我国上市商业银行内部治理结构对信用风险的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-12 14:56

本文关键词： 商业银行内部治理结构信用风险　出处：《上海师范大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：商业银行作为一种特殊的企业,其在一国金融乃至整个经济体系中的地位是相当重要的。从金融体系来说,商业银行是中央银行货币政策的首要传递者。从整个经济体系来看,商业银行是现代社会经济运转的枢纽之商业银行能否稳健经营关系到整个社会经济的良好运行。08年爆发于美国的次贷危机,给全球经济带来了严重的影响,其背后主要的原因是贷款机构向次级贷款者贷款产生的巨大信用风险。商业银行因为承担风险而存在,但是频繁发生的银行危机也使人们认识到控制信用风险的重要性。完善的公司治理结构是银行实现风险防范的前提和基础,因此我国商业银行必须建立科学、有效的内部治理结构,才能从根本上加强银行的信用风险防范能力。近些年来,我国商业银行纷纷上市,存贷款总额平稳增加,截至2012年底,银行业金融机构本外币各项存款余额为94.3万亿元,各项贷款余额为67.3万亿元：资本实力明显上升,资产质量稳定,不良贷款率不断下降,这些都是股份制改造产生的积极影响。但是我国商业银行在公司治理方面仍存在许多问题和不足,要想从根本上降低银行的信用风险,就必须从银行自身的治理出发,完善商业银行的内部治理结构。本文基于我国商业银行的发展现状,在阅读大量相关文献的基础上,分析了我国商业银行内部治理结构对信用风险的影响,然后选取了14家上市银行2007至2012年的年度数据为样本,通过面板数据模型进行了实证分析。本文的主要内容可以分为以下几个方面：第一部分是导论,主要介绍了本文的研究背景、目的、意义、内容、方法,研究结构,以及本文的主要贡献。第二部分是相关理论与文献综述,该部分首先介绍了公司治理的理论基础,然后对公司治理结构及信用风险理论进行了详细的阐述,最后对国内外关于银行公司治理对信用风险影响的相关文献进行了归纳和阐述。第三部分是银行内部治理结构对信用风险影响的理论分析,该部分将我国商业银行的内部治理结构分为股权结构、董事会治理、监事会治理、激励约束机制四个部分,在总结前人分析成果的基础上分别阐述了这四部分对银行信用风险的影响。第四部分是银行内部治理结构对信用风险的实证分析,该部分选取我国14家上市银行2007-2012年的数据为样本,把不良贷款率作为被解释变量来衡量信用风险,解释变量则选取股权集中度、股权构成、董事会规模、独立董事占比、董事会会议次数、监事会规模、监事会会议次数、高管薪酬及是否持股来衡量银行内部治理结构。此外,还将资产规模作为控制变量来进行研究。最后,本文根据前面的理论分析及实证分析结果对完善银行内部治理结构及防范信用风险提出了一些建议。第五部分是结论,该部分首先对第四章的实证结果进行归纳总结,得出以下结论：在股权结构方面,前三大股东持股比例之和与银行信用风险显著负相关,国有股比例与信用风险显著正相关；在董事会结构方面,董事会人数与信用风险显著负相关,独立董事占比与信用风险的关系不明显,董事会会议次数与信用风险的关系不显著：监事会结构方面,监事会人数与信用风险显著负相关,监事会会议次数与信用风险的关系不显著；在激励约束机制方面,高管薪酬与信用风险的关系不显著,管理层持股与信用风险显著正相关。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks as a special enterprise, its role in a country's financial system and the whole economy is very important. From the financial system, commercial bank is the first transfer of the central bank's monetary policy. From the whole economic system, commercial bank is the pivot of the modern social economy
The commercial bank could be related to the healthy operation of the entire social economy of the smooth operation of the.08 outbreak of the subprime crisis in the US, has brought the serious influence to the global economy, the main reason behind it is a huge credit risk of lending institutions to subprime borrowers of loans from commercial banks. But because of the risk, but the importance of the frequent occurrence of bank the crisis also makes people realize the control of credit risk. Perfect corporate governance structure is the precondition and foundation of bank risk prevention, so China's commercial banks must establish a scientific and effective internal governance structure, to strengthen the bank's credit risk prevention ability fundamentally.
In recent years, China's commercial banks have listed, deposits and loans increased steadily, as of the end of 2012, the balance of foreign currency deposits in the banking financial institutions 94 trillion and 300 billion yuan, the loan balance of 67 trillion and 300 billion yuan, capital strength increased significantly, stable asset quality, non-performing loan ratio continued to decline, these are the positive influence of joint-stock production the Commercial Bank of our country. But there are still many problems and shortcomings in corporate governance, in order to reduce the bank's credit risk fundamentally, we must start from the bank's own management, improve the internal governance structure of commercial banks.
In this paper, the current development of China's commercial banks based on, based on reading a lot of literature, analysis of the impact of the internal governance structure of China's commercial banks to credit risk, then selects the annual data of 14 listed banks from 2007 to 2012 as a sample, we make an empirical analysis of panel data model. The main contents of this paper can is divided into the following areas:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background, purpose, meaning, content, method, structure and main contribution of this paper.
The second part is the related theory and literature review, this part first introduces the basic theory of corporate governance, and then expatiates on the corporate governance structure and credit risk theory, finally at home and abroad on the influence of corporate governance on bank credit risk related literatures were summarized and discussed.
The third part is the analysis of the theory of bank internal governance structure on the influence of credit risk, the part of the internal governance structure of commercial banks in China is divided into the ownership structure, board governance, governance of the board of supervisors, the four part of the incentive and restraint mechanism, the four part of the impact on the banking credit risk are discussed based on the previous analysis results the.
The fourth part is the empirical analysis of the bank's internal governance structure of credit risk, this part selects the data of 14 listed banks in China for 2007-2012 years as a sample, the non-performing loan ratio as explanatory variables to measure the credit risk, the explanatory variables from ownership concentration, equity structure, board size, proportion of independent directors. The number of meetings of the board of supervisors, the scale, the number of meetings of the board of supervisors, executive compensation and shareholding to measure the bank's internal governance structure. In addition, also to study the asset size as the control variables. Finally, this paper according to the results of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to improve the bank's internal governance structure and put forward some prevention of credit risk advice.
The fifth part is the conclusion. The first part of the fourth chapter of the empirical results are summarized, the following conclusions: in terms of ownership structure, the proportion of top three shareholders and bank credit risk is significantly negatively correlated, positively correlated with the proportion of state-owned shares in credit risk; the structure of the board of directors, the board of directors and the credit number the risk of a significant negative correlation, independent directors accounted for less than the relationship with credit risk, the relationship between the number of meetings of the board and the credit risk is not significant: the supervisory board structure, the number of supervisors and the credit risk of a significant negative correlation between the number of meetings of the board of supervisors and the credit risk is not significant; the relationship between executive incentive and restraint mechanism. Pay with credit risk is not significant, positive correlation of managerial ownership and credit risk.

【学位授予单位】：上海师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33;F830.42

【参考文献】