上市公司股权激励对盈余质量的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-26 01:21

本文选题：股权激励 + 盈余质量　；参考：《兰州理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：实行股权激励可以使所有者与经营者利益趋同,使经营者努力工作,提高经营效率、减少代理成本,从而增加企业的价值。而经营者也会由于股价上涨来实现自身收益。但股权激励的经济后果有时并不与计划一致,一方面的确激励了经营者,而另一方面它也会使经营者操纵盈余,使盈余质量下降。近年来出现的会计舞弊事件使对盈余管理的研究的关注点由会计盈余数量转向了盈余质量。那么,我国企业实施的股权激励能否有效地提高企业的盈余质量以及通过何种途径影响盈余质量?这方面的研究将对我国上市公司科学合理的设计适合自身的股权激励方案有重大的实践意义。本文在委托代理理论及人力资本理论的基础上,主要对股权激励对盈余质量的影响及影响机理进行了研究。本文选取了2006-2011年公布实施股权激励的沪深两市279家A股上市公司为样本,对满足条件的上市公司的股权激励和盈余质量的数据进行了分析,并对经营效率和代理成本在股权激励影响盈余质量的过程中是否存在中介效应进行了验证,即检验股权激励能否通过激励管理层提高经营效率并降低代理成本达到提高盈余质量的目的。本文得出如下结论：(1)股权激励正向影响盈余质量。(2)股权激励能够提高经营效率,经营效率在股权激励与盈余质量之间存在中介效应。(3)股权激励能够有效地降低代理成本,但是并没有因此提高盈余质量,即以管理费用率表示的代理成本中介效应不显著。最后本研究为上公司设计合理的股权激励方案提出了相关建议。企业应当建立良好市场环境和科学的业绩评价体系、完善薪酬契约以及考核监督机制。应当注重管理层的企业家才能的发挥,加强对管理层经营能力的培养,同时约束规范管理层在职消费,从而提高企业的盈余质量。
[Abstract]:The equity incentive can make the owner and the operator benefit the same, make the operator work hard, improve the management efficiency, reduce the agency cost, so as to increase the value of the enterprise. And operator also can because share price rises to realize oneself profit. However, the economic consequences of equity incentive are sometimes inconsistent with the plan. On the one hand, it does motivate the operator, on the other hand, it also makes the operator manipulate the surplus and make the quality of the earnings decline. Accounting fraud in recent years has changed the focus of earnings management from the quantity of accounting earnings to earnings quality. So, can the equity incentive of Chinese enterprises effectively improve the earnings quality of the enterprises, and through what way can the earnings quality be affected? The research on this aspect will have great practical significance for the scientific and reasonable design of the stock right incentive scheme of listed companies in our country. On the basis of principal-agent theory and human capital theory, this paper mainly studies the influence and mechanism of equity incentive on earnings quality. In this paper, 279 A-share listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2011 are selected as samples to analyze the data of equity incentive and earnings quality of listed companies that meet the requirements. The paper also verifies the existence of intermediary effect in the process of equity incentive affecting earnings quality. That is to test whether equity incentive can improve earnings quality by encouraging management to improve management efficiency and reduce agency cost. In this paper, we draw the following conclusions: 1) Equity incentive positively affects earnings quality. (2) Equity incentive can improve management efficiency, and operational efficiency has intermediary effect between equity incentive and earnings quality. Equity incentive can effectively reduce agency cost. However, it does not improve the quality of earnings, that is, the agency cost intermediary effect expressed by overhead rate is not significant. In the end, the paper puts forward some suggestions for the company to design a reasonable equity incentive scheme. Enterprises should establish good market environment and scientific performance evaluation system, perfect salary contract and check and supervise mechanism. We should pay attention to the enterpriser's ability of management, strengthen the cultivation of management's management ability, and restrain and standardize the management's in-service consumption, so as to improve the earnings quality of the enterprise.
【学位授予单位】：兰州理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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