高管薪酬契约与会计稳健性

发布时间：2018-10-19 18:15

【摘要】：2008年美国金融危机爆发后,会计稳健性在企业中发挥的作用以及高管薪酬契约的有效性这两个问题引发了人们的关注。会计稳健性需求主要来自于契约,其中高管薪酬契约是产生会计稳健性需求的原因之一。随着资本主义经济的发展,现代企业制度逐步确立,所有权和经营权的分离产生了委托-代理关系。由于信息不对称以及利己主义,会产生代理人的道德风险和逆向选择。委托人为了减轻代理人的道德风险和自利行为,便在企业会计和薪酬制定方面引入了会计稳健性。但会计稳健性在高管薪酬契约中的运用并没有达到“最佳水平”,高管薪酬契约“好消息”和“坏消息”的不对称反映的薪酬设计理念应运而生。这种高管薪酬契约的设计从一个侧面反映了会计稳健性存在于管理层薪酬契约中。目前我国上市公司基本建立了以会计业绩为基础的高管薪酬评价体系,但是由于信息不对称,管理层为了实现自身利益的最大化,产生盈余管理的动机,进而会影响到企业的会计稳健性水平。首先对国内外有关会计稳健性和高管薪酬契约方面的研究成果进行回顾,接着是对相关理论的阐述。通过以上的回顾和分析,提出本文的假设并进行实证分析。本文选取了2004-2011年的我国上市公司的财务数据,对假设一和假设二分别运用Basu (1997)盈余-股票报酬计量方法和Basu(1997)盈余持续性计量方法对会计稳健性进行度量。借鉴Leone,Wu和Zmi merman的方法,构建了假设一模型；借鉴Basu (1997)盈余持续性模型构建了假设二的模型。通过对数据回归分析,我们发现：(1)在我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约中存在会计稳健性,因为当公司出现“好消息”时,管理层薪酬与公司业绩的相关性程度低于当公司出现“坏消息”时。(2)在我国上市公司中,高管薪酬与会计业绩的相关性程度越高,会计稳健性越差。
[Abstract]:After the outbreak of the American financial crisis in 2008, the role of accounting conservatism in enterprises and the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts have attracted people's attention. Accounting conservatism demand mainly comes from contract, among which executive compensation contract is one of the reasons for accounting conservatism demand. With the development of capitalist economy, modern enterprise system has been gradually established, and the separation of ownership and management has produced principal-agent relationship. Because of information asymmetry and egoism, agent moral hazard and adverse selection will be produced. In order to reduce the moral hazard and self-interest of the agent, the principal introduces the accounting conservatism in the aspects of enterprise accounting and salary formulation. However, the application of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contract has not reached the "best level", and the asymmetric compensation design concept of "good news" and "bad news" of executive compensation contract emerges as the times require. The design of executive compensation contract reflects accounting conservatism in management compensation contract. At present, the listed companies in our country have basically established an executive compensation evaluation system based on accounting performance. However, because of the asymmetry of information, in order to maximize their own interests, the management has the motive of earnings management. In turn, it will affect the accounting conservatism level of enterprises. Firstly, it reviews the domestic and foreign research results on accounting conservatism and executive compensation contract, and then expounds the relevant theories. Through the above review and analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis and carries on the empirical analysis. This paper selects the financial data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2011 and measures accounting conservatism using Basu (1997) earnings-stock return measurement method and Basu (1997) earnings persistence measurement method respectively. Using the methods of Leone,Wu and Zmi merman to construct a hypothesis-one model, and Basu (1997) earnings persistence model to construct a hypothesis-2 model. Through regression analysis of data, we find that: (1) Accounting conservatism exists in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China, because when there is "good news" in companies, The correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance is lower than that when there is "bad news". (2) in Chinese listed companies, the higher the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance, the worse accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275.2;F272.9

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