管理层权力、股本扩张与股利政策
发布时间:2018-08-01 14:45
【摘要】:股利政策作为上市公司的一项重要财务政策,一直以来受到人们的关注。当前我国上市公司的股利政策仍存在很多问题,部分公司的股利政策仍处在无序状态。虽然证券监管机构已经出台了许多政策法规,但股利政策的乱象仍然没有从根本上得到遏制。探究股利政策的影响因素,对规范我国股票市场、完善上市公司的公司治理具有现实意义。 本文主要从两个方面来研究股利政策的影响因素:首先是管理层权力对股利政策的影响,因为股利政策的实施会影响到管理层所能控制的现金总量,所以管理层完全有动机也有能力来影响股利政策;其次是股本扩张对股利政策的影响,因为存在股本扩张动机的上市公司可能会更倾向于股票股利的发放。本文选取了2010—2012年三年在沪深证券交易所上市并发行A股的制造业上市公司为样本,通过总经理是否兼任董事长、董事会规模、独立董事人数和管理层持股比例来衡量管理层权力的大小,以公司规模、公司上市年限、每股未分配利润和每股资本公积作为股本扩张替代变量,进而提出自己的研究假设,并通过描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析检验了本文的研究假设,从而得出研究结论,并提出改进上市公司股利政策监管的政策建议。 通过实证分析,本文发现:管理层权力的大小直接影响着上市公司股利政策的选择,上市公司股本扩张的各个衡量指标对股利政策的选择也有显著的影响。为了限制管理层满足自身利益而滥用其权力影响上市公司股利政策,有必要对管理层权力的某些方面进行限制。而对于那些股本扩张需求比较小的上市公司,有必要强化强制分红机制。只有加强对上市公司分红的要求,,才能建立良好的投资者回报机制,推动我国股票市场健康有序的发展。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy as an important financial policy of listed companies, has been paid attention to. At present, there are still many problems in the dividend policy of listed companies in China, some of which are still in disorder. Although securities regulators have issued many policies and regulations, the chaos of dividend policy has not been fundamentally contained. Exploring the influencing factors of dividend policy is of practical significance to standardize the stock market and improve the corporate governance of listed companies. This paper mainly studies the influence factors of dividend policy from two aspects: firstly, the influence of management power on dividend policy, because the implementation of dividend policy will affect the total amount of cash that management can control. Therefore, the management is fully motivated and able to influence dividend policy, followed by the impact of equity expansion on dividend policy, because the listed companies with equity expansion motivation may be more inclined to pay dividends. This paper selects the manufacturing listed companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for three years from 2010 to 2012, and the size of the board of directors through whether the general manager is also the chairman or not. The number of independent directors and the proportion of management shares to measure the size of the management power, the size of the company, the company listed years, undistributed profits per share and capital reserves per share as a substitute for equity expansion variables, and then put forward their own research assumptions. Through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis, the research hypotheses are tested, and the conclusions are drawn, and some policy suggestions to improve the regulation of dividend policy of listed companies are put forward. Through empirical analysis, this paper finds that: the size of management power directly affects the choice of dividend policy of listed companies, and each measure of equity expansion of listed companies also has a significant impact on the choice of dividend policy. In order to limit the management to satisfy their own interests and abuse their power to influence the dividend policy of listed companies, it is necessary to restrict some aspects of management power. For those listed companies with relatively small demand for equity expansion, it is necessary to strengthen the compulsory dividend mechanism. Only by strengthening the requirement of dividends of listed companies can we establish a good investor return mechanism and promote the healthy and orderly development of our stock market.
【学位授予单位】:山东财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F275;F272.91;F271
本文编号:2157912
[Abstract]:Dividend policy as an important financial policy of listed companies, has been paid attention to. At present, there are still many problems in the dividend policy of listed companies in China, some of which are still in disorder. Although securities regulators have issued many policies and regulations, the chaos of dividend policy has not been fundamentally contained. Exploring the influencing factors of dividend policy is of practical significance to standardize the stock market and improve the corporate governance of listed companies. This paper mainly studies the influence factors of dividend policy from two aspects: firstly, the influence of management power on dividend policy, because the implementation of dividend policy will affect the total amount of cash that management can control. Therefore, the management is fully motivated and able to influence dividend policy, followed by the impact of equity expansion on dividend policy, because the listed companies with equity expansion motivation may be more inclined to pay dividends. This paper selects the manufacturing listed companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for three years from 2010 to 2012, and the size of the board of directors through whether the general manager is also the chairman or not. The number of independent directors and the proportion of management shares to measure the size of the management power, the size of the company, the company listed years, undistributed profits per share and capital reserves per share as a substitute for equity expansion variables, and then put forward their own research assumptions. Through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis, the research hypotheses are tested, and the conclusions are drawn, and some policy suggestions to improve the regulation of dividend policy of listed companies are put forward. Through empirical analysis, this paper finds that: the size of management power directly affects the choice of dividend policy of listed companies, and each measure of equity expansion of listed companies also has a significant impact on the choice of dividend policy. In order to limit the management to satisfy their own interests and abuse their power to influence the dividend policy of listed companies, it is necessary to restrict some aspects of management power. For those listed companies with relatively small demand for equity expansion, it is necessary to strengthen the compulsory dividend mechanism. Only by strengthening the requirement of dividends of listed companies can we establish a good investor return mechanism and promote the healthy and orderly development of our stock market.
【学位授予单位】:山东财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.51;F275;F272.91;F271
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