对赌协议的有效性—公司治理中的激励机制

发布时间：2018-02-28 07:25

本文关键词： 对赌协议激励机制公司治理期权射幸合同价值　出处：《上海交通大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：PE作为一种战略投资者，过去的十年在中国得到快速发展。而源于对非公众公司信息披露不完善和公司治理水平的不确定性，对赌协议这一估值调整工具也被PE行业广泛运用，并成为项目的关键机制。这一被投资方广泛采用的机制是否真的实现了很好的价值发现功能和对融资方的激励效应，这是本文要论述的。对赌协议从合同属性来看，是建构在合同自由这一民事行为原则基础上，基于对未来不确定性收益建构的一种利益交换约定，很好的体现了市场经济的自发调节原则，它所具备的射幸合同的等价有偿的相对性，很好的解决了信息不确定性下的风险控制机制。而从经济学角度来看，作为对信息不对称环境下的“逆向选择”和“道德问题”的回应，“对赌协议”在一定条件下，对管理层来说是激励强度最大，对投资者来说是风险控制最优，对经济效率来讲是帕累托最优的一种机制安排。本文重点用量化模型的方法，，首先构建了一个方程模型，论证了对赌协议可以视为一个固定收益债券和实物期权组合模型，并体现出了对赌协议对于投资方而言是一种很好的风险转移工具。然后通过案例，比较了实物期权定价模型和净现值计算结果的差异，发现了对赌协议作为一种期权性质的财务工具的价值发现功能。最后通过对赌协议投资方和融资方收益方程的建立与比较，进一步论证了对赌协议是一种对投资方和融资方的双向激励机制。作为公司治理中的激励机制是否有效,取决于在多大程度上将激励主体与激励客体的目标利益函数联系在一起,使报酬具有充分的激励数额与合理的结构。对赌协议的恰恰很好的将投资方和融资方的目标利益函数联系在一起，它不只是一种零和博弈的利益再分配机制和对投资方的风险保障，更是实现了对未来不确定性的战略决策权的价值发现，进而创造性的解决了投资和融资方之间的利益一致化问题，实现一种双向的激励机制设计。对赌协议的设计体现了一种对当事双方的正向激励性。
[Abstract]:As a strategic investor, PE has developed rapidly in China in the past ten years. But because of the uncertainty about the imperfect information disclosure of non-public companies and the level of corporate governance, gambling agreement, a valuation adjustment tool, has also been widely used in the PE industry. And become the key mechanism of the project. Whether the mechanism widely used by the investors has really realized the value discovery function and the incentive effect to the financier is discussed in this paper. From the point of view of contract attribute, the gambling agreement is based on the civil behavior principle of freedom of contract and a kind of benefit exchange agreement based on the construction of uncertain income in the future, which well embodies the principle of spontaneous regulation of market economy. It has the equivalent paid relativity of the lucky contract, which solves the risk control mechanism under the information uncertainty. From the economic point of view, as a response to the "adverse selection" and "moral issues" in the asymmetric information environment, the "gambling agreement" is the strongest incentive for the management under certain conditions. Risk control is optimal for investors and Pareto optimal mechanism for economic efficiency. In this paper, the quantitative model is used to construct an equation model, which proves that the bet agreement can be regarded as a combination model of fixed income bonds and real options. It also shows that gambling agreement is a good risk transfer tool for investors. Then the difference between the real option pricing model and the net present value calculation results is compared and the value discovery function of the gambling agreement as a financial tool of option nature is found. Finally, through the establishment and comparison of the profit equation between the investor and the financier of the gambling agreement, it is further demonstrated that the gambling agreement is a two-way incentive mechanism for the investor and the financier. Whether the incentive mechanism in corporate governance is effective or not depends on the extent to which the incentive subject and the objective interest function of the incentive object are linked together. Make the reward have sufficient incentive amount and reasonable structure. The agreement on gambling is a good link between the investor and the financier's objective interest function, It is not only a zero-sum game benefit redistribution mechanism and risk protection for investors, but also the realization of the value of the strategic decision-making power of uncertainty in the future. Then it creatively solves the problem of the consistency of interests between the investors and the financiers, and realizes the design of a two-way incentive mechanism, and the design of the gambling agreement reflects a positive incentive for both parties.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.48

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