我国家族上市公司大股东侵害小股东权益研究

发布时间：2018-05-31 04:33

本文选题：家族上市公司 + 股东代理　；参考：《西北大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：进入新世纪以来,伴随着中国经济的复苏,很多上市家族企业取得了巨大的发展。更多的家族通过采取上市融资的措施,企业开始不断壮大,从而涌现出一大批规模庞大、实力雄厚的家族企业。对这些上市企业进行研究分析,可以发现一个相似的问题,那就是这些上市企业具有的股权都比较集中,即存在所谓家族控股的性质。由于家族企业的股东有权控制上市企业,正是这些权利的存在导致了股东不断地通过控制权力实现自身利益最大化,这样无疑造成企业的经营决策与企业自身利益最大化相背离,因此造成严重的代理问题。本文在总结学术界对该问题研究的基础上,建立家族上市公司大股东与中小股东之间代理问题的回归模型。中国家族上市公司一般是金字塔式的控股形式,现金流权和投票权在某种意义上具有分离性。其投票权和公司价值呈现出显著的负相关,而现金流权与控制权的分离率与企业价值成显著正相关。经过回归模型的研究得出,虽然股权集中在某种意义上的可以减小代理成本,不过股权的高度集中会发生大股东侵害小股东权益的情况。家族控股股东在可以有效控制公司的同时,会尽可能的攫取他人利益,就有可能转移公司内部资源,造成公司价值的下降,因此严重影响到小股东的利益。以上实证检验结果表明,在我国上市公司的大股东与中小股东之间确实存在小股东利益受大股东侵害的问题,而在家族企业中,实际控股股东是家族,从而造成更严重的权益侵占问题。随后,文章以委托代理理论和企业合约理论为基础,分析了上市家族企业大股东权益侵害的表现方式和产生原因。最后针对这些问题提出了较为细致的解决措施,并总结了文章结论。
[Abstract]:Since entering the new century, with the recovery of Chinese economy, many listed family enterprises have made great progress. More families through the adoption of public financing measures, companies began to grow, resulting in the emergence of a large number of large, powerful family businesses. Through the research and analysis of these listed enterprises, we can find a similar problem, that is, the ownership of these listed enterprises is relatively concentrated, that is, there is the nature of so-called family holding. Because the shareholders of the family enterprises have the right to control the listed enterprises, it is the existence of these rights that leads the shareholders to realize the maximization of their own interests through the power of control. This no doubt causes the deviation between the enterprise's management decision and the enterprise's own benefit maximization, thus causes the serious agency problem. On the basis of summing up the academic research on this issue, this paper establishes a regression model of the agency problem between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders of the family listed companies. Chinese family listed companies are generally pyramid holding form, cash flow rights and voting rights are separated in a sense. There is a significant negative correlation between voting rights and corporate value, and a significant positive correlation between the separation rate of cash flow right and control right and firm value. Through the study of regression model, although the concentration of equity in a certain sense can reduce the agency costs, but the high concentration of equity rights and interests of large shareholders will be infringed on minority shareholders. While controlling the company effectively, the family controlling shareholder will seize the benefit of others as much as possible, which may transfer the internal resources of the company and cause the decline of the company value, thus seriously affecting the interests of the minority shareholders. The above empirical results show that there is a problem that the interests of minority shareholders are infringed by large shareholders in Chinese listed companies, but in family enterprises, the actual controlling shareholders are families. Thus causing a more serious problem of encroachment of rights and interests. Then, based on the principal-agent theory and the enterprise contract theory, this paper analyzes the manifestation and causes of the infringement of the rights and interests of the majority shareholders in the listed family enterprises. Finally, the author puts forward some detailed measures to solve these problems, and summarizes the conclusion of the paper.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.5;F832.51

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