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中国旅行社市场过度竞争研究

发布时间:2018-07-04 19:45

  本文选题:旅行社业 + 过度竞争 ; 参考:《西北师范大学》2013年硕士论文


【摘要】:随着1984年旅游外联权的下放,中国旅行社业的行业规模不断发展壮大,旅行社业对旅游业发展的促进作用也逐渐显现。但与此同时,中国旅行社业自身的发展却渐入困境,产业集中度一直呈下降趋势,市场结构类型也由极高寡占型演变成了分散竞争型,市场过度竞争盛行,行业平均利润率与游客满意度逐年下降。根据哈佛学派的观点,市场结构决定市场行为,进而决定市场绩效。旅行社市场绩效主要受旅行社行为影响,而对旅行社行为影响最大的因素是价格恶性竞争的程度。旅游产业的效率提升是我国旅游产业转型发展的一个重点方向,旅行社业作为我国旅游业的重要支柱之一,其市场绩效的提高与否直接关系到旅游业整体效率的变化。因此,对我国旅行社市场过度竞争现象的研究有着十分重要的理论意义和现实意义。 文章基于对以往过度竞争理论的梳理和我国旅行社市场的实际情况的分析,选取了一个非对称成本的伯特兰德模型来分析我国旅行社市场的过度竞争现象。然后,从破解“伯特兰德悖论”的研究思路出发,尝试着通过弱化模型的假设条件来使得中国旅行社业摆脱目前这种过度竞争的现状。但是由于旅行社所需固定设施很少,其生产能力就是接待旅游者的人数,故旅行社业基本不存在生产能力的限制。所以,本文只从产品差异化、重复博弈、信息完美等角度探讨了实现中国旅行社业有效竞争的途径。 研究结果表明:(1)现阶段我国旅行社市场的过度竞争使得整个旅行社业利润率持续下降,旅行社业绩效低下。(2)旅行社数目过多是我国旅行社市场过度价格竞争的主要原因之一。(3)旅行社若能将产品异质化可能会使得过度价格竞争的现象减少,但是因缺乏产权保护和很低的模仿成本也会使得旅行社产品创新激励不足。此外,旅行社还需考虑旅游者对产品质量偏好的差异大小。(4)质量保证金制度通过降低旅游产品市场上信息不完美的程度,从而起到了改善市场均衡和提高市场效率的作用。(5)加强对监管部门的监督和松懈失职行为的查处的举措,虽然在长期中并不能使监管部门更加尽忠职守,,但是却能有效地抑制旅行社销售劣质产品的行为。
[Abstract]:With the decentralization of the right of tourism outreach in 1984, the scale of the travel agency industry in China has been growing, and the promoting effect of the travel agency industry on the development of the tourism industry has gradually appeared. However, at the same time, the development of China's travel agency industry has gradually entered a dilemma, the degree of industrial concentration has been declining, the type of market structure has also evolved from extremely high oligopoly to decentralized competition, and excessive market competition is prevalent. Industry average profit margin and tourist satisfaction decreased year by year. According to Harvard School, market structure determines market behavior and market performance. Travel agency market performance is mainly affected by travel agency behavior, and the most important factor is the degree of price vicious competition. The promotion of the efficiency of tourism industry is one of the key directions of the transformation and development of tourism industry in China. As one of the important pillars of tourism industry in China, the improvement of its market performance is directly related to the change of the overall efficiency of tourism industry. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the phenomenon of excessive competition in travel agency market in China. Based on the analysis of the past excessive competition theory and the actual situation of the travel agency market in China, this paper selects a Bertrand model of asymmetric cost to analyze the phenomenon of excessive competition in the travel agency market of our country. Then, from the perspective of solving the Bertrand Paradox, this paper tries to make the travel agency industry of China get rid of the over-competitive situation by weakening the hypothetical conditions of the model. However, because the travel agency needs few fixed facilities, its production capacity is the number of tourists, so the travel agency industry basically does not have the limitation of production capacity. Therefore, this paper discusses the ways to realize the effective competition of Chinese travel agency industry from the point of view of product differentiation, repeated game, information perfection and so on. The results show that: (1) the excessive competition in the travel agency market of our country at present makes the profit margin of the whole travel agency industry continue to decline. (2) the excessive number of travel agencies is one of the main reasons for excessive price competition in China's travel agency market. (3) if travel agencies can make products heterogeneous, the phenomenon of excessive price competition may be reduced. However, the lack of property right protection and low imitation cost will also make travel agency product innovation incentive inadequate. In addition, travel agencies also need to consider the difference between tourists' preference for product quality. (4) the quality margin system reduces the degree of information imperfection in the tourism product market. This has played a role in improving market equilibrium and market efficiency. (5) measures to strengthen supervision of the regulatory authorities and to relax the investigation and punishment of negligence, although in the long run will not make the regulators more devoted to their duties, But it can effectively restrain travel agencies from selling inferior products.
【学位授予单位】:西北师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F592.6

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