大型煤矿社区基础设施剥离改造融资分担研究

发布时间：2018-01-14 15:15

本文关键词：大型煤矿社区基础设施剥离改造融资分担研究　出处：《中国矿业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：煤炭市场不景气，已成为目前社会不争的事实，然而尽管如此，煤矿企业依然背负着沉重的办社会职能，为矿区居民提供福利，这种依靠煤矿企业提供供养的煤矿社区是我国重工业发展的产物，其遗留下来的基础设施问题也将持续困扰煤炭企业转型发展。研究了煤矿企业办基础设施职能的历史成因，并在对我国普通社区基础设施费用体系进行梳理的基础上，厘清了煤矿社区基础设施改造的瓶颈与症结。通过设计未来驱动所要达成融资目标的估值模型，使测算剥离改造所需资金缺口成为可能。基于以上对煤矿社区基础设施剥离改造问题的认识，本文借助经济学中的博弈手段研究利益相关者诉求及相互之间的矛盾，在此基础上，引入过渡园区概念对基础设施进行剥离改造，合理的从一定程度上规避剥离参与主体中政府、基础设施运营企业、煤矿企业、矿区用户之间的利益矛盾。同时在剥离模式、融资模式、运作模式等方面对剥离改造做相关探析与研究，最终实现煤矿基础设施安全平稳剥离、过渡给接收单位的剥离模式的构建。本文通过建立不完全信息下政府与煤矿企业博弈模型，并引入海萨尼转换，求解在无限期讨价还价博弈模型中的政府和煤矿企业不需要承担投资比例的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡解，转换得出两者应出的资金比例，并在权值因子判断表法的基础上，从历史责任、社会贡献、财务状况等角度实现了对出资比例的最终量化。其次，对于基础设施剥离后价格调整规制方面，应允许有一定的过渡空间，且政府必须设定价格调整规制体系及价格上限规制体系，以实现对其价格的具体管制。基于以上对基础设施剥离改造的研究，本文以煤矿社区基础设施剥离改造的全过程为主线进行研究，按照剥离改造时序为研究脉络，其中包括剥离前的影响要素、动因分析及剥离利益相关者分析，为正式剥离做准备；剥离中通过科学测算出煤矿社区基础设施剥离改造的缺口费用确定融资目标，继而确定剥离模式、融资模式、运作模式等，剥离后制定基础设施价格补偿策略，对于其价格调整规定应允许有一定的过渡空间，，以实现社会福利最大化的目标。最后，本研究选取晋煤集团古书院矿基础设施剥离改造进行研究，采用重置成本法对融资目标进行了测算，并分析了在不完全信息下政府与煤矿企业就基础设施剥离改造资金分担进行博弈，最后通过模型测算出政企合作双方的出资分配比例。
[Abstract]:The downturn in the coal market, the community has become an indisputable fact, however, the coal mine enterprise is still burdened with heavy social functions, providing for the welfare of residents in the mining area, the coal mine enterprises rely on mine community support is a product of China's heavy industry development, infrastructure issues its legacy will also continue to plague the coal enterprise restructuring and development.
Study on the historical causes of the coal mining enterprises to do infrastructure functions, and on the basis of analyzing our country ordinary community infrastructure cost system, clarify the bottleneck and the crux of reconstruction of community infrastructure. The coal mine valuation model reached a financing target by designing future to drive, the calculation of stripping the necessary transformation of the funding gap has become possible.
The above understanding of mine community infrastructure stripping transformation based on the contradiction between the interests of the game means claims of stakeholders in economics and, on this basis, the introduction of transition park concept stripping transformation of the infrastructure, reasonable from a certain extent to avoid stripping in the main government, enterprises, infrastructure the operation of coal mining enterprises, mining interests contradiction between users. At the same time stripping mode, financing mode, operation mode and related analysis and Research on the peeling transformation, finally realize the mine infrastructure smooth transition to the construction of Shi Anquan peel, the receiving unit peeling pattern.
Based on incomplete information game model of government and coal mine enterprises, and the introduction of Harsanyi transformation, solving in the bargaining game model of government and coal enterprises do not need to assume the refined Bias Nash equilibrium investment ratio, the proportion of funds should be both a conversion, and determine the weight factor based on table method, from the historical responsibility, social contribution, perspective of financial condition to achieve the ultimate quantification of the proportion of investment for infrastructure. Secondly, after peeling off the price adjustment regulation, should be allowed to have a transitional space, and the government must set the price adjustment price cap regulation system and regulation system, to achieve the specific regulation on the price.
The above infrastructure stripping modification research based on the whole process of the coal mine community infrastructure stripping the transformation of the main line to study, in accordance with the timing for stripping transformation research context, including the influence factors before stripping, stripping agent analysis and analysis of stakeholders, in preparation for the formal separation; stripping through scientific measurement gap the cost of infrastructure rebuilding community to determine the financing goal of mine stripping, and then determine the stripping mode, financing mode, mode of operation, the price of compensation for infrastructure strategy after stripping, for its price adjustment provisions should be allowed to have a transitional space, in order to achieve the maximization of social welfare.
Finally, this study chooses Jincheng Gushuyuan Mine infrastructure stripping transformation of the replacement cost method to calculate the financing target, and analyzed in the incomplete information of government and coal mine infrastructure reconstruction funds sharing stripping game, finally through the model to calculate the contribution proportion of government enterprise cooperation between the two sides.

【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F299.24;F285

【共引文献】