相近持股比与公司绩效相关性研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 12:48

本文选题：相近持股比 + 公司绩效　；参考：《安徽财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：基于现代公司制企业特征的委托代理理论认为,提高公司绩效我们首先需要解决两个问题：一是委托人(股东)与代理人(经理人员)两者间的冲突；二是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。这两类代理问题是分析股权结构和公司绩效之间关系的理论基础。为了解决上述两类代理问题,我们需要采取一定的激励和约束价值,使得上市公司的股权结构达到最优,从而提高上市公司的绩效水平。股权结构包括高度集中型、相对集中型、相近持股型和完全分散型,其中相近持股型公司主要解决的便是在股东股权比例相近的情况下存在的两类委托代理冲突。但是就相近持股比与公司绩效相关性这方面的研究,已有文献没有达成一致结论,因此,深入研究两者者之间的关系,具有一定的理论现实意义。本文正是从相近持股比对公司绩效的影响进行理论和实证分析,并在文章的最后得到了一定的结论及启示。因为我国国情的特殊性,大部分上市公司是国有企业通过改制而来的,这样就会导致一股独大等现象的存在,而对上市公司的业绩水平产生负面影响。本文的研究目的便是通过分析相近持股比式股权结构对公司绩效的影响,使得达到一个有利的股权结构状态,能够有效地解决两类委托代理问题,实现公司绩效最大化。本文通过一定的理论分析,并在文章的后半部分通过因子分析、回归分析、t检验,最终得出以下结论：(1)相近持股比公司中,外部大股东与控股股东形成控制联盟,控制权私利水平将会高于高度集中型公司,而不利于公司绩效水平的提高。同时,伴随股权制衡度的增长,控制权私利水平也得到相应的增加；(2)相近持股比公司中,民营控股公司控制权私利水平高于国有控股公司,民营控股公司的大股东比国有控股公司大股东更有能力形成控制联盟,进而来侵占中小股东的利益；(3)公司绩效和股权制衡度呈倒U型关系,即适当的股权制衡程度有利于使得公司绩效达到最大化。本文共有五个章节,各章节的划分是按照以下结构研究的。第一章引言,主要讲述本选题的选题背景、选题意义,然后写的是国内外文献综述,通过对国内外文献的学习阐述造成学者们研究结论没有达成一致的原因,并在此基础上提出问题,在本章的最后提出的本文的框架以及研究方法。第二章是相近持股比与公司绩效的相关概念界定及基本理论,主要介绍了相关概念以及它们的度量指标和理论依据与基本理论研究。第三章写的是相近持股比与公司绩效的政策沿革、作用机理分析与研究假说。第四章是实证分析,介绍了数据的来源、指标的选取、实证结果与分析,文中通过因子分析、描述性统计以及回归分析的方法对上一章的研究假说进行了检验,并对实证结果进行了分析。第五章是研究结论与启示,系统的概括了本文的研究结果并在此基础上得到了一定启示。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent theory based on the characteristics of modern corporate enterprises holds that to improve corporate performance we need to solve two problems: one is the conflict between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager); The second is the conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders. These two kinds of agency problems are the theoretical basis of analyzing the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. In order to solve the above two kinds of agency problems, we need to take some incentive and constraint value to make the ownership structure of listed companies optimal, thus improve the performance level of listed companies. The ownership structure includes high concentration, relative centralization, close shareholding and complete dispersion, in which the two kinds of principal-agent conflicts exist in the case of similar shareholders' equity ratio are mainly solved by similar shareholding companies. However, there is no consensus conclusion on the correlation between similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between them. This paper makes a theoretical and empirical analysis on the influence of similar shareholding ratio on corporate performance, and at the end of this paper, it draws some conclusions and enlightenments. Because of the particularity of China's national conditions, most of the listed companies come from the state-owned enterprises through restructuring, which will lead to the existence of a dominant phenomenon, which has a negative impact on the performance level of listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of the similar shareholding ratio on corporate performance, so as to achieve a favorable ownership structure state, which can effectively solve two kinds of principal-agent problems and realize the maximization of corporate performance. In this paper, through a certain theoretical analysis, and in the second half of the article through factor analysis, regression analysis and t test, it is concluded that: 1) in the company with similar shareholding ratio, the outside major shareholder and the controlling shareholder form the control alliance. The level of self-interest of control will be higher than that of high-centralized company, which is not conducive to the improvement of corporate performance. At the same time, with the increase of the degree of equity balance, the level of private interest of control right is also increased accordingly.) among the similar shareholding companies, the private holding company has a higher level of control private interest than the state-owned holding company. The large shareholders of the private holding company have more ability to form the control alliance than the majority shareholders of the state-owned holding company, thus encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders. (3) the performance of the company and the degree of equity checks and balances are inversely U-shaped. That is, the appropriate degree of equity balance is conducive to maximize corporate performance. This article has five chapters, each chapter divides according to the following structure research. The first chapter introduces the background of the topic, the significance of the topic, and then the literature review at home and abroad, through the study of domestic and foreign literature, scholars do not reach a consensus on the reasons for the conclusion. On the basis of this, the framework and research methods of this paper are put forward at the end of this chapter. The second chapter is the definition and basic theory of the similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance, mainly introduces the related concepts and their metrics, theoretical basis and basic theoretical research. The third chapter is about the policy evolution, mechanism analysis and research hypothesis of similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance. Chapter four is empirical analysis, which introduces the source of data, the selection of indicators, the empirical results and analysis, and tests the hypotheses in the previous chapter by factor analysis, descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The empirical results are analyzed. The fifth chapter is the research conclusion and enlightenment, systematically summarizes the research results of this paper and gets some enlightenment.
【学位授予单位】：安徽财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】