我国中小板上市公司股权激励实施现状及其效应研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 11:31

本文关键词：我国中小板上市公司股权激励实施现状及其效应研究　出处：《西北大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代企业制度所有权与经营权的分离导致委托代理问题的出现,激化了股东和经营者之间的利益矛盾,股权激励通过给予经营者部分公司股权,将二者的目标利益统-起来。西方国家的实践证明股权激励在降低公司代理成本、完善治理结构、健全激励约束机制、促进企业长期价值创造、吸引和留住人才方面具有重要作用,并被视为有效解决委托代理问题的重要途径和激励管理人员的“金手铐”。随着我国对股权激励的不断探索和中小企业的迅速崛起,大批中小企业纷纷加入股权激励的大军,由此引来理论界和实业界的广泛关注和热议。那么,股权激励在我国中小企业的实施状况究竟如何?在我国特殊的体制背景下能否促进公司业绩的提升和价值的创造?激励强度与公司业绩水平之间具有怎样的效应规律?本文在已有研究成果的基础上,针对上述问题提出三个假设,选取2009-2011年披露并实施了股权激励计划的中小上市公司作为研究样本,分别进行实证检验。在对股权激励实施状况的研究中主要运用经验分析的方法得出定性结论；在对实施效果的研究中采用独立样本T检验和配对样本T检验的方法,并运用独立样本的非参数检验考察了不同股权激励模式的效应差异；在对激励水平与公司业绩之间的效应规律研究中通过构建模型采用多元线性回归分析的方法来揭示二者之间的相关性。本文的研究结果表明：尽管中小公司对实施股权激励的热衷度较高,但实施进程却不佳,因各种原因终止或撤销的较多,在激励方案的设计中普遍存在计划有效期较短、激励强度和水平不高、激励条件的业绩考核指标过于单一等问题；股权激励的实施对于公司业绩的提升具有一定的积极效应,激励强度与公司业绩之间存在较为显著的正相关关系；股票期权与限制性股票两种激励模式对公司业绩的影响差异不大。最后,根据本文的研究结论提出相关建议及展望。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprise system leads to the emergence of principal-agent problem, which intensifies the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. The practice of western countries proves that equity incentive can reduce the agency cost, perfect the governance structure, perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism, and promote the long-term value creation of the enterprise. Attracting and retaining talent has an important role to play. It is regarded as an important way to solve the principal-agent problem effectively and "golden handcuffs" to motivate managers. With the continuous exploration of equity incentive and the rapid rise of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. A large number of small and medium-sized enterprises have joined the ranks of equity incentives, which has attracted wide attention and heated discussion in theoretical and business circles. So, what is the status of equity incentive in the implementation of small and medium-sized enterprises in China? Can we promote the promotion of corporate performance and the creation of value under the special institutional background of our country? What is the effect law between the incentive intensity and the performance level of the company? Based on the existing research results, this paper puts forward three hypotheses to solve the above problems, and selects the small and medium-sized listed companies which disclosed and implemented the equity incentive plan in 2009-2011 as the research sample. In the study of the implementation of equity incentive, we mainly use the method of empirical analysis to get the qualitative conclusion. The independent sample T test and matched sample T test are adopted in the study of the implementation effect, and the non-parametric test of independent sample is used to investigate the effects of different equity incentive modes. In the study of the effect law between incentive level and corporate performance, the correlation between incentive level and corporate performance is revealed by using the method of multiple linear regression analysis. The results of this paper show that: although small and medium-sized companies have a high enthusiasm for the implementation of equity incentives, but the implementation process is not good, because of a variety of reasons to terminate or withdraw more. In the design of incentive scheme, there are many problems, such as short period of validity, low intensity and level of incentive, too single performance evaluation index of incentive condition, etc. The implementation of equity incentive has a certain positive effect on the improvement of corporate performance, and there is a significant positive correlation between incentive intensity and corporate performance. There is little difference between the two incentive modes of stock option and restrictive stock. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, some suggestions and prospects are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.3;F272.92

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