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分析师关注、职业声誉对会计信息透明度的影响研究

发布时间:2018-04-09 16:42

  本文选题:分析师关注 切入点:分析师职业声誉 出处:《安徽大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:信息披露是缓解委托代理问题、降低信息不对称程度的有效机制。信息披露的透明度是公司治理机制有效运行的前提,能够强化外部市场对企业内部控制人行为的约束,对于保护投资者利益和促进资源有效配置具有举足轻重的作用。有关会计信息透明度影响因素的研究一直是财务会计领域学术研究的热点问题。本文从委托代理理论、信号传递理论和声誉理论出发,将证券分析师作为企业外部治理机制的一部分,运用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法考察了证券分析师关注及其职业声誉对会计信息透明的影响。 本文共分为五部分。第一部分为绪论,介绍了在现行背景下本文的研究意义、研究思路和研究方法、回顾了会计信息透明度影响因素和分析师行为经济后果的相关文献。第二部分为本文研究的理论基础,对研究对象的相关概念进行界定并对委托代理理论、信号传递理论和声誉理论等进行阐述。第三部分是理论分析与假设,对我国会计信息披露质量和分析师行业发展的现状进行了描述,论述了证券分析师关注及其职业声誉影响会计信息透明度的作用机理并在此基础上提出了本文的研究假设。第四部分为实证研究,本文选取2003-2012年深圳证券交易所上市公司的6134个观测值作为研究样本,运用Logistics和Ordered Logistics回归方法,对本文提出的假设进行了实证检验。第五部分为研究结论与政策建议。研究发现:(1)证券分析师关注与企业会计信息透明度显著正相关,说明分析师作为一种重要的公司外部治理机制,发挥了监督与约束管理层的作用,显著提升了上市公司会计信息透明度;(2)证券分析师职业声誉与企业会计信息透明度显著正相关,说明作为一种传递分析师专业水准和职业道德的信号,分析师的职业声誉对企业会计信息透明度的提高有显著的促进作用。
[Abstract]:Information disclosure is an effective mechanism to alleviate the principal-agent problem and reduce the degree of information asymmetry.The transparency of information disclosure is the premise of the effective operation of the corporate governance mechanism, which can strengthen the external market constraints on the behavior of the internal controller of the enterprise, and play an important role in protecting the interests of investors and promoting the effective allocation of resources.The research on the influencing factors of accounting information transparency has always been a hot issue in the field of financial accounting.Based on the principal-agent theory, signaling theory and reputation theory, this paper regards securities analysts as part of the external governance mechanism.By combining normative research with empirical research, this paper investigates the influence of securities analysts' attention and professional reputation on accounting information transparency.This paper is divided into five parts.The first part is the introduction, which introduces the significance of the research, the research ideas and research methods, and reviews the relevant literature on the influencing factors of accounting information transparency and the economic consequences of analysts' behavior.The second part is the theoretical basis of this study, defining the related concepts of the object of study and explaining the principal-agent theory, signal transfer theory and reputation theory.The third part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis, describes the quality of accounting information disclosure and the current situation of the development of the analyst industry in China.This paper discusses the mechanism of securities analysts' concern and their professional reputation influencing the transparency of accounting information, and puts forward the research hypotheses of this paper.The fourth part is empirical research. This paper selects 6134 observations of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 as the research sample, and uses Logistics and Ordered Logistics regression method to test the hypothesis put forward in this paper.The fifth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations.The study found that the concerns of securities analysts are significantly positively related to the transparency of corporate accounting information, indicating that analysts, as an important external governance mechanism of a company, play a role in supervising and constraining management.There is a significant positive correlation between the professional reputation of securities analysts and the transparency of corporate accounting information, indicating that as a signal of professional standards and professional ethics of analysts, securities analysts' professional reputation is positively correlated with the transparency of accounting information of listed companies.The professional reputation of analysts has a significant role in promoting the transparency of accounting information.
【学位授予单位】:安徽大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F233;F275

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