土地储备成本控制研究

发布时间：2018-01-27 08:29

本文关键词： 土地储备土地储备成本成本控制激励约束机制信息不对称　出处：《华中科技大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：土地储备制度的建立是我国土地管理制度的重要变革，诞生以来为城市的建设和发展带来强大的动力。但是从整体上看，我国土地储备收益率不高，在现有的土地出让制度下，，提高土地储备效益的关键是控制成本。本文对土地储备成本控制体系、方法进行总结探讨，为政府控制土地储备成本提供理论支持。本文首先介绍了我国土地储备制度的变迁，土地储备制度的意义，土地储备制度的运行，分析土地储备与城市建设之间的关系。其次，论文界定了土地储备成本构成，分析了成本影响因素，并以武汉市为例对土地取得成本测算、现有土地成本控制体系进行了总结分析。再次，针对土地储备机构缺乏成本控制的积极性的问题，探讨了建立成本控制激励约束机制的主要障碍和基本条件，分析建立成本控制激励约束机制的可行性。然后，对激励机制进行设计：激励合同宜采用成本加酬金合同，以联合确定基数法确定土地储备的目标成本，建立委托代理模型给出分享系数和惩罚系数的确定方法。最后，对土地储备成本控制约束机制进行了设计，包括：不诚信行为的惩罚机制，资金监督机制，成本信息披露机制，法律约束机制，社会监管机制等。本文研究了土地储备成本构成及控制体系，对成本控制的激励约束机制进行设计，具有较强的实践性和操作性，对解决土地储备机构成本控制动力不足的问题起到一定的作用。
[Abstract]:The establishment of the land reserve system is an important reform of the land management system in China, which has brought a strong impetus for the construction and development of the city since its birth. But on the whole, the rate of return on the land reserve in our country is not high. Under the present land transfer system, the key to improve the benefit of land reserve is to control the cost. It provides theoretical support for the government to control the cost of land reserve. This paper first introduces the changes of land reserve system in China, the significance of land reserve system, the operation of land reserve system, and analyzes the relationship between land reserve and urban construction. The paper defines the composition of land reserve cost, analyzes the factors affecting the cost, and takes Wuhan as an example to estimate the cost of land acquisition, and the existing land cost control system is summarized and analyzed. In view of the lack of enthusiasm for cost control in land reserve institutions, this paper discusses the main obstacles and basic conditions of establishing cost control incentive and constraint mechanism, and analyzes the feasibility of establishing cost control incentive and constraint mechanism. The incentive mechanism is designed: the incentive contract should adopt the cost plus reward contract and determine the target cost of the land reserve by the method of joint determination base. A principal-agent model is established to determine the sharing coefficient and punishment coefficient. Finally, the constraint mechanism of land reserve cost control is designed, including: dishonest behavior punishment mechanism, capital supervision mechanism. Cost information disclosure mechanism, legal restraint mechanism, social supervision mechanism and so on. This paper studies the structure and control system of land reserve cost, designs the incentive and constraint mechanism of cost control, and has strong practicality and maneuverability. It plays a certain role in solving the problem of insufficient power of cost control in land reserve institutions.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F301.2;F302.6

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