创业板控股股东减持研究

发布时间：2018-10-13 10:09

【摘要】：2009年10月23日创业板在深交所成立，从此正式中国的资本市场舞台。2012年10月开始，尤其是从2013年开始创业板迎来大量限售期为36个月的首发原始股东限售股解禁，使得2013年创业板限售股解禁市值一下子暴增至两千六百多亿元，数值超过了前三年创业板解禁市值的总和。从减持公告公布的情况来看，2013年的上半年创业板减持的解禁股市值达一百五十多亿元，占上半年解禁市值的16.5％，然而2012年的占比仅为13.6％。2013年8月份和9月份是创业板开板以来限售股解禁的最高峰。这些股票限售期为36个月的股东一般都是公司的控股股东或实际控制人，不仅持股比例大，解禁股数多，而且对于公司的信息披露和决策有较强的控制能力，，因而这些股东股票的解禁会对市场造成更大的冲击，对小股东和广大投资者的利益造成更大的威胁。本文以2012年10月31日起截止到2013年10月31日的一年内发生的30家公司的90起控股股东减持事件（基本集中在2013年）为研究对象，应用理论分析、统计分析以及案例研究等方法，对30家公司控股股东减持前的行为总体分析或逐个探讨。研究分为两个部分，第一部分针对30家发生减持的公司整体从减持比例、减持前公司消息的释放、减持时的股价特征及减持后的股价走势、减持时的市场反应和减持前的盈余管理等方面展开；第二部分则从30家公司中选择了一家公司从减持前消息的释放和减持前的盈余管理方面做了具体分析。本研究针对已经发生减持的30家公司的分析得出了以下结论：创业板控股股东减持比例较大且自然人股东的减持比例远远大于机构股东；创业板控股股东如果减持可能更倾向于在解禁后的短期内（一至三个月）进行减持；5月份发生的创业板控股股东减持事件最多；在控股股东减持前的一个月内公司倾向于披露好消息，而在减持后的一个月里倾向于披露坏消息，自然人控股股东相比于机构控股股东来说更倾向于在减持前前披露好消息来推高股价；创业板控股股东限售股解禁的短期内（一天至一周）内市场并未如以往文献所总结的那样做出负面反应；减持后的一至三天内市场做出了负面反应；而减持公告日后的短期（一天至一周）内市场也并未有以往文献所述的负面反应；减持后的长期（1至3个月）股价相对于减持时的股价有明显上升；有些公司有利用销售费用、管理费用和营业外收入在减持前进行盈余管理从而推高股价的嫌疑。通过对赛为智能控股股东减持的具体案例分析，分析出赛为智能有利用提前披露业绩靓丽的年报、减持前发布“高送转”利润分配消息以及减持前一季度进行盈余管理抬高股价从而在高位套现的嫌疑。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, the gem was established in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and from then on, China's capital market stage was formalized. In October 2012, especially since 2013, the gem has ushered in a large number of initial restricted shares of initial shareholders for 36 months, which have been restricted for a period of 36 months. This led to a market value of more than 2600 billion yuan in 2013, more than the total market value of the gem in the previous three years. Judging from the announcement of the reduction notice, in the first half of 2013, the value of the gem's lifting of the ban on the stock market reached more than 150 billion yuan, accounting for 16.5 percent of the market value of the lifting of the ban in the first half of the year. However, the share in 2012 was only 13.6. August and September 2013 were the highest peaks since the gem opened. The shareholders who hold the shares for 36 months are generally the controlling shareholders or actual controllers of the company. They not only hold large shares, but also have a strong ability to control the information disclosure and decision-making of the company. As a result, the lifting of these shareholder shares will have a greater impact on the market and a greater threat to the interests of minority shareholders and investors. In this paper, 90 cases of controlling shareholder reduction (mainly concentrated in 2013) that occurred in 30 companies during the year from October 31, 2012 to October 31, 2013 are used as the research objects. The methods of theoretical analysis, statistical analysis and case study are used in this paper. 30 controlling shareholders before the reduction of the behavior of the overall analysis or individual discussion. The study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the reduction ratio of 30 companies, the release of the news before the reduction, the characteristics of the stock price during the reduction and the stock price trend after the reduction. The second part selects a company from 30 companies to make a concrete analysis from the release of news before reduction and earnings management before reduction. Based on the analysis of 30 companies that have already reduced their holdings, this study draws the following conclusions: the proportion of holding reduction of gem controlling shareholders is large and the proportion of natural shareholders is much larger than that of institutional shareholders; If the gem controlling shareholders reduce their holdings, they may be more inclined to reduce their holdings in the short term (one to three months) after the lifting of the ban. The company tends to disclose good news in the month before the reduction of the controlling shareholder and the bad news in the month after the reduction. Compared with the institutional controlling shareholders, the natural person controlling shareholders tend to disclose good news before the reduction to push up the stock price; In the short term (from one day to one week), the market has not made the negative reaction as summarized in the previous literature, and the market has made the negative reaction within one to three days after the reduction. In the short term (from one day to one week) after the announcement of the reduction, the market did not have the negative reaction described in the previous literature; the long-term (one to three months) share price after the reduction was significantly higher than the stock price at the time of the reduction; some companies had utilization sales expenses. Management fees and non-operating income before the reduction of earnings management, driving up the stock price suspicion. Through the analysis of the specific cases in which the game is reduced by the intelligent controlling shareholders, the paper analyzes that the competition is the annual report of smart people who make use of early disclosure of their beautiful performance. The sell-off follows the announcement of a "high transfer" profit distribution and the suspicion that earnings management will drive up the share price to cash in at a high level in the quarter before the sale.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51

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