管理者薪酬对企业资本结构的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-08 20:56

本文选题：管理者薪酬　切入点：最优资本结构　出处：《湖南大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文考虑管理者薪酬结构如何影响公司资本结构问题,论证了在我国实行一个成熟的、富有竞争力的中小企业管理者的薪酬激励机制的必要性和可行性。本文在定性分析管理者薪酬激励运行机理基础之上,通过构建风险中性定价模型,得到中小企业最优资本结构数值解,定量讨论了市场摩擦和公司收益波动率对公司资本结构和债券溢价的影响、管理者的薪酬结构和外部收入对公司资本结构和风险溢价的影响、部分股权和机会收益对管理者与股东之间利益冲突的影响、担保契约设计参数与管理者薪酬及融资规模的关系等问题。数值计算结果表明:在企业债券融资规模不变的情况下,管理者若是选择风险大的项目,会得到更多的薪酬价值,同时企业股权价值也增加,而企业的债券价值减少,即管理者有较强的风险转移动机;随着券息的增加,公司价值先增加后递减;企业杠杆增加,债券的风险溢价也增加。在无杠杆下,管理者放弃时机与券息无关。随着固定薪水的增加,管理者的薪酬价值、债券价值和公司价值增加;公司财务杠杆减少;债券信用溢价减少。随着管理者获得的股权份额增加,管理者薪酬价值、公司股权价值随之增加;债券价值与公司价值减少;公司财务杠杆和债券信用溢价随之减少;管理者放弃水平和期权水平增加,而最优的券息减少。假设企业资本由股权和基于担保换股权协议获得的永久性债权资本组成,管理者薪酬包括部分股权和固定工资,担保公司担保部分债务风险。分析表明:管理者风险转移动机随着管理者获得股权份额、固定工资、机会收益增加而增强,随着担保公司获得的担保比例增加而减少。
[Abstract]:This paper considers how the salary structure of managers affects the capital structure of a company, and demonstrates the necessity and feasibility of implementing a mature and competitive salary incentive mechanism for managers of small and medium-sized enterprises in China.Based on the qualitative analysis of the mechanism of managers' compensation incentive, this paper constructs a risk-neutral pricing model and obtains the numerical solution of the optimal capital structure of SMEs.The effects of market friction and volatility of corporate income on corporate capital structure and bond premium, and the effects of managers' salary structure and external income on capital structure and risk premium are discussed quantitatively.The influence of partial equity and opportunity income on the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, the relationship between the design parameters of guarantee contract and the salary and financing scale of managers, etc.The numerical results show that under the condition of constant corporate bond financing scale, managers will get more compensation value if they choose high-risk projects, at the same time, the corporate equity value will also increase, while the corporate bond value will decrease.That is, managers have strong motivation for risk transfer; with the increase of bond interest, the value of the company increases first and then decreases; the corporate leverage increases, and the risk premium of bonds also increases.In the absence of leverage, managers give up the timing is not related to coupon interest.With the increase of fixed salary, managers' compensation value, bond value and company value increase; corporate financial leverage decreases; and bond credit premium decreases.With the increase of the share share of the manager, the compensation value of the manager, the equity value of the company increases, the value of the bond and the value of the company decrease, the financial leverage and the credit premium of the bond decrease.The manager gives up the level and the option level increases, while the optimal coupon rate decreases.Assuming that the corporate capital consists of equity and permanent debt capital based on the guarantee for equity agreement, the manager's compensation includes a portion of the equity and fixed salary, and the guarantee company guarantees part of the debt risk.The analysis shows that the risk transfer motivation of managers increases with the increase of equity share, fixed salary and opportunity income, and decreases with the increase of guarantee ratio.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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