股权结构视角下负债融资对公司过度投资行为治理作用的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-27 00:27

本文关键词： 负债融资债务期限结构债务存量水平过度投资行为国有控股控制权和现金流权分离　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资和融资是企业的两项基本的财务活动,它们既相互独立,又休戚相关,是企业资金运动中不可分割的两个方面。市场经济条件下,负债即是企业的一种重要的融资来源,同时也是一种重要的治理机制,其与企业投资之间的关系成为许多学者研究的热点。不同于西方国家比较完善的市场经济体制下发达的信贷体制和债券市场,我国的市场经济发展还在初级阶段,其债券市场还处在一个探索和发展的时期,加之我国银行的发展历程和发展模式也不同于西方国家,使得我国的信贷市场也区别与发达的信贷市场。总体来说,我国企业的债务融资渠道还不健全,银企关系也比较复杂,将外国的研究理论和成果直接移植到我国缺乏说服力。目前也有许多学者结合我国特殊的投融资环境来阐述负债是否能够发挥其治理机制,起到抑制过度投资的作用。但遗憾的是,目前实证结果存在诸多矛盾之处,相关结论仍然有待检验。本文拟在在梳理国内外相关文献的基础上,借鉴他们的理论模型和研究方法,以我国制造业上市公司的数据为样本来实证检验负债融资对企业过度投资行为的治理作用。本文的主要研究内容如下：第一部分为导论。这部分主要介绍研究背景和研究意义,引出本文研究的主要问题。目前我国的债务融资环境如债券市场、银行贷款制度等虽然有所发展,但是还不够完善,预算软约束等问题导致我国上市公司特别是国有上市公司可能存在过度投资的问题。研究我国目前负债治理的现状对于改善企业资源合理配置,提高企业价值有着深刻的意义。本文主要研究负债治理的三个关键问题：一是对比过度投资样本和投资不足样本,验证不同期限的债务对过度投资的影响；二是研究过度投资的企业样本,验证负债融资是否有效抑制了企业的过度投资行为；三是研究不同的股权结构是否会影响负债的治理作用,验证在国有控股和股权集中背景下大股东控制权和现金流权的分离是否会阻碍负债的治理作用得到发挥。第二部分为文献综述。在这一部分本文分别整理总结了国内和国外的学者在负债融资与企业投资行为领域的研究成果。在国外研究中,本文分别就负债的代理成本问题、负债的相机治理作用、负债期限与企业投资行为的关系进行了研究综述；在国内研究中,学者的研究主要集中在研究我国目前的债务融资环境下过度投资现象是否存在,以及负债融资是否能够发挥对过度投资的治理作用,本文对相关文献做了归纳和总结后遗憾的发现,对于这个问题实证研究没有定论。在文献综述的最后一部分,本文对国内外文献做了进一步的评述,归纳了目前国内外学者对负债融资与企业投资行为关系的研究成果。第三部分为本文的理论分析。这一部分本文对涉及到的主要理论基础进行了阐述,并在此基础上分析了负债融资作用于企业投资行为的机理。按照代理理论,企业内部股东——经理之间的冲突容易引起过度投资行为,而公司与外部负债之间的冲突则会导致投资不足和资产替代的产生。在股东和经理代理问题严重的公司中,负债可以通过增加利息、信贷配给以及签订严格的债务契约等措施加强治理,使得由此产生的投资不足倾向可以抵消债务人过度投资的动机,抑制过度投资。另外,投资不足的企业还会倾向选择短期债务进行融资,由此缓解企业与外部负债之间的冲突产生的投资不足问题。在发达国家中,由于债券评级制度健全,银行放贷较为谨慎,法律法规比较健全等原因,一般学者研究负债的代理成本引起投资不足的假设；而对于发展中国家的新兴市场,由于债券和银行市场不发达,预算软约束存在,一般学者研究负债的治理效应抑制过度投资假设。我国属于发展中国家新兴市场,加之银行和国有企业的产权同源性可能使得过度投资问题更加严重,所以负债对过度投资行为是否起到抑制作用成为研究焦点。第四部分为本文的实证检验部分。首先,提出本文的四个假设。假设1：在我国普遍存在长期负债引发的过度投资问题。假设2：在我国,负债融资对过度投资的约束作用较弱。假设3：在国有控股企业中,长期负债引起的过度投资问题更严重,同时负债融资对过度投资的约束作用更弱。假设4：控股股东控制权和现金流权分离的公司,长期负债引起的过度投资问题更严重,同时负债融资对过度投资的约束作用较弱。其次,以2007——2012年制造业上市公司的数据为样本,用债务期限结构模型和债务存量水平模型对提出的假设进行了实证检验。最后,对检验结果进行的分析和归纳。第五部分通过分析实证结果给出了本文的研究结论以及政策建议,提出了相关领域研究的进一步展望。结论如下：在我国,企业普遍存在着长期负债引起的过度投资行为,同时债务的存量水平与过度投资规模之间的负相关关系不显著,说明负债融资对过度投资行为的治理作用较弱,负债的预算软约束现象在某种程度上仍然存在；在区分企业控制权性质后,发现国有控股企业中负债融资对过度投资行为的约束作用更弱；在股权集中背景下,考察控股股东控制权和现金流权的分离对负债治理作用的影响,发现在控制权和现金流权分离的公司,负债融资对过度投资的约束作用更弱。根据此结论,本文提出提高我国负债融资对过度投资行为约束作用的建议。第一,应减少国家对负债治理作用的干预,减少国有股份在企业中的比例,特别减少国家控股公司的数量。第二,应规范上市公司控股股东的行为,防止大股东利用金字塔结构进行过度投资,损害中小股东利益,阻碍公司的健康发展。本文的创新之处在于：第一,从国内的研究现状来看,人们普遍认为负债融资会影响到企业的投资行为,研究比较多的是负债融资水平与企业投资规模的负相关关系,这并不同于本文所研究的负债融资对过度投资行为的治理作用。本文利用最优投资预测模型拟合出企业的过度投资水平,在此基础上研究债务存量水平对过度投资规模的约束作用,验证负债融资的治理作用在我国是否有效。第二,目前很少有研究从债务期限结构角度探讨负债融资与企业过度投资的关系。根据Myers(1977)的理论,长期负债更容易引起企业过度投资行为,而短期负债则可以缓解负债融资导致的代理成本。因此在负债对过度投资的治理作用弱时,企业应该可以更多地利用长期负债进行融资。本文利用债务期限结构模型对这一假设进行了检验,证明长期负债的增加加剧了过度投资的规模。第三,在目前上市公司股权集中的背景下,通过理论推导证明了股权集中背景下大股东——中小股东冲突和股权分散背景下股东——经理冲突的一致性。并利用控股股东控制权和现金流权是否分离来度量大股东——中小股东冲突的程度,证明了股权集中背景下控股股东控制权和现金流权的分离会导致负债融资对过度投资行为的约束作用更弱。本文的不足之处在于：第一,企业的投资行为表现是多方面的,如投资过度、投资不足、资产替代等。介于我国债权市场的不发达,国有股权的存在导致的预算软约束问题严重,企业普遍存在过度投资的行为,因此本文仅研究了负债融资对投资过度的治理作用,并没有分析负债融资的产生代理成本对企业投资不足和资产替代行为的影响。第二,企业投资规模的度量也是多方面的,不仅如本文研究的,表现为投资支出的绝对量,还会体现在投资波动性等方面,这些都是本文没有涉及到的。第三,研究样本问题。本文研究样本的局限性体现在以下几个方面：选择2007——2012年制造业公司的数据作为样本,虽然在一定程度上避免了研究宏观政策(如房地产企业很容易受到宏观经济调控而产生投资规模的变化,新兴行业也比较容易受到市场不稳定性的影响)变动的影响,但是也造成了对其他行业的忽略；本文所用的大股东控制权和现金流权分离度直接取自CSMAR数据库,此变量的缺失也导致了一部分研究样本的损失,使得回归结果可能会受到影响；上市公司一般为大型企业,相比中小型企业来说,比较容易得到信贷资源的支持,由于其他大量非上市的中小型民营企业并没有纳入本文样本,使得研究成果存在偏差。
[Abstract]:Investment and financing are two basic financial activities of enterprises, they are both independent and bound together in a common cause is two aspects, indivisible enterprise capital movement. Under the condition of market economy, debt is an important source of financing for enterprises, but also an important governance mechanism, the relationship between it and business investment has become the focus of many scholars. Different from western countries relatively perfect market economy developed credit system and the bond market, still in the primary stage of development of market economy in our country, the bond market is still in a period of exploration and development, coupled with the development process and development mode of China's banks is also different in western countries, making China's credit market is different with developed credit markets. Overall, our corporate debt financing channel is not perfect, the relationship between banks and enterprises is relatively complex, foreign The research theories and achievements are directly transplanted to our country's lack of persuasion.
At present, there are many scholars, combined with China's special financing environment to explain whether the debt can play its governance mechanism to curb excessive investment. But unfortunately, there exist many contradictions in the empirical results, the conclusion remains to be tested. This paper based on the literature at home and abroad, reference the theoretical model and their research methods, empirical test sample to governance effect of debt financing on corporate over investment behavior in listed companies of China's manufacturing industry data.
The main contents of this paper are as follows:
The first part is the introduction. This part mainly introduces the research background and significance of the research, this study leads to major problems. China's current debt financing environment such as bond market, bank loan institution, although some development, but is still not perfect, the soft budget constraint problem in the listed companies especially the state-owned listed companies there may be excessive the issue of investment research. China's current status of debt governance to improve the rational allocation of corporate resources, it has profound significance to improve enterprise value. This paper mainly studies three key problems of Debt Governance: a comparison of excessive investment and insufficient investment in sample sample, verify the different period of the debt of over investment; two is the sample study on over investment of enterprises, verify whether debt financing can effectively restrain the excessive investment behavior of enterprises; the three is whether the ownership structure of different It will affect the governance function of liabilities, and verify whether the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of large shareholders under the state holding and ownership concentration background will hinder the governance role of liabilities.
The second part is literature review. In this part, this paper summarizes the research achievements in the field of domestic and foreign scholars to invest in debt financing and corporate behavior. In the research abroad, this paper respectively on the agency cost of debt, debt governance role, the relationship between debt maturity and corporate investment behavior are reviewed; in the domestic research, scholars mainly focus on the excessive in the study of China's current debt financing environment investment phenomenon exists, and whether debt financing can play a role in corporate governance of over investment, this paper found and summarized after the regret of the relevant literature, the empirical research in an inconclusive. The last part of the literature review, the literature at home and abroad were further reviewed, summarized the current domestic and foreign scholars on debt financing and investment bank Research results for the relationship.
The third part is the analysis of the theory of this paper. This part of the paper elaborates the main theoretical basis involved, and based on the analysis of the mechanism of the role of debt financing on corporate investment behavior. According to the agency theory, the internal conflict between shareholders, managers easily lead to excessive investment behavior, and the conflict between the company and the external debt it will lead to insufficient investment and asset substitution. The shareholders and the manager agency problems in the company, debt can be increased through interest rate, credit rationing and signed a strict debt contract and other measures to strengthen governance, so that the resulting underinvestment tendency can be offset by the debtor of excessive investment, to curb excessive investment. In addition, investment the lack of enterprises will tend to choose short-term debt financing, thus alleviate the conflict between the enterprise and the external liabilities of investment is not Foot problem. In developed countries, the bond rating system, bank loans are more cautious, sound laws and regulations and other reasons, the agency cost of general scholars liabilities caused by lack of investment assumptions; and for emerging markets in developing countries, because the bonds and bank market is not developed, there are soft budget constraints, the governance effect of general scholars the debt to curb excessive investment assumptions. China is a developing country and emerging market, coupled with the bank and the state-owned enterprise's property right homology may make the over investment problem is more serious, so the debt of over investment behavior is to restrain become the focus of research.
The fourth part is the empirical part of this paper. First, then put forward four hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: overinvestment problem in our country exists generally long-term liabilities caused. Hypothesis 2: in our country, weak restriction effect of debt financing on excessive investment. Hypothesis 3: in state-owned enterprises, long-term over investment caused by the debt is more serious, at the same time restriction effect of debt financing on excessive investment is weaker. Hypothesis 4: controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights separation company, over investment of long-term liabilities caused by more serious, at the same time, the debt financing on excessive investment constraint is weak. Secondly, from 2007 to 2012 listed companies in the manufacturing industry as the sample data, an empirical test on the hypothesis of the debt maturity structure of debt stock model and level model. Finally, analysis and summary of the test results.
The fifth part presents the conclusion and policy recommendations of this study empirical analysis results, put forward the prospect of further research in the related field. The conclusions are as follows: in our country, enterprises generally exist over investment behavior of long-term liabilities caused by the negative correlation between the debt stock level and over investment scale is not significant, so the debt financing the governance effect is weaker over investment behavior, the phenomenon of soft budget constraint debt still exists in some extent; in distinguishing the nature of the right of corporate control, found in state-owned enterprises debt financing constraint on over investment behavior is weaker; in the ownership context, the influence of the separation of controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights on the governance role of debt, flow right in the separation of control rights and cash, debt financing constraint on over investment is weak. The root According to the conclusion, this paper puts forward to improve China's debt financing on the over investment behavior constraint suggestions. First, should reduce the state intervention in the governance role of debt, reduce the proportion of state-owned shares in the enterprise, especially to reduce the number of state-controlled companies. Second, the controlling shareholder of listed companies should standardize the behavior, prevent the use of large shareholders the structure of Pyramid excessive investment, damage the interests of minority shareholders, and hinder the healthy development of the company.
The innovation of this paper lies in: first, from the domestic research, people generally believe that debt financing will affect the investment behavior of enterprises, study is a negative correlation between the level of debt financing and corporate investment, this is different to the research on debt financing governance over investment behavior. In this paper, using the optimal investment model fitted over the level of investment enterprises, on the basis of the research on the debt stock level constraint on excessive investment scale, the governance role of debt financing in our country to verify whether it is effective. Second, there have been few studies from the perspective of relationship between the debt maturity structure of debt financing and corporate over investment. According to the Myers (1977) the theory of long-term liabilities is more likely to cause excessive investment behavior of enterprises, while the short-term debt can reduce the agency costs of debt financing lead. Because In the governance role of debt of over investment is weak, the enterprise should make more use of long-term debt financing. This hypothesis is tested by using the model of debt maturity structure, that long-term debt exacerbated by increased excessive investment scale. In third, the shares of listed companies concentrated in the background, through theoretical derivation proof of ownership concentration consistency of large shareholders and small shareholders conflict under the background of shareholder, manager of dispersed ownership conflict under the background. And the controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights are separated to measure large shareholders, small shareholders of the extent of the conflict, proof of ownership concentration under the background of controlling shareholders separation of control rights and cash flow rights the causes of debt financing constraint on over investment behavior is weaker.
The inadequacies of this article are: first, the investment behavior of enterprises is expressed in many aspects, such as excessive investment, insufficient investment, asset substitution. Between China's market is not developed, the soft budget constraint of state-owned shares due to the existence of serious, enterprises generally have over investment behavior, so the paper only studies the governance role of debt financing on excessive investment, and has no influence analysis of the agency costs of debt financing on corporate investment and asset substitution behavior. Second, measure the investment scale of the enterprise is in many aspects, such as not only the absolute amount, for the performance of the investment expenditure, but also reflected in the fluctuation of investment etc. These are not involved in this paper. Third, the research sample. The limitations of this study sample is reflected in the following aspects: 2007 - Industry Company in 2012 manufacturing data As a sample, although to a certain extent to avoid the study of macro policy (change, such as real estate enterprises are vulnerable to macroeconomic regulation and the scale of investment in emerging industries are more likely to be influenced by market instability) changes, but also caused the neglect of other industries; the control of large shareholders right and the separation of cash flow rights directly from the CSMAR database, the absence of this variable has lead to a partial loss of samples, the regression results may be affected; listed companies generally compared to large enterprises, small and medium enterprises, easier access to credit resources to support, because many other unlisted small and medium private enterprises are not included in the sample, the research results of the deviation.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F271;F406.7

【参考文献】