创业板上市公司董事会治理绩效影响因素研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 09:42

本文选题：创业板上市公司 + 董事会治理绩效　；参考：《山东大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：董事会作为连接股东与经理层的“中枢”机构,是公司的终极控制者和最终决策者,董事会是公司治理的核心。各个国家的立法以及各种机构的规则和指引等都把建设一个高效的董事会作为公司治理的终极目标。我国上市公司董事会治理合规性明显改善,但却有效性偏低,这一不争的事实迫切需要理论和实践界将董事会制度改革的出发点转移至提升董事会治理绩效,而不仅是合规性建设。董事会特征是治理绩效的关键影响因素,董事会特征通过影响董事会履行职能的行为而影响治理绩效,因此,以董事会治理绩效为导向,研究如何配置董事会特征能够保障董事会有效履行职能而达到应有的效果,对于提升董事会治理绩效具有重要意义。创业板聚集了高技术、高成长性、年轻的创业型公司,是提升我国自主创新能力的重要力量。与大型成熟上市公司相比,这类公司委托代理问题较低、资源稀缺、内外部环境高度不确定,董事会更有动机和能力履行职能,因此,董事会治理绩效的影响因素具有特殊性。相关文献虽已取得较丰富的研究成果,但实证研究中多以公司绩效代替治理绩效,未建立治理绩效的测量指标,从而缩小了治理绩效的外延,甚至造成概念的混淆；大多遵循“董事会特征→绩效”的逻辑范式,而忽视了董事会行为的中介效应,造成研究结论多种多样甚至相互矛盾；多基于线性视角研究变量之间的关系,而未关注更符合实际的非线性关系；多以大型成熟上市公司为样本,而对创业型企业的研究较为稀缺。鉴于此,本文基于创业企业董事会特点,立足于董事会治理绩效,在建立董事会治理绩效测量指标的基础上,从非线性视角出发,研究董事会特征如何通过影响董事会履行职能的行为而影响治理绩效,以期对董事会治理绩效的影响因素这一科学问题进行探索。董事会通过履行职能的治理行为而达成治理绩效。董事会行为是指董事会履职能、实现治理目标的过程。结合股东至上主义、利益相关者理论和组织控制理论,创业板上市公司的治理目标是通过公司创新实现股东为主导的核心利益相关者利益最大化。基于资源依赖理论、管家理论和委托代理理论,董事会是通过行战略和监督职能而实现公司治理目标。据此,董事会行为可相应划分为战略为(包括资源提供和战略参与)和监督行为。不同情境下的董事会监督和战略行为水平是权变的,创业板上市公司董事会可能更加经常的深入到经营层面进行监督,但对经理层机会主义行为,特别是公司合规和财务审计的监督水平较低；资源提供行为水平更高,战略参与行为更加积极,且范围不仅涉及战略层面而是深入至管理边界之内,从而使创业板上市公司的董事会与战略、管理的交互融合性较强。董事会治理绩效是董事会通过战略行为与监督行为,履行战略与监督职能而达到的治理效果。基于董事会战略行为和监督行为,治理绩效可以分为战略行为绩效和监督行为绩效两个维度。战略行为绩效指董事会通过战略行为履行其战略职能取得的效果,具体指标至少包括组织创新、股东财富、社会责任、规避破产风险等。监督行为绩效是指董事会实施对经理层的监督与控制行为所产生的治理效果,具体指标至少包括代理成本与效率、信息披露质量、规避违规等。借鉴产业组织理论的SCP范式,董事会特征对治理绩效的影响并非简单而直接,而是通过董事会行为的传递,对治理绩效产生影响。董事会特征如董事会结构、人口学属性和人力资本的制度设计影响董事会履行职能的动机和能力,从而影响董事会战略行为和监督行为强度。进一步的,董事会通过资源提供行为和战略参与行为,影响公司创新、股东财富、社会责任以及破产风险规避等战略行为绩效；董事会通过监督行为,影响代理成本、改善信息披露质量和规避违规等监督行为绩效。董事会特征对治理绩效的影响存在双路径：“董事会特征→战略行为→战略行为绩效”和“董事会特征→监督行为→监督行为绩效”。从非线性视角出发,基于创业板上市公司的特点,对董事会特征对行为的影响、行为对治理绩效的影响以及董事会行为在董事会特征与治理绩效之间的中介效应提出研究假设。以董事会治理绩效指标作为被解释变量、董事会特征指标作为解释变量、董事会行为指标作为中介变量,以2009-2011年我国509家创业板上市公司为研究样本,运用非线性的中介效应检验方法,对研究假设进行实证检验。由于董事会特征对行为、董事会行为对治理绩效的影响并非直线而是非线性的,因此,董事会行为的中介效应并非常数,而是随董事会特征的不同取值而发生动态变化,即存在董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效产生的瞬间间接效应。采用Hayes and Preacher(2010)提出的检验非线性中介效应的科学方法,对董事会行为的非线性中介效应进行检验。该方法用于检验X→M→Y中,解释变量X对中介变量M存在非线性影响并且(或)M对被解释变量Y存在非线性影响时,X通过M对Y产生的瞬间间接效应。数据运行采用的统计软件为MEDCURVE for SPSS,使用OLS回归对董事会特征对董事会行为的影响以及董事会行为对治理绩效影响的系数进行估计,并执行bootstrapping以获取置信区间,用来检验董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效产生的瞬间间接效应的显著性。通过对我国创业板上市公司的样本进行实证检验,得到以下重要结论：第一,创业板上市公司董事会特征对董事会行为具有显著影响,不同特征对董事会行为的影响可能是非线性或线性。董事会结构对董事会行为的影响方面,董事会规模与董事会行为之间呈负向的对数曲线关系；独立董事比例、董事股权激励与董事会行为之间均呈U型关系。董事会人口学属性对董事会行为的影响方面,女性董事比例与董事会行为正相关；董事平均年龄与董事会行为之间呈负向的对数曲线关系；董事平均学历对董事会行为没有影响。在董事会人力资本对董事会行为影响方面,风险投资董事比例与董事会行为之间呈负相关关系；创始人董事比例特别是创始人内部董事比例与董事会行为呈正相关关系,而创始人外部董事与董事会行为不相关；董事平均任期与董事会行为之间呈正相关关系。第二,创业板上市公司董事会行为对战略行为绩效和监督行为绩效的影响有所差异。董事会行为与RD投入、净资产收益率、托宾Q值、总资产增长率、破产风险等战略行为绩效各指标存在正向的对数曲线关系,这说明随着董事会行为的强化,董事会治理的战略行为绩效得以提高,但是由于董事会过度履行战略职能负效应的抵减作用,战略行为绩效提高的速度将越来越缓慢。董事会行为与监督行为绩效指标中的代理效率以及第一类代理成本之间存在正向的对数曲线关系,说明随着董事会行为的强化,代理效率得以提升且提升的速度逐渐变缓；随着董事会行为的强化,第一类代理成本得以降低且降低的速度逐渐变缓。然而,然而,董事会行为与第二类代理成本、信息披露质量等监督行为绩效指标不存在相关性。这说明创业类企业的董事会行为主要体现于提供资源和战略参与的战略行为,而监督行为相对弱化。验证了董事会与经理层的合作关系模型,表明资源依赖理论和管家理论更适用于作为创业型企业情境董事会治理的理论依据。第三,董事会行为在董事会特征与战略行为绩效之间起重要的非线性中介效应。董事会结构各指标、董事会人口学属性中的女性董事比例与董事平均年龄以及人力资本各指标通过董事会行为的中介作用,而对战略行为绩效以及代理效率、第一类代理成本的监督行为绩效指标产生影响。由于某些董事会特征指标与行为之间存在U型或对数曲线关系,董事会行为与战略行为绩效及代理效率、第一类代理成本之间存在对数曲线关系,因此,董事会行为在董事会特征与治理绩效之间的中介效应并不是固定的常数,而是随董事会特征变量的不同取值而发生动态变化,即董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效的影响存在瞬间间接效应。董事会行为在董事会特征与代理成本、信息披露等监督行为绩效之间不存在中介效应。同时发现,不同董事会特征对不同治理绩效指标的影响路径存在差异,如果忽视董事会行为的中介效应直接研究董事会特征与绩效的关系将得到不稳定甚至是错误的研究结论。本文对于已有研究具有如下贡献：(1)建立“董事会特征→战略行为→战略行为绩效”和“董事会特征→监督行为→监督行为绩效”的双路径模型,深化了“结构→行为→绩效”的研究范式,丰富了董事会治理研究框架体系。(2)构建董事会治理绩效的测量指标,有助于从董事会履行职能的效果角度,为董事会有效性的实证研究提供理论依据。(3)将非线性中介效应检验方法首次应用于董事会治理的研究中,验证了董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效动态的瞬间间接效应,突破了以往研究的线性逻辑,完善了董事会研究的实证检验方法。(4)挖掘了创业型企业情境下董事会特征、行为对治理绩效影响路径的特殊性,丰富了创业企业公司治理的理论研究、以及权变理论在董事会治理研究中的运用。
[Abstract]:As the "central" organization connecting shareholders and managers, the board of directors is the ultimate controller and final decision maker of the company. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance. The legislation of various countries and the rules and guidelines of various institutions are the ultimate goal for the construction of an efficient board of directors. The board of directors of China's listed companies The governance compliance is obviously improved, but its effectiveness is low. This indisputable fact urgently needs the theoretical and practical circles to transfer the starting point of the board system reform to the improvement of the performance of the board of directors, but not only the construction of compliance. The characteristics of the board of directors are the key factors affecting the performance of the board of directors, and the characteristics of the board of directors will affect the performance of the board of directors by influencing the performance of the board of directors. The behavior of the board affects the performance of governance. Therefore, taking the board governance performance as the guidance, it is of great significance to study how to allocate the characteristics of the board of directors to ensure the effective performance of the board of directors to achieve its due effect and to improve the performance of the board of directors. The gem is a high technology, high growth, and young entrepreneurial company, which is promoted. Compared with the large and mature listed companies, these companies have lower principal-agent problems, scarce resources, highly uncertain internal and external environment, and the board of directors have more motivation and ability to perform functions. Therefore, the factors affecting the performance of the board of directors are special. The related literature has made a rich study of the related literature. But in the empirical study, most of the empirical studies take the company performance instead of the governance performance, and do not establish the measurement indicators of the governance performance, thus reducing the extension of the governance performance and even the confusion of the concept, most of which follow the logical paradigm of "the characteristics of the board of directors", while ignoring the intermediary effect of the board behavior, resulting in a variety of research conclusions. It is even contradictory; it is based on the linear perspective to study the relationship between variables, and does not pay attention to the nonlinear relationship that is more in line with the actual situation; most of them are large and mature listed companies as samples, and the research on entrepreneurial enterprises is scarce. On the basis of the performance measurement indicators, the paper studies how the board characteristics affect the performance of the board of directors by affecting the performance of the board of directors from the nonlinear perspective, in order to explore the scientific problem of the influencing factors of the performance of the board of directors.
The board of directors can achieve governance performance by performing the governance behavior of the function. The behavior of the board refers to the process of the performance of the board of directors and the realization of the goal of governance. Based on the theory of resource dependence, the theory of housekeeping and the theory of principal-agent, the board of directors can achieve the goal of corporate governance through the line strategy and supervision function. Accordingly, the behavior of the board of directors can be divided into strategies (including resource provision and strategic participation) and the supervision line. The board of directors of the GEM may be more often overseen in the management level, but it has a lower level of supervision of the executive level opportunistic behavior, especially the corporate compliance and financial audit; the level of resource provision is higher, the strategic participation is more active, and the scope not only involves the strategic level but the depth. To enter the management boundary, so that the board of directors of GEM companies and strategic management interaction fusion.
Board governance performance is the governance effect achieved by the board of directors through strategic behavior and supervisory function. Based on the strategic behavior and supervision behavior of the board of directors, the governance performance can be divided into two dimensions: strategic behavior performance and supervision performance performance. The specific indicators include organizational innovation, shareholder wealth, social responsibility, and evasion of bankruptcy risk. The performance of supervisory behavior refers to the governance effect of the board of directors' supervision and control of the manager's level, and the specific indicators include at least the agency and efficiency, the quality of information disclosure, and the avoidance of violation.
Referring to the SCP paradigm of industrial organization theory, the impact of board characteristics on governance performance is not simple but direct, but it has an impact on governance performance through the transfer of board behavior. The characteristics of the board of directors, such as board structure, demography property and human capital system design, affect the motivation and ability of the board to perform its functions. Further, the board provides behavior and strategic participation through resources, which affects corporate innovation, shareholder wealth, social responsibility and the avoidance of bankruptcy risk. The board of directors, through supervision, affects the cost of generation, improves the quality of information disclosure and evade violations. There are two ways of the governing performance of the board of directors: the characteristics of the board of directors, the strategic behavior, the performance of strategic behavior, the characteristics of the board of directors, the supervision behavior, and the performance of supervision behavior.
From the nonlinear perspective, based on the characteristics of the GEM listed companies, the influence of the board characteristics on the behavior, the influence of behavior on the governance performance and the intermediary effect between the board behavior and the governance performance are put forward. The board governance performance indicators are taken as the explanatory variables and the characteristics of the board of directors are made. In order to explain the variables, the behavior index of the board of directors as the intermediary variable, taking the 509 GEM listed companies of our country as the research sample for 2009-2011 years, using the nonlinear intermediary effect test method, the empirical test of the research hypothesis is carried out.
Because of the behavior of the board of directors, the influence of the board behavior on governance performance is not linear but nonlinear. Therefore, the intermediary effect of the board behavior is not constant, but changes with the different values of the board of directors, that is, the characteristics of the board of directors have the instantaneous indirect effect on the performance of governance by the characteristics of the board of directors. Ha A scientific method proposed by yes and Preacher (2010) to test the nonlinear mediation effect of the board behavior. The method is used to test the nonlinear intermediary effect of the board behavior. This method is used to test the X to M to Y, explaining the nonlinear effect of the variable X on the intermediate variable M and (or) the existence of the nonlinear effect of M on the interpreted variable Y. The statistical software used for data operation is MEDCURVE for SPSS, which uses OLS regression to estimate the influence of board characteristics on the board behavior and the influence of board behavior on governance performance, and carries out bootstrapping to obtain confidence interval, which is used to test the transients of the board characteristics through behavior to governance performance. The significance of the indirect effect.
Through the empirical test of the sample of the GEM listed companies in China, the following important conclusions are obtained: first, the characteristics of the board of directors of the GEM listed companies have a significant influence on the board behavior, and the influence of the different characteristics on the board behavior may be nonlinear or linear. There is a negative logarithmic curve relationship between the behavior of the board and the board of directors; the proportion of independent directors, the U relationship between the directors' equity incentive and the board behavior. The proportion of the board of directors has a positive correlation with the behavior of the board of directors; the average age of the board and the behavior of the board are negative. The relationship between the logarithmic curve and the average degree of directors has no effect on the behavior of the board of directors. There is a negative correlation between the proportion of the director of the board of directors and the behavior of the board of directors; the proportion of the directors and directors, especially the internal directors of the founders, is positively related to the behavior of the board of directors. There is no correlation between the external directors and the board of directors, and there is a positive correlation between the average term of directors and board behavior.
Second, the influence of board behavior on the performance of strategic behavior and supervision performance is different. The relationship between board behavior and RD investment, net asset yield, Tobin Q value, total asset growth rate, bankruptcy risk and other strategic behavior performance indicators have positive relationship with the opposite number, which indicates that the behavior of the board of directors is strengthened. The performance of the strategic behavior of the board of directors has been improved, but the speed of the performance improvement of the strategic behavior will be more and more slow due to the overperformance of the board's overperformance of the negative effect of the strategic function. There is a positive logarithmic curve relationship between the agency efficiency of the board behavior and the performance indicators of supervision and the first type of cost. It shows that with the strengthening of the board of directors, the speed of the agency efficiency is gradually improved and the speed of promotion gradually slows down. With the strengthening of the board of directors, the speed of the first type of agency cost can be reduced and reduced gradually. However, the performance indicators of the board behavior and the second types of agency costs and the quality of information disclosure do not exist. This shows that the behavior of the board of directors is mainly reflected in the strategic behavior of providing resources and strategic participation, and the supervision behavior is relatively weak. The model of the cooperation relationship between the board of directors and the manager level is verified, which shows that the theory of resource dependence and the theory of housekeeping are more applicable to the theoretical basis of the governance of a creative enterprise.
Third, the board behavior plays an important nonlinear intermediary effect between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of the strategic behavior. The index of the board structure, the proportion of the directors of the board of directors and the average age of the directors in the demography of the board of directors, and the mediating role of each index of human capital through the behavior of the board of directors, and the performance of strategic behavior and the acting efficiency of the agency. There is a relationship between the U type or logarithmic curve between the characteristic index and the behavior of some board of directors. There is a logarithmic curve relationship between the board behavior and the strategic behavior performance and the agency efficiency, and the first agent cost. Therefore, the board behavior is characteristic and governance of the board of directors. The intermediary effect between performance is not a fixed constant, but a dynamic change with the different values of the characteristic variables of the board of directors. That is, the characteristics of the board of directors have an instant indirect effect on the effect of governance on the performance of governance. The board behavior does not exist between the characteristics of the board of directors and the agency cost, information disclosure and so on. At the same time, it is found that there are differences in the impact of different board characteristics on different governance performance indicators. If the intermediary effect of the board behavior is ignored, the relationship between the characteristics of the board and the performance of the board will be unstable or even the wrong conclusion.
This paper has the following contributions to the existing research: (1) establishing the dual path model of the characteristics of the board of directors, strategic behavior, strategic behavior performance, the characteristics of the board of directors, supervision behavior and performance of supervision, which deepens the research paradigm of "structure, behavior and performance" and enriches the framework of the research on the governance of the board of directors. (2) construction of the framework of the research on the governance of the board of directors. The measurement index of board governance performance helps to provide theoretical basis for the empirical study of the effectiveness of the board of directors. (3) applying the nonlinear intermediary effect test method to the study of board governance for the first time, verifies the instantaneous and indirect effect of the board's characteristics on the dynamic performance of governance. We should break through the linear logic of previous research and improve the empirical test method of the board research. (4) excavate the characteristics of the board of directors, the particularity of the impact of behavior on the governance performance, and enrich the theoretical research on corporate governance of the enterprise, and the application of the contingency theory in the research of the board governance.

【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F271

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