我国地方债务的风险成因及改革路径
发布时间：2018-08-15 19:11
【摘要】：地方债务作为重要的财政工具,其使用日渐频繁与广泛。在现有财政体制下,地方债务管理的制度建设滞后于其实际使用水平,导致我国地方债务潜存着风险。除财政体制外,地方债务同时又与宏观经济调控、地方政府治理效率紧密关联,表明地方债务的制度改革既在债务管理本身,也在债务管理之外。分析我国地方债务制度的特征,探讨地方债务风险的形成机制,提出以"自我调节为主、集中调节为辅"的改革逻辑,实现"自上而下"与"自下而上"改革路径的同时并举。
[Abstract]:As an important financial tool, local debt is used more and more frequently. Under the present financial system, the construction of local debt management system lags behind its actual application level, which leads to the latent risk of local debt in our country. Besides the financial system, the local debt is closely related to the macro-economic control and the local government governance efficiency, which indicates that the system reform of the local debt is not only in the debt management itself, but also outside the debt management. This paper analyzes the characteristics of the local debt system in China, probes into the formation mechanism of the local debt risk, and puts forward the reform logic of "self-regulation as the main, centralized adjustment as the auxiliary", and realizes the reform path of "top-down" and "bottom-up" simultaneously.
【作者单位】： 中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院;
【分类号】：F812.5
[Abstract]:As an important financial tool, local debt is used more and more frequently. Under the present financial system, the construction of local debt management system lags behind its actual application level, which leads to the latent risk of local debt in our country. Besides the financial system, the local debt is closely related to the macro-economic control and the local government governance efficiency, which indicates that the system reform of the local debt is not only in the debt management itself, but also outside the debt management. This paper analyzes the characteristics of the local debt system in China, probes into the formation mechanism of the local debt risk, and puts forward the reform logic of "self-regulation as the main, centralized adjustment as the auxiliary", and realizes the reform path of "top-down" and "bottom-up" simultaneously.
【作者单位】： 中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院;
【分类号】：F812.5
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 龚强;王俊;贾s，
本文编号：2185145
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