企业金融化、高管股权激励与研发投资

发布时间：2018-05-27 18:47

本文选题：企业金融化 + 高管股权激励　；参考：《科技进步与对策》2017年22期

【摘要】：以2010-2015年沪深584家A股上市公司为样本,从产权异质性角度考察企业金融化、高管股权激励与研发投资关系。研究发现:(1)非货币金融资产持有比例与研发投资呈负相关,反映企业金融化对研发投资具有挤出效应,且高管股权激励能弱化企业金融化与研发投资的负向关系。挤出效应和弱化效应在投资性金融资产上体现非常明显,而在交易类金融资产上体现不明显;(2)与非国有企业相比,非货币金融资产的挤出效应和高管股权激励的弱化效应在国有企业中表现更为显著。投资性金融资产的挤出效应在国有企业中较为显著,而在非国有企业中不太显著,但高管股权激励的抑制作用在国有或非国有企业均较为明显。不论产权异质性,交易类金融资产的挤出效应和高管股权激励的抑制作用均不显著。
[Abstract]:Taking 584 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2015 as a sample, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate financialization, executive equity incentive and R & D investment from the perspective of property heterogeneity. It is found that the proportion of non-monetary and financial assets is negatively correlated with R & D investment, which reflects that enterprise financialization has crowding out effect on R & D investment, and executive equity incentive can weaken the negative relationship between enterprise financialization and R & D investment. The crowding-out effect and the weakening effect are very obvious in the investment financial assets, but not obvious in the transaction financial assets.) compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the crowding-out effect and the weakening effect are very obvious. The crowding out effect of non-monetary financial assets and the weakening effect of executive equity incentive are more obvious in state-owned enterprises. The crowding out effect of investment financial assets is more significant in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises, but the inhibition effect of executive equity incentive is obvious in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Regardless of the heterogeneity of property rights, the crowding-out effect of transaction financial assets and the inhibition of executive equity incentive are not significant.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71273082)
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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