基于博弈论视角的会计诚信问题研究

发布时间：2018-10-08 20:21

【摘要】：会计诚信问题影响着市场经济秩序的稳定，是整个会计行业乃至全社会所关注和讨论的热点话题。虽然国内外诸多学者已从不同角度对此进行了相关研究并取得了一定成果，但其在具体治理方面却收效甚微。近年来，博弈论作为一种前沿的经济学方法论开始应用于会计领域，这为研究会计诚信问题提供了新的切入点。本文基于博弈论独特的经济视角对会计诚信问题进行了分析，旨在得出各博弈的影响因素及纳什均衡解，据此提出相应的治理措施。本文主要利用博弈分析法，以会计诚信问题为研究对象，具体讨论了企业、证监会、注册会计师、投资者、债权人和竞争者六大博弈主体在各博弈场中的策略选择及相互间的作用。首先，综述了会计诚信问题的研究成果。通过引入博弈论，介绍博弈分析法在会计领域中的主要应用及会计博弈方法的主要特征，研究了博弈论与会计的关系。其次，结合博弈论的经典思想，界定了会计诚信的概念。继而选取2009—2012年证监会行政处罚决定书中典型的企业失信案例并对其进行梳理，，分析注册会计师、投资者和债权人对企业会计诚信问题的评价意见，总结出目前会计诚信问题现状的特点、成因和危害。最后，从博弈论的角度，确立了博弈局中人和博弈策略，构建了企业与其他五个博弈主体之间的不完全信息非合作混合策略博弈模型，通过数理方法计算求得各模型相应的纳什均衡解，研究出各因素对博弈局中人在博弈场中策略选择的影响，并进行了六方博弈的综合分析。通过博弈研究，本文得出如下结论：第一，企业最优诚信概率与证监会惩罚力度和监管概率、注册会计师机构独立性和专业水平、投资者风险意识、竞争者失信额外收益呈同向变动；与证监会监管成本、投资者和债权人调查成本、债权人放贷风险、竞争者受罚概率和受罚成本呈反向变动。第二，证监会最优监管概率、注册会计师最优违规操作概率、竞争者最优诚信概率与企业失信额外收益呈同向变动；投资者最优投资概率、债权人最优放贷概率均与企业受罚概率及受罚成本呈同向变动。基于博弈分析结论，本文从企业、证监会、注册会计师、投资者、债权人、竞争者的角度提出了通过健全会计法律法规、改善内部治理结构、重塑注册会计师诚信、提高投资鉴别力、完善会计信用制度这几个具体治理对策，以期营造良好的博弈环境，为解决会计诚信问题提供了参考和建议。同时本文的研究也促进了博弈论在会计领域中的应用，提高了其现实意义和理论价值。
[Abstract]:Accounting honesty affects the stability of market economic order and is a hot topic that the whole accounting industry and even the whole society pay attention to and discuss. Although many scholars at home and abroad have carried on the related research from different angles and obtained certain achievements, but it has little effect in the concrete governance. In recent years, game theory, as a forward economic methodology, has been applied to the field of accounting, which provides a new entry point for the study of accounting honesty. Based on the unique economic perspective of game theory, this paper analyzes the problem of accounting honesty and credit in order to obtain the influencing factors of each game and Nash equilibrium solution, and then puts forward the corresponding management measures. This article mainly uses the game analysis method, taking the accounting good faith question as the research object, specifically discusses the enterprise, the Securities Regulatory Commission, the certified accountant, the investor, The choice of strategy between creditor and competitor in each game field and the interaction between them. First of all, the paper summarizes the research results of accounting integrity. By introducing game theory, this paper introduces the main application of game analysis in accounting field and the main characteristics of accounting game method, and studies the relationship between game theory and accounting. Secondly, combined with the classical thinking of game theory, the concept of accounting integrity is defined. Then select and comb the typical enterprise dishonesty cases in the 2009-2012 CSRC administrative penalty decision, and analyze the evaluation opinions of CPA, investors and creditors on the enterprise accounting integrity. This paper summarizes the characteristics, causes and harm of the present situation of accounting honesty and credit. Finally, from the point of view of game theory, this paper establishes the game strategy of "person and game" in the game bureau, and constructs a game model of incomplete information non-cooperative mixed strategy between the enterprise and the other five players. The corresponding Nash equilibrium solution of each model is obtained by mathematical method, and the influence of various factors on the selection of strategy in game field is studied, and the comprehensive analysis of six-party game is carried out. Through the game study, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the optimal probabilities of good faith of enterprises and the punishment and supervision probability of CSRC, the independence and professional level of CPA institutions, the risk consciousness of investors, The additional earnings of competitors in breach of credit fluctuate in the same direction; they vary inversely with the CSRC's regulatory costs, investor and creditor investigation costs, creditor lending risks, competitors' penalty probability and penalty costs. Second, the CSRC's optimal supervision probability, the CPA's optimal violation operation probability, the competitor's optimal integrity probability and the enterprise's dishonest extra income are in the same direction; the investor's optimal investment probability, The optimal lending probability of creditors varies in the same direction as the penalty probability and penalty cost. Based on the conclusion of game analysis, this paper puts forward to improve the internal governance structure and rebuild the integrity of CPA by perfecting accounting laws and regulations from the point of view of enterprise, CSRC, CPA, investor, creditor and competitor. To improve investment discrimination and perfect accounting credit system, the author hopes to create a good game environment and provide reference and suggestions for solving the problem of accounting credit. At the same time, the research of this paper also promotes the application of game theory in the field of accounting, and improves its practical significance and theoretical value.
【学位授予单位】：陕西科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F224.32

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