控制权结构与中小股东利益实现

发布时间：2018-05-28 01:06

本文选题：控制权结构 + 中小股东利益实现　；参考：《兰州理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：公司中的利益冲突问题一直是公司治理要解决的核心。随着现代股份制公司的发展,文献研究的内容从公司所有者与公司经营者之间的第一类代理问题转移到控股股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理问题上,公司治理要解决的突出问题从第一类代理中的利益冲突转移到了第二类代理中的利益冲突上。在股权比较集中的公司中,大股东往往会得到比小股东多并且与其所持股份比例不相称的额外收益,这部分收益不是由于其所拥有的所有权带来的,而是大股东对小股东实施侵害所获得的收益。本文立足于公司治理机制,通过不同表现形式的控制权结构对中小股东利益的影响机制分析和实证分析,验证在我国有制衡关系的控制权结构有更高效公司治理机制,便于公司业绩的不断提升和中小股东利益的顺利实现,为公司治理结构优化和资本市场的健康发展提供依据。在相关理论和影响机制分析的基础上,选用了2007-2012年间第一大股东变更的143家A股上市公司,858个样本进行实证研究,通过相关分析和回归分析发现,股权集中有利于公司业绩的提升,即相对于股权分散公司,股权集中有利于中小股东利益实现；有制衡关系的控制权结构有利于公司治理效率的提高,表现为公司业绩的提升,即存在制衡关系的控制权结构更有利于中小股东利益的实现,且中小股东利益实现随制衡强度的增强而更有利,但第一大股东的国有性质在我国目前的市场环境中对中小股东的利益没有显著影响。论文中的股东控制权以直接持股股东的持股比例体现,设定间接控股股东为唯一控制人,未考虑控股股东通过控制若干直接持股股东的情况和若干控股股东共同控制某一直接持股股东的情况,研究结论有待进一步完善和数据支持。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest in the company has always been the core of corporate governance. With the development of modern joint-stock companies, the content of literature research has shifted from the first kind of agency problem between the owner and the manager of the company to the second kind of agency problem between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. The outstanding problems to be solved in corporate governance are transferred from the conflict of interest in the first kind of agency to the conflict of interest in the second type of agency. In companies with more concentrated shares, large shareholders tend to receive more than minority shareholders and are not commensurate with their share holdings, which is not due to their ownership. It is the income that the majority shareholder carries out to the minority shareholder. Based on the corporate governance mechanism, through the analysis and empirical analysis of the influence mechanism of different forms of control structure on the interests of minority shareholders, this paper verifies that the control right structure with checks and balances in China has a more efficient corporate governance mechanism. It is convenient for the improvement of the company's performance and the smooth realization of the interests of the minority shareholders, and provides the basis for the optimization of the corporate governance structure and the healthy development of the capital market. On the basis of the analysis of relevant theory and influence mechanism, we selected 143 A-share listed companies which changed the largest shareholder from 2007 to 2012 to carry out empirical research. Through correlation analysis and regression analysis, we found that, Equity concentration is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance, that is, relative to the decentralized equity companies, equity concentration is conducive to the realization of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; the control structure with checks and balances is conducive to the improvement of corporate governance efficiency, which is reflected in the improvement of corporate performance. That is, the structure of control with checks and balances is more beneficial to the realization of the interests of minority shareholders, and the realization of the interests of minority shareholders is more advantageous with the enhancement of the intensity of checks and balances. However, the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder has no significant influence on the interests of minority shareholders in the current market environment. In this paper, the shareholder control right is reflected by the proportion of the direct shareholding shareholder, and the indirect controlling shareholder is the sole controlling person. Without considering the situation of controlling some direct shareholders and controlling some direct shareholders, the conclusion of the research needs to be further improved and supported by data.
【学位授予单位】：兰州理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

【参考文献】