2012年为研究区间,实证检验了中国商业银行贷款损失准备金与股利政策信号之间的相互关系。实证检验结果表明,商业银行高管可以在利用会计政策(如：计提贷款损失准备金)的同时,使用财务政策(如：股利变化)对外传递信号。当管理者预测银行将继续保持高利润时,他们会增加贷款损失准备金水平,以向外界传递企业具有稳定的经营和发展前景良好的信号。另一方面,银行的管理者为了减轻不对称信息影响可能会选择多重信号达到最大效率的可能性。这样,计提贷款损失准备金信号和股利信号之间是相辅相成的关系。
[Abstract]:With the integration of the world economy and the increasingly fierce competition, the business variety and relevance of commercial banks are greatly enhanced. Bank managers often use a variety of methods to transmit information to external investors. As the trend of reform and listing of Chinese commercial banks has been strengthened in recent years, the management risk has also been raised, and the listed commercial banks play an important role in the healthy development of the national economy, so the development of Chinese commercial banks has attracted much attention. Many studies have proved that the loan loss reserve is an optional policy in the accounting management of commercial banks. In order to guard against possible loan risks, commercial banks judge the possibility of future losses according to the loan business that has already taken place. Bank Reserve Fund. In 2001, the Financial Enterprise Accounting system (FEA) began to be implemented, which stipulates that at the end of each accounting period, all banks should fully investigate the repayment strength of borrowers and take into account the actual needs of their banks' internal management. Identify the amount of uncollectible loans, determine the risk of uncollected loans and the possibility of recovery. If there is objective evidence of loan impairment, the bank should make a loan loss reserve against the loan. With the deepening of financial globalization and the implementation of Basel III, commercial banks begin to pay attention to the management of loan loss reserves. Because of the impact and incentive effect of the loan loss reserves that have been set aside, many banks manipulate loan loss reserves that can be independently determined to ease the volatility of profits and transmit enterprise information to the outside world. That is, the enterprise has a lower business risk and good prospects. On the other hand, according to the signaling theory of dividend distribution, managers often transmit the good news to the outside by the change of dividend. The dividend distribution policy of commercial banks usually has a strong signal transmission role. At the same time, commercial banks will also make full use of other low-cost information disclosure channels (such as alternative accounting policies) to mitigate the negative impact of dividend changes and transfer enterprise information to external investors. Therefore, the level of loan loss reserves and dividend policy changes have signalling tools. However, it is worth our attention that the level decision of loan loss reserve belongs to the choice of accounting policy, while the decision of dividend level belongs to the scope of financial policy. Is there a potential link between the two policy signals of commercial banks? Is the compensation relationship between the signal of reserve for loan loss and the signal of dividend? Or a substitute relationship? In this paper, we will use the empirical method to study the signaling problem of loan loss reserve and the relationship between it and dividend allocation. In this paper, 15 listed commercial banks in China are selected as research objects, and the relationship between loan loss reserve and dividend policy signals of Chinese commercial banks is tested empirically from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results show that commercial bank executives can make use of accounting policies (such as provision for loan losses) and use financial policies (such as dividend changes) to transmit signals to the outside world. When managers predict that banks will continue to maintain high profits, they will increase the level of loan loss reserves to send a signal to the outside world that businesses have stable operations and good prospects for growth. On the other hand, bank managers may choose multiple signals to achieve maximum efficiency in order to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. In this way, the loan loss reserve signal and dividend signal are complementary to each other.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.2;F832.51

【参考文献】