固定价格合同和成本加酬金合同选择研究
发布时间:2018-10-10 10:41
【摘要】:本文针对建设工程施工合同中固定价格和成本加酬金两种合同类型的选择,寻找建设项目与合同类型之间的适配,旨在避免业主和承包商由于固定价格合同和成本加酬金合同选择不当,而出现的如资源浪费、纠纷、违约、停工等现象,减少因此而蒙受的巨大经济损失,以达到双方利益最大化。 由于业主在合同类型的选择中起决定性作用,因此,本文就文站在业主角度对合同类型选择的进行研究。为了解决这一选择问题,本文运用系统分析法,对两种合同进行分析,在理论研究和现状调研的基础上,,从委托代理理论视角出发建立了两种合同模型,并对其选择情况进行分析,本文的主要内容包括: 通过对“建设工程施工合同类型选择”进行问卷调查,系统分析两种合同的使用与选择现状,结合选择两种合同的依据和方法,归纳选择方法存在的不足。 在此基础上,本文根据委托代理理论,构建两种合同类型的委托代理模型,利用此效用函数模型,通过设定模型中参数的变化分析两种合同的选择情况,从费用最小化和效率最大化两个方面,直观地反映出不同参数对两种合同类型选择的影响,弥补了选择方法存在的不足。 基于两种合同模型,针对两种合同存在的风险,从工作内容、工程量和工程单价的风险以及建立的效用模型的基础上引入风险因素,分析这四方面对合同类型的分析分配情况,根据业主自身风险承受能力,为分析如何选择适合自己的合同类型提供依据和帮助。
[Abstract]:According to the choice of fixed price and cost plus gratuities in construction contract, this paper tries to find the fit between construction project and contract type. The aim is to avoid such phenomena as waste of resources, disputes, breach of contract, suspension of work and so on, due to improper selection of fixed price contracts and cost plus gratuities contracts, so as to reduce the huge economic losses incurred as a result of this. To maximize the benefits of both parties. Since the owner plays a decisive role in the choice of contract type, this paper studies the choice of contract type from the angle of owner. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses the system analysis method to analyze the two kinds of contracts. On the basis of theoretical research and current investigation, two contract models are established from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The main contents of this paper are as follows: through the questionnaire survey of "Construction contract selection", the use and selection of the two kinds of contracts are systematically analyzed. Combined with the basis and method of selecting two kinds of contracts, the deficiency of the selection method is summarized. On this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of two types of contracts, using the utility function model to analyze the choice of the two contracts by setting the parameters in the model. From two aspects of cost minimization and efficiency maximization, this paper intuitively reflects the influence of different parameters on the choice of two contract types, and makes up for the deficiency of the selection method. Based on the two kinds of contract models, the risk factors are introduced from the work content, the risk of engineering quantity and the unit price of the project, and the established utility model, and the analysis and distribution of the contract types in these four aspects are analyzed in the light of the risks existing in the two kinds of contracts. According to the owner's own risk bearing ability, it provides the basis and help for analyzing how to choose the suitable contract type.
【学位授予单位】:西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F406.7;TU723.1
本文编号:2261466
[Abstract]:According to the choice of fixed price and cost plus gratuities in construction contract, this paper tries to find the fit between construction project and contract type. The aim is to avoid such phenomena as waste of resources, disputes, breach of contract, suspension of work and so on, due to improper selection of fixed price contracts and cost plus gratuities contracts, so as to reduce the huge economic losses incurred as a result of this. To maximize the benefits of both parties. Since the owner plays a decisive role in the choice of contract type, this paper studies the choice of contract type from the angle of owner. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses the system analysis method to analyze the two kinds of contracts. On the basis of theoretical research and current investigation, two contract models are established from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The main contents of this paper are as follows: through the questionnaire survey of "Construction contract selection", the use and selection of the two kinds of contracts are systematically analyzed. Combined with the basis and method of selecting two kinds of contracts, the deficiency of the selection method is summarized. On this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of two types of contracts, using the utility function model to analyze the choice of the two contracts by setting the parameters in the model. From two aspects of cost minimization and efficiency maximization, this paper intuitively reflects the influence of different parameters on the choice of two contract types, and makes up for the deficiency of the selection method. Based on the two kinds of contract models, the risk factors are introduced from the work content, the risk of engineering quantity and the unit price of the project, and the established utility model, and the analysis and distribution of the contract types in these four aspects are analyzed in the light of the risks existing in the two kinds of contracts. According to the owner's own risk bearing ability, it provides the basis and help for analyzing how to choose the suitable contract type.
【学位授予单位】:西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F406.7;TU723.1
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