不同市场情形下二度价格歧视应用的数理研究

发布时间：2018-06-24 19:41

本文选题：二度价格歧视 + 需求区间分段方式　；参考：《武汉理工大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 近年来,有许多文献对二度价格歧视理论进行了比较深入的研究。目前,关于二度价格歧视理论的研究主要分为两个方面:一是在既知的需求条件下研究厂商如何对需求区间进行分段以获得最大利润;二是在线性需求条件下垄断厂商通过向消费者进行打折即固定折扣率的方法进行二度价格歧视。本文借鉴以上研究思路,站在厂商的立场上对二度价格歧视理论进行了系统的、更符合实际情况的拓展,分别对垄断厂商在非线性需求条件下的二度价格歧视问题、不同需求条件下竞争厂商二度价格歧视的纳什均衡问题以及不确定性需求条件下的二度价格歧视问题进行了较为深入的研究,并在此基础上提出了更具一般性的不确定性需求下的二度价格歧视理论模型,得出了一系列重要的结论。本文主要分为五部分:第一章为绪论,详细介绍了该学位论文的研究背景和意义、国内外文献综述、研究内容、本论文的创新之处以及本文要用的主要结论;第二章主要研究了在一类特殊的非线性需求条件下垄断厂商实施二度价格歧视的方法,给出了此需求情形下垄断厂商实施变折扣率的二度价格歧视的新模型,并通过计算机模拟证实了此模型的可行性,最后通过分析此模拟结果得出了一系列的重要结论;第三章运用完全信息静态博弈模型研究了竞争厂商需求区间实行n段划分的二度价格歧视情形,并且给出了此情形下的纳什均衡结果。结果表明,其纳什均衡结果存在依赖于两厂商产品的市场占有率,并且两厂商需求区间的分段数越多,其纳什均衡存在的必要条件要求他们的实力越接近;第四章针对实际情况将确定性需求条件下厂商处于完全垄断状态下的二度价格歧视理论研究推广到不确定性需求条件下的二度价格歧视理论研究,更进一步地研究了垄断厂商在线性随机需求条件下的二度价格歧视模型,用计算机模拟了此模型的可行性,分析模拟结果得出了一系列重要结论,最后给出了更具一般性的不确定需求条件下的二度价格歧视模型,并严格证明了此模型的可行性;第五章对全文进行总结。
[Abstract]:In recent years, there are a lot of literature on the second-degree price discrimination theory has been more in-depth research. At present, the research on the theory of second-degree price discrimination is mainly divided into two aspects: first, under the condition of known demand, how to segment the demand interval in order to obtain the maximum profit; Second, under the condition of linear demand, monopolists discriminate second price by discount to consumers, that is, fixed discount rate. Using the above research ideas for reference, this paper systematically develops the theory of second degree price discrimination from the standpoint of the manufacturer, which is more in line with the actual situation, respectively, to the problem of second degree price discrimination of monopolists under the condition of nonlinear demand. The Nash equilibrium problem of second degree price discrimination of competitive firms under different demand conditions and the second degree price discrimination problem of uncertain demand conditions are studied deeply. On this basis, a theoretical model of two-degree price discrimination with more general uncertainty is proposed, and a series of important conclusions are obtained. This paper is divided into five parts: the first chapter is the introduction, which introduces the research background and significance of the thesis, the literature review at home and abroad, the research content, the innovation of this paper and the main conclusions to be used in this paper. In the second chapter, we mainly study the method of second degree price discrimination under the condition of special nonlinear demand, and give a new model of second degree price discrimination with variable discount rate. The feasibility of the model is verified by computer simulation. Finally, a series of important conclusions are obtained by analyzing the simulation results. In chapter 3, we use the static game model of complete information to study the second degree price discrimination situation in which the demand interval of the competitive firm is divided by n-section, and give the Nash equilibrium result under this condition. The results show that the result of Nash equilibrium depends on the market share of the two manufacturers, and the more segments in the demand range of the two firms, the closer their strength is required for the existence of Nash equilibrium. The fourth chapter generalizes the theory of two-degree price discrimination under the condition of deterministic demand to the theory of second-degree price discrimination under the condition of uncertain demand. Furthermore, the two-degree price discrimination model of monopoly firms under the condition of linear stochastic demand is studied. The feasibility of this model is simulated by computer, and a series of important conclusions are obtained by analyzing the simulation results. Finally, a more general model of price discrimination under uncertain demand conditions is given, and the feasibility of the model is proved strictly. Chapter five summarizes the full text.
【学位授予单位】：武汉理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F224;F014.3

【参考文献】