会计盈余时效性、薪酬委员会结构与经理人薪酬契约有效性

发布时间：2018-09-10 15:58

【摘要】：会计盈余时效性反映了企业会计收益信息与实际经营成果的结合程度,是监督、评价经理人当期努力影响未来业绩的重要指标。根据委托代理理论中与股东利益相融合的薪酬委员会结构旨在增强经理人薪酬契约设计有效性的观点,对2010~2011年我国A股主板909家上市公司以加权最小二乘回归的分析结果显示,与股东诱因融合度高的薪酬委员会结构能够增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度,同时能够根据当期会计盈余时效性调整盈余的薪酬权重,避免经理人短视,降低代理成本。有经理人参与的薪酬委员会降低了薪酬委员会薪酬契约设计的有效性,非政府控制的上市公司经理人不兼任薪酬委员会委员情形下的薪酬委员会更加有效,未发现薪酬与审计委员会董事分离度会增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度。
[Abstract]:The timeliness of accounting earnings reflects the degree of combination of accounting income information and actual operating results, and is an important indicator to monitor and evaluate managers' current efforts to affect future performance. According to the view that the structure of compensation committee which combines the interests of shareholders in principal-agent theory aims to enhance the effectiveness of executive compensation contract design, the analysis results of 909 listed companies in China's A-share main board from 2010 to 2011 show that the compensation committee structure is based on weighted least square regression. The structure of compensation committee with high degree of integration with shareholders' inducement can enhance the sensitivity of manager's compensation to performance, adjust the compensation weight of earnings according to the timeliness of current accounting earnings, avoid manager's shortsightedness and reduce agency cost. Remuneration committees with managers' participation reduce the effectiveness of the remuneration committee's compensation contract design, and pay committees where managers of non-government-controlled listed companies do not also serve as compensation committee members. No separation of compensation from board of auditors was found to enhance manager compensation-performance sensitivity.
【作者单位】：吉林大学商学院;
【基金】：吉林省科技厅项目2011(507) 吉林大学种子基金项目(2011ZZ036)
【分类号】：F275.2;F272.9

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