油藏经营管理投资激励机制研究
发布时间：2018-10-18 09:09
【摘要】：随着油藏经营管理在油田企业的逐步推广和完善,油藏经营管理机制设计已经成为油田企业管理研究的热点之一。在国内油藏经营管理体系中,采油厂是油藏经营管理的责任主体,油藏经营管理区直接对采油厂负责,既是独立核算主体,也是油气生产操作主体和成本中心,其行为策略直接影响和制约着油田企业的整体投资收益。在缺乏规范的投资激励机制的情况下,油田企业内部各采油厂、油藏经营管理区重项目前期立项,轻后期投资管理现象突出。因此,有必要对油藏经营管理体系下的投资激励机制问题进行深入研究,从而提高石油项目的投资收益率。 本文以机制设计理论、委托代理理论为基础,采取数理方法,以油田企业管理组织结构为基本框架,分别研究了双重委托代理、油藏经营管理区和行为主体的不同风险偏好对激励机制的影响。首先,本文构建双重委托代理模型,研究油田企业、采油厂以及油藏经营管理区之间的投资激励机制设计结果,探讨油田企业的投资信息价值和代理成本；其次,本文构建由单个采油厂和两个油藏经营管理区组成的委托代理模型,研究油藏经营管理区之间的竞争关系对投资激励机制设计结果的影响,分析采油厂的投资信息价值和代理成本,并探讨油藏经营管理区之间可能的合谋行为和采油厂的防范措施对投资激励机制设计结果的影响；再次,本文研究不同风险类型对激励机制设计结果、采油厂投资信息价值以及代理成本的影响。 研究发现：一是油田企业可以通过技能培训、技术支持等方式,帮助下属采油厂和油藏经营管理区降低生产成本,提高石油项目产出效率,从而激励后者在石油项目上更加努力地工作。二是油田企业不应该对下属采油厂和油藏经营管理区一味地强调风险规避,应该努力去收集与石油投资项目相关的市场信息,以降低投资市场不确定性,从而获取更多投资收益。三是采油厂能够从油藏经营管理区的激烈竞争中获得“渔翁之利”,而通过采取额外罚款、降职等其他手段,采油厂可以达到威慑油藏经营管理区合谋行为的作用。
[Abstract]:With the gradual promotion and improvement of reservoir management in oil field enterprises, the design of reservoir management mechanism has become one of the hot spots in the research of oil field enterprise management. In the domestic reservoir management system, the oil production plant is the main body responsible for the reservoir management, and the reservoir management area is directly responsible to the oil production plant, which is not only the independent accounting body, but also the main body and cost center of oil and gas production and operation. Its behavior strategy directly affects and restricts the overall investment income of oil field enterprises. In the absence of a standardized investment incentive mechanism, various oil production plants in oil field enterprises, reservoir management area heavy projects in the early stage, light of the late investment management phenomenon is prominent. Therefore, it is necessary to deeply study the investment incentive mechanism under the reservoir management system in order to improve the investment return rate of oil projects. Based on the theory of mechanism design, principal-agent theory and mathematical method, this paper studies the dual principal-agent theory by taking the management structure of oil field enterprises as the basic framework. The influence of different risk preference of reservoir management area and behavior on incentive mechanism. First of all, this paper constructs a dual principal-agent model to study the design results of investment incentive mechanism between oil field enterprises, oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and discusses the investment information value and agency cost of oil field enterprises. In this paper, a principal-agent model consisting of a single oil production plant and two reservoir management areas is constructed to study the influence of the competitive relationship between the reservoir management areas on the design results of the investment incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the investment information value and agency cost of oil production plant, and discusses the possible collusion between reservoir management areas and the influence of preventive measures on the design results of investment incentive mechanism. This paper studies the effects of different risk types on the design results of incentive mechanism, the value of investment information and agency cost of oil extraction plants. It is found that: first, oil field enterprises can help subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas to reduce production costs and improve oil project output efficiency by means of skill training and technical support. This encourages the latter to work harder on oil projects. Second, oil field enterprises should not blindly emphasize risk aversion to subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and should strive to collect market information related to oil investment projects in order to reduce the uncertainty of the investment market. In order to gain more investment income. The third is that the oil production plant can obtain the profit from the fierce competition in the reservoir management area, and by adopting additional fines, demotion and other means, the oil production plant can achieve the function of deterring collusion in the reservoir management area.
【学位授予单位】：西南石油大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.22;F406.7
本文编号：2278659
[Abstract]:With the gradual promotion and improvement of reservoir management in oil field enterprises, the design of reservoir management mechanism has become one of the hot spots in the research of oil field enterprise management. In the domestic reservoir management system, the oil production plant is the main body responsible for the reservoir management, and the reservoir management area is directly responsible to the oil production plant, which is not only the independent accounting body, but also the main body and cost center of oil and gas production and operation. Its behavior strategy directly affects and restricts the overall investment income of oil field enterprises. In the absence of a standardized investment incentive mechanism, various oil production plants in oil field enterprises, reservoir management area heavy projects in the early stage, light of the late investment management phenomenon is prominent. Therefore, it is necessary to deeply study the investment incentive mechanism under the reservoir management system in order to improve the investment return rate of oil projects. Based on the theory of mechanism design, principal-agent theory and mathematical method, this paper studies the dual principal-agent theory by taking the management structure of oil field enterprises as the basic framework. The influence of different risk preference of reservoir management area and behavior on incentive mechanism. First of all, this paper constructs a dual principal-agent model to study the design results of investment incentive mechanism between oil field enterprises, oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and discusses the investment information value and agency cost of oil field enterprises. In this paper, a principal-agent model consisting of a single oil production plant and two reservoir management areas is constructed to study the influence of the competitive relationship between the reservoir management areas on the design results of the investment incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the investment information value and agency cost of oil production plant, and discusses the possible collusion between reservoir management areas and the influence of preventive measures on the design results of investment incentive mechanism. This paper studies the effects of different risk types on the design results of incentive mechanism, the value of investment information and agency cost of oil extraction plants. It is found that: first, oil field enterprises can help subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas to reduce production costs and improve oil project output efficiency by means of skill training and technical support. This encourages the latter to work harder on oil projects. Second, oil field enterprises should not blindly emphasize risk aversion to subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and should strive to collect market information related to oil investment projects in order to reduce the uncertainty of the investment market. In order to gain more investment income. The third is that the oil production plant can obtain the profit from the fierce competition in the reservoir management area, and by adopting additional fines, demotion and other means, the oil production plant can achieve the function of deterring collusion in the reservoir management area.
【学位授予单位】：西南石油大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.22;F406.7
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