终极控制人特征与内部人交易行为关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 21:22

  本文选题：终极控制人 + 内部人交易　； 参考：《西安财经学院学报》2017年06期

【摘要】：拥有优势信息的内部人通过知情交易牟利,损害了外部投资者特别是中小投资者的利益。内部人交易问题成为监管者和投资者关注的热点问题。本文以2012-2016年深圳证券交易所上市公司为样本,追溯上市公司控制权结构,研究了终极控制人的行为动机与能力对内部人交易行为的影响。研究表明,当终极控制人为政府时,监管内部人的动机和能力较低,内部人交易发生的可能性更大;当现金流权和控制权的分离程度较高时,终极控制人具备侵占上市公司的动机和能力,与内部人合谋进而纵容内部人交易的可能性更大;终极控制人至上市公司之间的层级越多,委托代理成本越高,监管动机和能力越弱,越容易导致内部人交易行为的发生。
[Abstract]:Insiders with advantage information make profits through informed transactions, which impair the interests of external investors, especially small and medium-sized investors. Insider trading has become a hot issue for regulators and investors. Based on the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016, this paper traces the control structure of listed companies and studies the influence of ultimate controller's behavior motivation and ability on insider's trading behavior. Studies have shown that when the ultimate controller is the government, the motivations and abilities of the insiders are lower and the insider transactions are more likely to occur; when the separation of cash flow rights and control rights is higher, The ultimate controller has the motive and ability to occupy the listed company, and is more likely to connive with the insider to connive at the insider transaction. The more layers between the ultimate controller and the listed company, the higher the principal-agent cost. The weaker the regulatory motivation and ability, the more likely to lead to insider trading behavior.
【作者单位】： 西安外国语大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目“圈际政治关系、宏观调控政策与企业财务决策”(17YJA790073) 西安外国语大学校级重点项目(12XWA03)
【分类号】：F832.51
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本文编号：1821594