基于制衡机制的城市交通企业股权结构优化研究

发布时间：2018-11-07 18:57

【摘要】：进入后股权分置时代，我国公司治理水平不断提高，2011年公司治理指数已达60.28的最高水平。作为公司治理的重要组成部分，股东治理行为的研究成为实务界和学术界关注的热点。随着大股东数量的增多和中小股东参与程度的提高，越来越多的学者开始关注大股东之间的监督制衡机制，于是股权制衡机制的建立成为提高企业绩效水平和保护中小股东权益的重要手段。按照我国《交通运输“十二五”发展规划》的战略部署，未来五年交通企业将迎来一个“适度超前”发展的黄金时期。为顺应投资规模扩大和融资体制改革的总体趋势，交通企业应逐步建立大股东之间的制衡监督机制，提高企业的经营管理效率和价值绩效水平。鉴于此，本文在回顾股权制衡、公司治理等相关理论及国内外研究成果的基础上，立足于我国城市交通企业股权结构的现状，针对大股东的合谋与监督行为进行博弈分析，初步得出股权制衡机制有利于提高企业价值绩效水平的结论。为进一步研究股权制衡各主要变量对企业价值的影响，本文以2007年至2010年沪深两市所有城市交通类上市公司为样本，选取了主变量总资产收益率（ROA）和辅助变量净资产收益率（ROE）作为价值绩效指标，通过描述性统计、多元线性回归以及相关性检验，验证本文关于股权制衡度、第一大股东持股比例、股权均衡度、前两大股东持股差异及股东性质等变量与企业价值绩效变量之间相关性的假设是否成立。本文研究发现，在城市交通行业中，股权制衡类企业绩效好于股权集中类企业，股权集中类企业绩效又好于股权分散类企业。同时，企业股权制衡度对价值绩效水平有明显的正相关作用。前五大股东的股权分布越是均衡，企业价值水平就越高。第一大股东持股比例的适当降低可以促进企业价值绩效水平的提升。当前两位大股东的性质一致时，企业价值绩效的表现要优于其不一致时。然而，前两位大股东的持股差距对企业价值绩效没有表现出显著影响。结合实证结果，本文提出优化我国交通行业股权结构的对策建议，认为实践中应当从政府、企业和股东三个层面考虑建立股权制衡机制。监督和制衡行为的实施，不仅要有效制约大股东的侵权行为，保护中小股东权益和企业整体利益不受侵害，，而且要实现交通行业治理水平的提升、投融资体制的改革以及政策法规的完善。股权制衡机制的建立和完善能够使交通企业的股权结构朝着更加科学合理的方向发展，最终促进交通行业“十二五”战略发展目标的顺利实现。
[Abstract]:After entering the period of split share ownership, the level of corporate governance in our country has been improved continuously, and the corporate governance index has reached the highest level of 60.28 in 2011. As an important part of corporate governance, the research of shareholder governance has become a hot spot in practice and academia. With the increase of the number of large shareholders and the increase of participation of small and medium shareholders, more and more scholars begin to pay attention to the mechanism of supervision and balance between large shareholders. Therefore, the establishment of equity balance mechanism has become an important means to improve the performance of enterprises and protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders. According to the strategic arrangement of "the 12th Five-Year Plan", the transportation enterprises will usher in a golden period of "moderately advanced" development in the next five years. In order to conform to the general trend of the expansion of investment scale and the reform of financing system, traffic enterprises should gradually establish a mechanism of checks and balances between major shareholders to improve the efficiency of management and the level of value performance of enterprises. In view of this, on the basis of reviewing the relevant theories of equity balance, corporate governance and domestic and foreign research results, based on the present situation of stock ownership structure of urban transportation enterprises in China, this paper analyzes the collusion and supervision behavior of large shareholders by game theory. The conclusion that equity balance mechanism is helpful to improve enterprise value performance level. In order to further study the influence of the main variables of equity balance on the enterprise value, this paper takes all the urban transportation listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2010 as samples. The main variable total return of assets (ROA) and the auxiliary variable (ROE) are selected as value performance indicators. Through descriptive statistics, multivariate linear regression and correlation test, the paper verifies the equity balance degree in this paper. Whether the hypothesis of the correlation between the first shareholder's shareholding ratio, the equity equilibrium degree, the first two major shareholders' shareholding differences and the shareholder's nature and the enterprise value performance variable is true or not. This paper finds that in the urban transportation industry, the performance of equity balance enterprises is better than that of concentrated equity enterprises, and the performance of equity centralization enterprises is better than that of decentralized equity enterprises. At the same time, the degree of equity balance has a significant positive correlation to the level of value performance. The more balanced the equity distribution of the top five shareholders, the higher the level of enterprise value. A proper reduction in the proportion of the first largest shareholder can promote the improvement of the enterprise value performance level. When the nature of the two major shareholders is the same, the performance of enterprise value performance is better than its inconsistent performance. However, the stock holding gap between the first two major shareholders has no significant impact on corporate value performance. Combined with the empirical results, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to optimize the ownership structure of China's transportation industry, and holds that the equity balance mechanism should be considered in practice from three aspects: government, enterprise and shareholders. The implementation of supervision and checks and balances should not only effectively restrict the infringement of major shareholders, protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and the overall interests of enterprises, but also improve the level of governance in the transportation industry. The reform of investment and financing system and the perfection of policies and regulations. The establishment and perfection of equity balance mechanism can make the ownership structure of transportation enterprises develop in a more scientific and reasonable direction, and finally promote the smooth realization of the strategic development goal of the 12th Five-Year Plan of the transportation industry.
【学位授予单位】：天津理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F572;F276.6;F224.32

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