高新技术制造业与传统制造业上市公司股权激励效果对比研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 02:22

本文选题：制造业 + 高新技术　；参考：《信阳师范学院》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：本研究通过建立线性回归方程模型分别对我国2007年至2012年问高新技术制造业及传统制造业上市公司高级管理人员股权激励机制实施效果进行实证研究及对比研究,研究结果显示：高级管理人员股权激励机制的实施在我国高新技术类制造业上市公司中效果不显著,而在传统类制造业上市公司中显著有效。高新技术制造业上市公司担负着科技成果产业化重任,在我国全面实现现代化进程中具备及其重要的战略地位,然而管理团队则肩负引领研发团队与制定企业重大发展战略的双重责任,其激励机制高效性至关重要。国内诸多关于股权激励机制有效性的研究结论存在较大争议,而且尚无将高新技术类制造业上市公司单独作为研究对象的针对性研究。本次研究将我国2007年至2012年于深沪上市的制造业公司样本依照其产品技术密集度予以分类,分别对我国的高新技术制造业(实验组)及传统制造业(对照组)上市公司高管股权激励机制的实施效果进行检验,并将回归分析的结果结合两样本群的独立样本T检定,综合分析并揭示导致二者差异的关键因素。由于原先诸多相关的实证研究往往因研究样本数据质量不高(样本量不足或存在大量遗漏值)、所建模型涉及变量不全或者变量纳入不当导致了研究结论信度不高,且差异较大,因此本研究所构建模型综合所有相关研究中所涉及变量,同时剔除已被先前研究验证过的,与结论无关的无效变量,以确保模型完善程度。通过实证分析发现：高新技术制造业样本群中股权激励实施效果不显著,而在传统制造业组中效果良好。通过对比研究发现：与传统制造业上市公司相比,高管持股结构分散、资产规模偏小、资产负债率低、短期市盈率高以及国有企业占比较高等因素将制约高新技术类制造业上市公司股权激励机制的实施效果。因此在高新技术制造业上市公司中应适度降低资产负债率,依据自身境况优化股权结构,完善高管股权授予机制并探索其它有效激励机制,适当延长禁售期、大力推广阶梯式等待期激励模式特别是加速行权激励模式,其中中央企业均应进一步深化改革,完全彻底地引入市场竞争机制。
[Abstract]:Through the establishment of linear regression equation model, this paper makes an empirical and comparative study on the effect of equity incentive mechanism of senior managers in high-tech manufacturing and traditional manufacturing companies in China from 2007 to 2012. The results show that the implementation of the equity incentive mechanism for senior managers is not significant in the high-tech manufacturing listed companies in China, but significantly effective in the traditional manufacturing listed companies. The listed companies of high-tech manufacturing industry shoulder the heavy task of industrialization of scientific and technological achievements, and have an important strategic position in the process of realizing the modernization in an all-round way in our country. However, the management team shoulders the dual responsibility of leading the R & D team and formulating the major development strategy of the enterprise, and the efficiency of its incentive mechanism is very important. Many domestic research conclusions on the effectiveness of equity incentive mechanism are controversial, and there is no specific research on high-tech manufacturing listed companies as the research object. In this study, samples of manufacturing companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2007 to 2012 were classified according to their product technology intensity. The effect of executive equity incentive mechanism in Chinese high-tech manufacturing (experimental group) and traditional manufacturing (control group) is tested, and the results of regression analysis are combined with independent sample T test of two sample groups. Comprehensive analysis and reveal the key factors leading to the difference between the two. Because of the low quality of sample data (insufficient sample size or a large number of missing values) and the incomplete variables or improper inclusion of variables, the reliability of the research conclusions is not high, and the difference is great. Therefore, this study constructs a model that synthesizes all the variables involved in the relevant studies, while eliminating the invalid variables that have been verified by previous studies, which are independent of the conclusions, in order to ensure the perfection of the model. Through the empirical analysis, it is found that the effect of equity incentive in the sample group of high-tech manufacturing is not significant, but it is good in the group of traditional manufacturing. Through comparative study, we find that compared with the traditional manufacturing listed companies, the structure of executive ownership is scattered, the asset scale is small, and the ratio of assets to liabilities is low. The high short-term price-earnings ratio and the high proportion of state-owned enterprises will restrict the effect of equity incentive mechanism of high-tech manufacturing listed companies. Therefore, the listed companies in the high-tech manufacturing industry should reduce the ratio of assets and liabilities, optimize the ownership structure according to their own circumstances, perfect the mechanism of granting senior executives' equity and explore other effective incentive mechanisms, so as to extend the period of ban on sale appropriately. The incentive mode of step waiting period, especially the incentive mode of accelerating the exercise of power, should be popularized vigorously, in which the central enterprises should further deepen the reform and completely introduce the market competition mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：信阳师范学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F425;F406.7

【参考文献】