基于博弈理论的证券监管效率研究
发布时间：2018-08-15 13:09
【摘要】：随着中国证券市场的发展演进，证券投资在金融市场上的地位也日益显著。而近年来的事实证明，证券市场中的违规现象屡有发生，其中以中介机构的违规为主，，更有甚者，是出现监管庇护，监管机构与中介机构狼狈为奸。在证券市场中，投资者参与市场均需要某种程度上依赖于中介机构，而中介机构凭借其专业性以及排他性，有时会做出有损投资者利益的行为。因此，近年来监管机构的监管必要性屡被提及，关于监管政策的讨论也百家争鸣。如何通过监管政策的设计，降低中介机构违规概率，提高监管机构监管效率，成为证券市场监管的一大议题。 本文旨在通过对中介机构的违规行为分析，讨论在一定监管制度框架下，中介机构的自律机制如何发挥作用，试图探讨如何通过对监管政策的完善，创建一个健康良好的市场氛围，促进中介机构自律，在监管与自律的相辅相成之下，达到监管效率最大化的最佳目标。
[Abstract]:With the development and evolution of China's securities market, the position of securities investment in the financial market is becoming increasingly prominent. The facts in recent years have proved that there are frequent irregularities in the securities market, in which the intermediary organizations mainly violate the rules, and what is more, there is a regulatory asylum, and the regulatory agencies work in concert with the intermediary organizations. In the securities market, investors' participation in the market needs to depend on the intermediary to some extent, and the intermediary, by virtue of its specialization and exclusiveness, sometimes acts against the interests of the investors. Therefore, the regulatory necessity of regulators has been repeatedly mentioned in recent years, and the debate on regulatory policy has been controversial. How to reduce the probability of agency violation and improve the efficiency of supervision has become a major issue in the regulation of securities market through the design of regulatory policy. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how to exert the self-discipline mechanism of intermediary institutions under the framework of a certain regulatory system, and try to explore how to perfect the regulatory policy by analyzing the illegal behavior of intermediary organizations. To create a healthy and good market atmosphere, promote intermediary self-discipline, and achieve the best goal of maximization of regulatory efficiency under the complementary of supervision and self-regulation.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51
[Abstract]:With the development and evolution of China's securities market, the position of securities investment in the financial market is becoming increasingly prominent. The facts in recent years have proved that there are frequent irregularities in the securities market, in which the intermediary organizations mainly violate the rules, and what is more, there is a regulatory asylum, and the regulatory agencies work in concert with the intermediary organizations. In the securities market, investors' participation in the market needs to depend on the intermediary to some extent, and the intermediary, by virtue of its specialization and exclusiveness, sometimes acts against the interests of the investors. Therefore, the regulatory necessity of regulators has been repeatedly mentioned in recent years, and the debate on regulatory policy has been controversial. How to reduce the probability of agency violation and improve the efficiency of supervision has become a major issue in the regulation of securities market through the design of regulatory policy. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how to exert the self-discipline mechanism of intermediary institutions under the framework of a certain regulatory system, and try to explore how to perfect the regulatory policy by analyzing the illegal behavior of intermediary organizations. To create a healthy and good market atmosphere, promote intermediary self-discipline, and achieve the best goal of maximization of regulatory efficiency under the complementary of supervision and self-regulation.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51
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4 刘t
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