航班高延误率下的我国高速铁路与民航竞争关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-11 20:45

本文选题：航班高延误率 + 高速铁路　；参考：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国2030年“八纵八横”高速铁路中长期规划方案的出台,我国高速铁路进入了高速发展阶段。高速铁路的快速发展给我国民航运输业带来了不小的冲击。而随着近年来的航班延误率的持续升高,航班延误率这一指标因素也在影响着我国高速铁路与民航之间的竞争关系。而本文基于此背景,研究了航班高延误率下的我国高速铁路与民航之间的竞争关系。本文简要介绍了高速铁路与民航竞争之间的相关理论知识,构建了航班高延误率下的旅客出行效用函数、客流分担率模型以及高速客运运营商收益函数,并将博弈论理论运用于航班高延误率下的我国高速铁路与民航竞争的场景中,主要分析了航班延误率这一指标因素对旅客出行选择的影响,同时构建了航班高延误率下的高铁路与民航竞争的双矩阵博弈模型,并将构建的双矩阵博弈模型转化为二次规划模型,同时运用Lemke-Howson算法来对模型进行求解分析。本文将航班延误率这一指标进行灵敏度分析,研究了航班不同延误率下的高铁与民航之间的竞争博弈关系。最后本文选取京沪客运通道作为实例验证了本文所建立的模型,并为高速客运运营商的运营策略提供了参考。论文的主要工作如下:(1)根据实际的高速客运市场运营情况,考虑到我国高速铁路与民航的竞争会受现实条件下的航班延误因素的影响,在考虑高速铁路与民航技术经济特征、布局分析的基础上综合分析了我国高速铁路与民航之间的竞争关系。本文基于航班延误率这一指标因素建立了旅客出行效用函数和高速客运运营商(高速铁路运营商和民航运营商)的客流分担率模型,同时建立了高速客运运营商(高速铁路运营商和民航运营商)的收益函数。(2)基于航班延误问题建立了高速铁路与民航竞争的双矩阵博弈模型,为了便于求解,本文将其转化为二次规划模型,并运用Lemke-Howson算法来求解转化后的二次规划模型。本文还将航班延误率这一指标因素进行灵敏度分析,探讨了在航班不同延误率下的高铁与民航之间的竞争博弈关系。最后运用京沪客运线作为实证分析来对本文建立的模型进行验证。最后实证分析结果表明了本文所建立的博弈模型是科学的,同时本文的研究对高速客运运营商的策略调整也具有实际指导意义。(3)本文考虑了航班高延误率下的我国高速铁路与民航之间的竞争关系,论述了在这种现实运营条件下的高速客运运营商应该如何调整策略来增大自己的收益,即高铁运营商在航班延误时应如何采取相关策略增大收益,而民航运营商又会根据高速铁路运营商采取的策略来对自己的运输产品策略进行调整,以此来达到自己的收益最大。本文分析了高速铁路与民航运输之间的竞争博弈模型,最终博弈达到一个均衡的局面,以此来为高速客运运营商提供相关的策略参考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the coming out of the medium and long term plan of "eight vertical and eight horizontal" high-speed railway in China in 2030, China's high-speed railway has entered the stage of high-speed development. The rapid development of high-speed railway has brought great impact to the civil aviation transportation industry of our country. With the increase of flight delay rate in recent years, the index factor of flight delay rate is also affecting the competition between high-speed railway and civil aviation in China. Based on this background, this paper studies the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate. This paper briefly introduces the relevant theoretical knowledge between high-speed railway and civil aviation competition, and constructs the passenger travel utility function, passenger flow sharing rate model and revenue function of high-speed passenger transport operators under the high flight delay rate. The game theory is applied to the competition between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate, and the impact of flight delay rate on passenger travel choice is analyzed. At the same time, the two-matrix game model of high-speed railway and civil aviation competition under high flight delay rate is constructed, and the two-matrix game model is transformed into quadratic programming model, and Lemke-Howson algorithm is used to solve the model. In this paper, the sensitivity analysis of flight delay rate is carried out, and the competitive game relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation under different flight delay rates is studied. Finally, this paper selects Beijing-Shanghai passenger transport channel as an example to verify the model established in this paper, and provides a reference for the operation strategy of high-speed passenger transport operators. The main work of this paper is as follows: (1) according to the actual operation of high-speed passenger transport market, considering that the competition between high-speed railway and civil aviation in China will be affected by the flight delay factors under the actual conditions, the technical and economic characteristics of high-speed railway and civil aviation are considered. On the basis of layout analysis, the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation is comprehensively analyzed. In this paper, the passenger travel utility function and the passenger flow sharing rate model of high-speed passenger carriers (high-speed railway operators and civil aviation operators) are established based on the index factor of flight delay rate. At the same time, the revenue function of high speed passenger transport operators (high speed railway operators and civil aviation operators) is established. Based on the flight delay problem, a double matrix game model of competition between high speed railway and civil aviation is established, which is easy to solve. In this paper, the quadratic programming model is transformed into a quadratic programming model, and the Lemke-Howson algorithm is used to solve the transformed quadratic programming model. This paper also analyzes the sensitivity of flight delay rate and discusses the competitive game relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation under different flight delay rates. Finally, the Beijing-Shanghai passenger line is used as an empirical analysis to verify the model established in this paper. Finally, the empirical results show that the game model established in this paper is scientific. At the same time, the study of this paper also has practical guiding significance for the strategy adjustment of high-speed passenger transport operators.) this paper considers the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate. This paper discusses how the high speed passenger transport operators should adjust their strategies to increase their income under such practical operating conditions, that is, how the high-speed rail operators should adopt relevant strategies to increase their profits when the flights are delayed. Civil aviation operators will adjust their transport product strategy according to the strategy adopted by high-speed railway operators, so as to achieve their own maximum revenue. This paper analyzes the competition game model between high-speed railway and civil aviation transportation, and finally reaches a balanced situation to provide the relevant strategic reference for high-speed passenger transport operators.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F532;F562

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