管理层违规业绩预告与证券分析师盈利预测的实证研究
发布时间：2018-10-24 18:02
【摘要】：随着我国证券市场的发展，预测性财务信息的重要性日益凸显，其中盈利预测更是受到了投资者的重点关注。在盈利预测信息的供应链中，公司管理层业绩预告和证券分析师盈利预测是投资者获取公司未来盈利信息的两大途径。公司业绩预告是其管理层对公司特定会计期间盈利能力的预测，是重要的公共信息。分析师盈利预测是证券分析师在解读公共和私有信息的基础上，传递给市场的关于公司未来盈利能力的增量信息。公司管理层和证券分析师盈利预测都有助于改善信息不对称问题，提高资本市场的资源配置效率。 现代公司的两权分离，提高了信息不对称性和代理成本，使得管理层存在违规业绩预告的自利动机，增加了分析师的信息风险。同时，分析师还面临着供职券商和客户公司的双重委托压力，可能会为了讨好管理层而发布有偏预测结果。在我国新兴转型的资本市场中、在信息和监管环境相对薄弱的制度背景下，公司管理层业绩预告的违规披露会对分析师预测产生什么影响，是本文研究的重点。 本文在借鉴国内外相关文献的基础上，结合我国特有制度背景，考察了公司管理层业绩预告中出现的“未预告”、“错误预告”、“延迟预告”和“变脸”等违规行为对分析师跟进决策和盈利预测质量的影响。本文选取了2009-2011年沪深A股披露业绩预告并有分析师跟进的上市公司为样本，在描述性统计和相关性分析的基础上，，分别以分析师跟进人数、分析师预测误差和分歧度为被解释变量，以管理层业绩预告是否违规为解释变量，以公司治理、盈余质量和公司价值等因素为控制变量进行多元回归分析，并以深交所信息披露考评指标为替代变量进行了稳健性检验。描述性统计结果显示，我国沪深A股上市公司管理层倾向于披露好消息，并且近年来违规披露比例有所下降。分析师盈利预测整体准确性较高，但具有明显的乐观倾向。相关性分析和回归结果显示管理层违规预告对分析师预测行为及结果有显著影响，主要结论为：当管理层违规预告时，分析师跟进这一上市公司的人数会减少，分析师盈利预测的准确性下降，分歧度提高。说明我国证券分析师在一定程度上能够识别管理层的机会主义行为，但由于业绩预告信息的不确定性和固有的利益冲突，导致盈利预测具有普遍的乐观偏差。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, the importance of predictive financial information is becoming more and more prominent. In the supply chain of earnings forecast information, management performance forecast and stock analyst earnings forecast are two main ways for investors to obtain future earnings information. The company performance forecast is the management's forecast of the company's profitability in a specific accounting period and is an important public information. Analysts' earnings forecasts are incremental information that securities analysts pass to the market about a company's future profitability based on the interpretation of public and private information. Both management and equity analysts' earnings forecasts help improve information asymmetry and resource allocation efficiency in capital markets. The separation of the two rights of modern companies increases the information asymmetry and agency cost, which makes the management have the self-interest motive of the illegal performance forecast, and increases the information risk of the analysts. At the same time, analysts are also under pressure from both brokerage and client firms to issue biased forecasts to please management. Under the background of weak information and regulatory environment in the newly transformed capital market of our country, what effect will the illegal disclosure of company management performance forecast have on the analyst forecast, which is the focus of this paper. On the basis of reference from relevant literature at home and abroad, combined with the background of China's unique system, this paper investigates the "unannounced", "false foretell" in the management performance forecast of the company. The impact of irregularities such as "deferred forecasts" and "face changes" on the quality of analysts' follow-up decisions and earnings forecasts. Based on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, this paper selects the listed companies which disclose the earnings forecast of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in 2009-2011 and has analysts to follow up with the number of analysts. The forecast error and divergence degree of the analyst are explained variables, whether the management performance forecast is irregular or not, and the factors such as corporate governance, earnings quality and company value are taken as the controlling variables to carry out multivariate regression analysis. And the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information disclosure evaluation index as a substitute variable for the robustness test. The results of descriptive statistics show that the managers of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies tend to disclose good news, and the proportion of illegal disclosure has decreased in recent years. Analyst earnings forecast overall accuracy is high, but has the obvious optimistic tendency. The correlation analysis and regression results show that the forecast behavior and results of the analyst are significantly affected by the management non-compliance forecast. The main conclusions are: when the management violates the forecast, the number of analysts following the listed company will decrease. The accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts declined and divergence improved. It shows that Chinese securities analysts can identify the opportunistic behavior of management to a certain extent, but due to the uncertainty of performance forecast information and inherent conflict of interest, the profit forecast has a general optimistic deviation.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.42;F832.51
本文编号：2292134
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, the importance of predictive financial information is becoming more and more prominent. In the supply chain of earnings forecast information, management performance forecast and stock analyst earnings forecast are two main ways for investors to obtain future earnings information. The company performance forecast is the management's forecast of the company's profitability in a specific accounting period and is an important public information. Analysts' earnings forecasts are incremental information that securities analysts pass to the market about a company's future profitability based on the interpretation of public and private information. Both management and equity analysts' earnings forecasts help improve information asymmetry and resource allocation efficiency in capital markets. The separation of the two rights of modern companies increases the information asymmetry and agency cost, which makes the management have the self-interest motive of the illegal performance forecast, and increases the information risk of the analysts. At the same time, analysts are also under pressure from both brokerage and client firms to issue biased forecasts to please management. Under the background of weak information and regulatory environment in the newly transformed capital market of our country, what effect will the illegal disclosure of company management performance forecast have on the analyst forecast, which is the focus of this paper. On the basis of reference from relevant literature at home and abroad, combined with the background of China's unique system, this paper investigates the "unannounced", "false foretell" in the management performance forecast of the company. The impact of irregularities such as "deferred forecasts" and "face changes" on the quality of analysts' follow-up decisions and earnings forecasts. Based on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, this paper selects the listed companies which disclose the earnings forecast of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in 2009-2011 and has analysts to follow up with the number of analysts. The forecast error and divergence degree of the analyst are explained variables, whether the management performance forecast is irregular or not, and the factors such as corporate governance, earnings quality and company value are taken as the controlling variables to carry out multivariate regression analysis. And the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information disclosure evaluation index as a substitute variable for the robustness test. The results of descriptive statistics show that the managers of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies tend to disclose good news, and the proportion of illegal disclosure has decreased in recent years. Analyst earnings forecast overall accuracy is high, but has the obvious optimistic tendency. The correlation analysis and regression results show that the forecast behavior and results of the analyst are significantly affected by the management non-compliance forecast. The main conclusions are: when the management violates the forecast, the number of analysts following the listed company will decrease. The accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts declined and divergence improved. It shows that Chinese securities analysts can identify the opportunistic behavior of management to a certain extent, but due to the uncertainty of performance forecast information and inherent conflict of interest, the profit forecast has a general optimistic deviation.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.42;F832.51
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