创业板上市公司金字塔股权结构对公司效率的影响分析
发布时间：2018-10-13 07:49
【摘要】：创业板作为新兴的高科技行业,外界一直对其抱有较大期望,但是实际财务表现却差强人意,考虑到其成立时间尚短,市场风险和经营风险较大,财务绩效波动较大,此时公司效率更能反映创业板的发展实质。基于中国股权集中的现状,公司的控制权往往掌握在大股东手中,金字塔结构的出现,使公司的决策权由直接控股股东转变为隐藏在金字塔链条后的终极控制人,此时终极控制人的治理动机成为影响公司效率的主导因素。以往对于终极控制人的固有印象大多是对于公司的“侵占”行为,本文基于创业板上市公司较好的发展前景以及终极控制人创始高管身份等特征,通过研究创业板上市公司金字塔股权结构对于公司效率的影响,来探究终极控制人对于公司的治理动机,对于创业板未来的发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文以终极控制为视角,从金字塔股权结构类型和金字塔股权终极控制特征两方面,通过对终极控制人与管理层、中小股东以及利益相关者之间的代理问题进行系统地梳理,来研究其对于创业板上市公司效率的影响,在已有研究的基础上,结合创业板上市公司的特点,提出了本文的模型构建和研究假设。首先,根据金字塔股权结构类型、两类代理成本与公司效率的概念模型,分析了金字塔股权结构类型中的纵向层级和横向跨度对于公司效率的影响,并验证了在其对公司效率影响过程中,两类代理成本所起的中介作用。研究结论表明,金字塔结构类型中的纵向层级和横向跨度的增大均显著抑制两类代理成本的上升,促进公司效率的提高,两类代理成本提高的同时会显著抑制公司效率的提升,在金字塔股权结构类型影响公司效率的过程中,两类代理成本发挥显著的中介作用。其次,根据金字塔股权终极控制特征、企业社会责任与公司效率的概念模型,分析了金字塔股权终极控制权、现金流权和两权分离度对于公司效率的影响,并验证了在其对公司效率的影响过程中,企业社会责任所起的中介作用。研究结论表明,金字塔股权终极控制权、现金流权和两权分离度的增大会显著促进企业社会责任的履行,进而促进公司效率的提高,同时也验证了企业社会责任的履行对于公司效率的促进作用,在金字塔股权结构特征影响公司效率的过程中,企业社会责任发挥显著的中介作用。最后,提出在金字塔组织结构下优化创业板上市公司终极股权结构的管理启示,以期能有效防止终极控制人的自利行为,为提高创业板上市公司效率提供一定的理论依据。
[Abstract]:As a new high-tech industry, gem has been expected by the outside world, but its actual financial performance is not satisfactory. Considering its short time, market risk and management risk, financial performance fluctuates greatly. At this time, the efficiency of the company can better reflect the essence of the gem development. Based on the present situation of Chinese ownership concentration, the control of the company is often held in the hands of the major shareholders. The emergence of the pyramid structure changes the decision-making power of the company from the direct controlling shareholder to the ultimate controller hidden behind the pyramid chain. At this time, the ultimate controlling person's governance motive becomes the dominant factor that affects the company's efficiency. In the past, the traditional impression of ultimate controller is "encroachment" on the company. This paper is based on the characteristics of gem listed companies' better development prospects and the identity of the ultimate controller's founding executives, and so on. By studying the influence of pyramid ownership structure on the efficiency of the listed companies on the gem, this paper explores the governance motivation of the ultimate controller for the company and has important theoretical and practical significance for the future development of the gem. From the perspective of ultimate control, this paper systematically combs the agency problems between ultimate controller and management, minority shareholders and stakeholders from two aspects of pyramid ownership structure type and pyramid ownership ultimate control characteristics. On the basis of the existing research, combined with the characteristics of gem listed companies, this paper puts forward the model construction and research hypothesis. Firstly, according to the type of pyramid ownership structure, the conceptual model of two kinds of agency cost and company efficiency, the influence of vertical level and horizontal span of pyramid ownership structure on corporate efficiency is analyzed. It also verifies the intermediary function of the two kinds of agency cost in the process of its influence on the company efficiency. The results show that the increase of vertical level and horizontal span in pyramid structure type can significantly inhibit the increase of agency cost and promote the improvement of company efficiency, while the increase of agency cost of two types will significantly inhibit the improvement of company efficiency. In the process of pyramid ownership structure type affecting corporate efficiency, two types of agency cost play a significant intermediary role. Secondly, according to the characteristics of ultimate control of pyramid equity, the conceptual model of corporate social responsibility and corporate efficiency, this paper analyzes the influence of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights on corporate efficiency. It also verifies the intermediary role of corporate social responsibility in the process of its influence on corporate efficiency. The research results show that the increase of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights of pyramid equity will significantly promote the performance of corporate social responsibility, and then promote the improvement of corporate efficiency. At the same time, it also verifies the promotion of corporate social responsibility to corporate efficiency. Corporate social responsibility plays a significant intermediary role in the process of pyramid ownership structure affecting corporate efficiency. Finally, the paper puts forward the management enlightenment of optimizing the ultimate equity structure of gem listed companies under the pyramid organization structure, in order to effectively prevent the self-interest behavior of ultimate controllers, and to provide certain theoretical basis for improving the efficiency of gem listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：山东科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
本文编号：2267833
[Abstract]:As a new high-tech industry, gem has been expected by the outside world, but its actual financial performance is not satisfactory. Considering its short time, market risk and management risk, financial performance fluctuates greatly. At this time, the efficiency of the company can better reflect the essence of the gem development. Based on the present situation of Chinese ownership concentration, the control of the company is often held in the hands of the major shareholders. The emergence of the pyramid structure changes the decision-making power of the company from the direct controlling shareholder to the ultimate controller hidden behind the pyramid chain. At this time, the ultimate controlling person's governance motive becomes the dominant factor that affects the company's efficiency. In the past, the traditional impression of ultimate controller is "encroachment" on the company. This paper is based on the characteristics of gem listed companies' better development prospects and the identity of the ultimate controller's founding executives, and so on. By studying the influence of pyramid ownership structure on the efficiency of the listed companies on the gem, this paper explores the governance motivation of the ultimate controller for the company and has important theoretical and practical significance for the future development of the gem. From the perspective of ultimate control, this paper systematically combs the agency problems between ultimate controller and management, minority shareholders and stakeholders from two aspects of pyramid ownership structure type and pyramid ownership ultimate control characteristics. On the basis of the existing research, combined with the characteristics of gem listed companies, this paper puts forward the model construction and research hypothesis. Firstly, according to the type of pyramid ownership structure, the conceptual model of two kinds of agency cost and company efficiency, the influence of vertical level and horizontal span of pyramid ownership structure on corporate efficiency is analyzed. It also verifies the intermediary function of the two kinds of agency cost in the process of its influence on the company efficiency. The results show that the increase of vertical level and horizontal span in pyramid structure type can significantly inhibit the increase of agency cost and promote the improvement of company efficiency, while the increase of agency cost of two types will significantly inhibit the improvement of company efficiency. In the process of pyramid ownership structure type affecting corporate efficiency, two types of agency cost play a significant intermediary role. Secondly, according to the characteristics of ultimate control of pyramid equity, the conceptual model of corporate social responsibility and corporate efficiency, this paper analyzes the influence of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights on corporate efficiency. It also verifies the intermediary role of corporate social responsibility in the process of its influence on corporate efficiency. The research results show that the increase of ultimate control right, cash flow right and separation of two rights of pyramid equity will significantly promote the performance of corporate social responsibility, and then promote the improvement of corporate efficiency. At the same time, it also verifies the promotion of corporate social responsibility to corporate efficiency. Corporate social responsibility plays a significant intermediary role in the process of pyramid ownership structure affecting corporate efficiency. Finally, the paper puts forward the management enlightenment of optimizing the ultimate equity structure of gem listed companies under the pyramid organization structure, in order to effectively prevent the self-interest behavior of ultimate controllers, and to provide certain theoretical basis for improving the efficiency of gem listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：山东科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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