中国地方政府债务竞争:基于省级空间面板数据的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 14:21

本文选题：地方政府债务竞争 + 财政分权　；参考：《财贸经济》2017年09期

【摘要】：2008年全球金融危机以来,中国地方政府债务规模迅速膨胀,风险不断累积。地方政府债务是否可持续以及如何对其有效地进行治理已然成为国内外关注的重要问题。在理论上,本文构建了一个包含企业、家庭和地方政府三部门的地方政府竞争模型。研究发现,中国地方政府间存在债务竞争的策略性互动行为;同时,在给定地方政府间存在债务竞争的情况下,财政分权会降低地方政府债务竞争程度。在实证研究上,基于2009-2013年29个省级面板数据,本文使用空间计量经济模型进行了实证检验。结果表明,本地政府选择举债融资时会充分地考虑相邻地区的举债融资策略行为,即相邻地区的人均政府债务规模每增加1%,本地区的人均政府债务就会相应地增加0.264%。此外,进一步实证分析了财政分权与地方政府债务竞争行为的关系,结果与理论发现保持一致。本文的研究对合理地控制地方政府债务规模快速扩张和防范地方政府债务风险有着重要的政策意义。
[Abstract]:Since the global financial crisis in 2008, China's local government debt has expanded rapidly and risks have been accumulated. Whether local government debt is sustainable and how to manage it effectively has become an important issue at home and abroad. In theory, this paper constructs a competition model of local government including enterprise, family and local government. It is found that there is a strategic interaction of debt competition among local governments in China, and that fiscal decentralization will reduce the degree of debt competition among local governments given the existence of debt competition among local governments. Based on the 29 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2013, this paper uses the spatial econometric model to test the empirical research. The results show that the local government will take into account the debt financing strategies of the neighboring regions when they choose to borrow for financing, that is, the per capita government debt will increase by 0.264 per capita for each increase of the per capita government debt in the adjacent areas. In addition, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and local government debt competition is analyzed empirically, and the results are consistent with the theoretical findings. The research in this paper has important policy significance for controlling the rapid expansion of local government debt and preventing the risk of local government debt.
【作者单位】：复旦大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F812.5

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