非上市公司股权激励法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-25 07:39

本文关键词： 股权激励非上市公司法律问题　出处：《华中科技大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：理性人作为西方经济学的一个基本假设，即假定人都是利己的，在面临决策时都会选择最大限度地满足自己的利益，因此，这就带来了另一个经济学原理：人们会对激励做出反应。激励是引起一个人做出某种行为的某种东西，诸如惩罚或奖励的预期。由于理性人通过比较成本与利益作出决策，所以，他们会对激励做出反应。①因此，我们在进行制度设计时，绝对不能忘记激励。激励机制设计的出发点是为了满足客体的需要，其直接目的是为了调动激励客体的积极性，最终实现激励客体的个人目标和激励主体目标的一致性。②在现代公司的治理理论中，激励功能是指力求公司经营者在追求个人利益的同时，使其行为的客观效果更好地实现股东所要达到的目的。激励的方式有很多种，从时间的长短来分，有长期激励和短期激励；从内容来看，有货币激励和非货币激励。其中，货币激励主要有基本工资、奖金、津贴和福利、期权、社会保险等；而非货币激励则主要指名誉激励和职位消费等。③而法律无疑是这些激励得以实现的最重要的保障，，这是因为法律不仅给这些激励机制提供制度保障，也给行为人一个明确的预期。在这样的背景下，股权激励作为一种长期的激励机制，能够合理、有效地将经营者个人利益同公司价值增值及股东利益结合在一起，这样公司在运作过程中所产生的代理成本问题就能够得到很好的解决，同时股权激励机制也是公司治理过程中重要组成部分。本文正是以非上市公司作为研究对象,遵循理论结合实践的原则，从非上市公司与上市公司的不同点出发，分析非上市公司股权激励计划的相关法律问题,总结我国现有实践和制度中所存在的问题，提出完善建议。
[Abstract]:Rational people, as a basic hypothesis of western economics, assume that people are self-interested and will choose to satisfy their own interests to the maximum extent in the face of decision-making. This leads to another economic principle: people react to incentives, something that causes a person to behave. Such as the expectation of punishment or reward. Since rational people make decisions by comparing costs and benefits, they will react to incentives. The starting point of incentive mechanism design is to meet the needs of the object, and its direct purpose is to mobilize the enthusiasm of the incentive object. In the modern corporate governance theory, the incentive function is to strive for the company managers to pursue personal interests at the same time. To make the objective effect of its behavior better to achieve the purpose of shareholders. There are many ways of incentive, according to the length of time, there are long-term incentive and short-term incentive; From the content point of view, there are monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives. Among them, monetary incentives mainly include basic wages, bonuses, allowances and benefits, options, social insurance and so on. The non-monetary incentive mainly refers to reputation incentive and position consumption, and the law is undoubtedly the most important guarantee to realize these incentives, which is because the law not only provides institutional protection for these incentive mechanisms. In this context, equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, can be reasonable. Effectively combine the personal interests of the operator with the value added and the interests of the shareholders, so that the company in the operation process of the agency cost problem can be well resolved. At the same time, the equity incentive mechanism is also an important part of the corporate governance process. This article takes the non-listed company as the research object, following the principle of combining theory with practice, starting from the difference between the non-listed company and the listed company, analyzes the related legal problems of the non-listed company's equity incentive plan. This paper summarizes the existing problems in the practice and system of our country, and puts forward some suggestions for perfection.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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