机构投资者对高管超额薪酬的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-30 20:32

本文选题：机构投资者 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：机构投资者的崛起是全球金融体系近30年来最重大的变化之一,随着其规模的不断扩大,逐渐成为资本市场上的主导力量。相比于中小投资者,机构投资者拥有资金、专业、信息、有限理性等优势,可以在制衡大股东、监督管理层方面发挥更好的治理效果。20世纪80年代以来,以养老基金为代表的美国机构投资者“股东积极主义”逐渐兴起,机构投资者不再采用传统的抛售股票的“华尔街规则(The Wall Street Rule)"来保护其资本的价值,而是以积极的姿态“用手投票”,主动参与和改善公司治理状况。近十年来,我国机构投资者在国家一系列政策的大力推动下得到了快速发展。从招商银行的“可转债风波”、中兴通讯增发H股等事件可以看出,机构投资者开始尝试在公司治理中扮演积极监督者的角色。然而在我国法律制度背景、市场环境、上市公司质量、机构投资者发展水平等内外部因素的阻碍下,经过成本收益分析,机构投资者也会选择在公司治理中扮演“消极监督者”甚至“合谋者”的角色。所有权和经营权的分离,使管理层成为公司事实上的“内部控制人”,其可能会为了私人利益损害外部股东利益,产生所有者与经营者之间的代理问题。高管薪酬制度作为缓解此类代理问题的一种方式,也是机构投资者参与公司治理,监督管理层的一个重要方面。然而,2008年金融危机后集中爆发的高管超额薪酬现象使得高管薪酬制度本身已成为公司治理中新的代理问题。本文通过选择高管超额薪酬这一视角,从持股集中度、持股期限两个维度将机构投资者进行划分,通过研究机构投资者与高管超额薪酬、高管-薪酬业绩敏感性、高管总薪酬的相关性,试图检验机构投资者能否在监督管理层,参与公司治理中扮演更加积极的角色。虽然实证结果表面上与假设不一致,但通过回归分析并结合之前学者的研究,本文认为高管超额薪酬包括两部分,一部分是管理层权利寻租获取的私有收益,一部分是公司对管理层经营才能和经营风险的补偿。机构投资者持股期限越长、持股集中度越高时,越倾向于积极参与公司治理、监督管理层。当公司治理环境得到改善时,业绩相应上升,高管与业绩相联系的薪酬提高。同时,体现高管经营能力的超额薪酬的增长幅度将大大超过高管减少权力寻租获取超额薪酬的下降幅度,最终使总薪酬增加。总之,通过机构投资者持股与高管超额薪酬相关性的研究,验证了机构投资者一定程度上能在公司治理中扮演积极监督者的角色。本文分为六个章节,以委托代理理论、最优契约理论、管理层权利理论、组织合谋理论为背景,聚焦于机构投资者持股对高管超额薪酬的影响进行研究,并运用多元线性模型进行回归分析,对我国资本市场上影响上市公司高管薪酬激励问题的因素加以解释,以期对完善当前的高管薪酬激励方案提供借鉴和参考。并验证了机构投资者随着持股规模的增大确实能在公司治理领域产生积极的效果。第一章为导论。主要对论文进行了简要概述。其中包括研究背景及意义、研究思路与框架、研究方法、研究贡献及相关名词解释。第二章为机构投资者与高管超额薪酬相关文献综述。本章从与机构投资者相关的研究、与高管超额薪酬相关的研究、机构投资者与高管薪酬的关系三大方面对国内外相关领域文献进行梳理归纳。第三章为机构投资者影响高管超额薪酬的机理分析。本章分为理论基础和机构投资者参与公司治理的影响因素两部分。首先,对与本文有关的委托代理理论、管理层权利理论、最优契约理论和组织合谋理论做出详细介绍。其次,从机构投资者参与公司治理的内外部条件、动因与障碍几方面分析影响其积极参与公司治理的各种因素。第四章为机构投资者对高管超额薪酬影响的实证研究。根据对相关文献的梳理归纳和理论分析,本章提出了与本文相关的六个假设。根据研究假设建立起回归模型,并对各变量进行解释、给出变量选择理由、样本筛选标准及数据来源。本文以2006年至2012年我国只发行A股的上市公司为样本,选用上市公司各年的高管实际薪酬与由回归模型计算出的高管预期正常薪酬的差额及调整后的上市公司高管薪酬总额与行业职工平均工资的差额两种方式衡量高管超额薪酬。另外分别以公司期末资产负债率、第一大股东持股集中度、总资产、总资产利润率、管理层持股比例、两职合一等作为控制变量,衡量公司资本结构、股权结构、公司规模、资产收益和董事会特征。第五章为机构投资者影响高管超额薪酬的实证结果与分析。本章主要对变量进行描述性统计、相关性分析、多元回归分析及稳健性检验。实证结果显示机构投资者持股比与高管超额薪酬负相关、与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性相关性不显著、与高管总薪酬水平正相关。通过进一步分析,本文认为模型计算出的高管超额薪酬不仅包括高管利用权力寻租获得的超额薪酬,还包括公司对高管经管才能和经营风险的补偿,随着机构投资者积极参与公司治理,抑制了高管利用权利寻租获取超额报酬。而公司业绩的增加,使股东又逐渐加大对高管经管才能和风险的补偿,导致高管超额薪酬不降反升,高管总薪酬水平上升、薪酬与业绩的敏感性不显著。第六章为研究结论与启示。本文的研究结论是：通过回归模型计算的高管超额薪酬包括两部分,高管利用权力寻租获得的超额薪酬和公司对高管经管才能和经营风险的补偿。当公司治理环境得到改善时,公司业绩增加,高管与业绩相联系的薪酬提高。同时,体现高管经营能力的超额薪酬的增长幅度将大大超过高管减少权力寻租获取的超额薪酬的下降幅度,最终导致总薪酬水平上升。鉴于高管超额薪酬的存在,机构投资者对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性未有明显影响。说明随着我国机构投资者持股规模的扩大、持股比例的提高一定程度上能够在改善公司内部治理环境、监督管理层方面产生积极的作用。结合我国机构投资者的发展现状本文提出以下建议：(1)增强股票市场的进化机制；(2)完善资本市场法制环境,减少机构投资者主动参与公司治理的法律障碍；(3)放宽机构投资者设立和入市的限制,培育多元市场投资主体；(4)机构投资者要重视对管理层的薪酬激励,全面参与公司治理。本文的学术贡献主要有以下三点： (1)拓展了机构投资者对高管薪酬影响的研究视角。本文立足我国机构.投资者发展现状,从高管超额薪酬这一角度进行深入分析,对机构投资者与高管薪酬的研究角度进行了一定的补充。 (2)本文从高管薪酬的内部结构进行分析,认为高管超额薪酬包括高管利用权力寻租获得的薪酬、高管基于自身经管才能和经营风险获得的薪酬。将由回归模型计算出的高管超额薪酬的构成因素考虑在内,可以对之前学者研究结论的差异进行一个合理的解释。 (3)本文分别研究了机构投资者整体、长期机构投资者与高管超额薪酬的关系,证明了随着机构投资者规模的扩大,持股比例的提高,确实能够在公司治理中积极扮演监督者的角色。本文的不足之处主要有以下几点： (1)数据的获取方面存在局限性。本文只是对高管经济性报酬中的货币薪酬进行了相关研究。没有涉及股权、期权等非货币经济性报酬,也没有涉及高管薪酬中的福利、在职消费等非经济性报酬。 (2)所选择指标的准确性存在局限。由于对高管超额薪酬的定义不统一,并且在本文的研究中对衡量高管超额薪酬模型的选取和指标的采用,主要是借鉴了学者以往的研究经验,但是对于哪种指标更具有衡量意义还有待于进一步研究。 (3)没有对机构投资者的持股情况进行对比分析。本文只是对上市公司中有机构投资者、机构投资者持股期限超过一年的情况进行了分析,没有与无机构投资者持股或者其持股期限短于一年的上市公司高管薪酬状况进行对比分析,得出的结论还有待进一步验证。
[Abstract]:The rise of institutional investors is one of the most important changes in the global financial system in the past 30 years. As its scale continues to expand, it has gradually become the dominant force in the capital market. Compared with small and medium-sized investors, institutional investors have the advantages of capital, specialty, information and limited rationality, and can play a more important role in balancing large shareholders and supervising management. Good governance effect in the 80s.20, the American institutional investor "Shareholder Activism", represented by pension fund, has been rising gradually. Institutional investors no longer adopt the traditional "The Wall Street Rule" to protect the value of their capital, but take a positive attitude to "vote by hand", and take the active reference. And improve the state of corporate governance.
In the last ten years, China's institutional investors have developed rapidly under the strong impetus of a series of national policies. From the "convertible bonds" of China Merchants Bank and the addition of H-shares by ZTE communications, institutional investors have begun to try the role of active supervisors in corporate governance. However, the market is in the background of China's legal system and the market. Under the hindrance of the internal and external factors such as the environment, the quality of the listed companies and the development level of institutional investors, the institutional investors will also choose to play the role of "the negative supervisor" or even the conspirators in the corporate governance through the analysis of the cost and income.
The separation of ownership and right of management makes the management a "internal controller" in fact. It may damage the interests of the external shareholders for the private interests and produce the agency problem between the owner and the operator. The executive compensation system is a way to alleviate the problem of such agency, and also the institutional investors participate in corporate governance. An important aspect of monitoring management.
However, the overpay phenomenon of top executives in 2008 after the financial crisis has made the executive pay system a new agency problem in corporate governance. This paper divides the institutional investors from the two dimensions of the ownership concentration and the duration of the stock, through the study of the institutional investors and the high level. Overpay, executive pay performance sensitivity, and the relevance of executive compensation try to test whether institutional investors can play a more active role in supervising management and participating in corporate governance. Although the empirical results are not consistent with assumptions, this paper believes that the top salary is overpaid by regression analysis and previous scholars' research. There are two parts, one part is the private income obtained by management rights rent-seeking, part of which is the company's compensation for management and management risks. The longer the time limit is, the higher the ownership concentration is, the more inclined to actively participate in corporate governance and supervise the management. When the corporate governance environment is improved, the performance phase is improved. At the same time, the increase in the amount of excess pay that embody the executive ability will greatly exceed the decrease in the overpay of the executive's power seeking and rent-seeking, which will eventually increase the total salary. Investors can play an active role in corporate governance to some extent.
This paper is divided into six chapters. Based on the principal-agent theory, the optimal contract theory, the management right theory and the organizational collusion theory, this paper focuses on the research on the influence of institutional investors' Shareholding on senior executives' excess pay, and uses a multiple linear model to carry out regression analysis, which affects the executive compensation incentive of the listed companies in China's capital market. The factors of the problem are explained in order to provide reference and reference for improving the current executive compensation incentive scheme, and verify that institutional investors can produce positive effects in the field of corporate governance with the increase of the size of the stock.
The first chapter is an introduction. This paper gives a brief overview of the paper, including the research background and significance, research ideas and frameworks, research methods, research contributions and related nouns interpretation.
The second chapter is the literature review of institutional investors and senior executives' excess pay. This chapter reviews the related research related to institutional investors, the research related to senior executive pay and the relationship between institutional investors and executive compensation in three aspects.
The third chapter is the mechanism analysis of institutional investors affecting executive excess compensation. This chapter is divided into theoretical basis and the two part of the influence factors of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. First, this chapter gives a detailed introduction to the principal-agent theory, management rights theory, optimal contract theory and organizational collusion theory. Secondly, from institutional investment. The internal and external conditions, motivations and obstacles of corporate governance are factors that affect their active participation in corporate governance.
The fourth chapter is an empirical study on the impact of institutional investors on top executives' excess pay. According to the related literature and theoretical analysis, this chapter puts forward six hypotheses related to this article. Based on the hypothesis, a regression model is set up, and the variables are explained, the reasons for the selection of variables, the standard of sample screening and the source of data are given. In this paper, the listed companies that only issued A shares from 2006 to 2012 were used as samples, and the top executive compensation was measured in two ways, which were the difference between the actual salary of senior executives and the average salary calculated by the regression model and the difference between the total salary of the senior executives and the average wages of the employees. The company's final asset liability ratio, the concentration degree of the first large shareholders, the total assets, the total asset profit rate, the proportion of managerial ownership and the two position as control variables are used to measure the company's capital structure, the ownership structure, the company size, the asset income and the characteristics of the board of directors.
The fifth chapter is the empirical results and Analysis on the effect of institutional investors on executive excess compensation. This chapter mainly describes the variables as descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and robustness test. The empirical results show that institutional investors' shareholding ratio is negatively related to executive excess compensation, and has no significant correlation with executive compensation performance sensitivity. The total salary level of senior executives is positively related. Through further analysis, this paper thinks that the excess compensation of top executives calculated by the model not only includes the excess compensation obtained by the executive use of power rent-seeking, but also the compensation for the management and management risks of the executives. With the active participation of institutional investors in corporate governance, the executives have suppressed the rent-seeking of the executive's rights. The increase of the company's performance makes the shareholders gradually increase the compensation for the management ability and risk of senior executives, which leads to the rise of top executives' excess pay, the rising level of executive pay and the insignificant sensitivity of salary and performance.
The sixth chapter is the conclusion and inspiration. The conclusion of this paper is that the excess compensation of senior executives calculated by the regression model includes two parts, the senior executives use the power to rent the excess compensation and the company's compensation for the management and management of the executives. At the same time, the increase in the excess pay, which embodies the executive ability, will greatly exceed the decrease in the excess compensation obtained by the executive to reduce the power rent-seeking, and eventually lead to the increase in the total salary level. With the expansion of China's institutional investors' shareholding scale, the increase in the shareholding ratio can make a positive effect on improving the corporate governance environment and supervising the management level.
Combined with the development status of institutional investors in China, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) strengthen the evolution mechanism of the stock market; (2) improve the legal environment of the capital market, reduce the legal barriers to the initiative of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance; (3) relax the restrictions on the establishment and entry of institutional investors, and cultivate multiple market investment bodies; (4) institutional investment. Investors should pay attention to management incentive compensation and fully participate in corporate governance.
The academic contribution of this article is mainly the following three points:
(1) the research perspective on the impact of institutional investors on executive compensation is expanded. Based on the current situation of China's institutions and the development of investors, this paper makes a thorough analysis from the perspective of executive excess pay, and makes a certain supplement to the research angle of institutional investors and executive compensation.
(2) from the analysis of the internal structure of executive compensation, this paper holds that top executives' excess pay includes the salary obtained by executive use of power rent-seeking, and the salary of executives based on their own management ability and management risk. A reasonable explanation is made.
(3) this paper studies the relationship between institutional investors as a whole, long-term institutional investors and senior executive pay, which proves that with the expansion of institutional investors and the increase of the share proportion, it is true that the role of supervisors can be actively played in corporate governance.
The inadequacies of this paper are as follows:
(1) there are limitations in the acquisition of data. This paper only studies the monetary remuneration in the economic reward of senior executives. It does not involve non monetary remuneration such as equity, option and other non monetary remuneration, nor does it involve non economic rewards such as executive compensation and on-the-job consumption.
(2) the accuracy of the selected indicators is limited. Because the definition of top executive excess pay is not uniform, and the selection of the excess compensation model and the use of indicators in this study are mainly used for reference to the previous research experience of the scholars, but the more measurable significance of which kind of reference remains to be further studied.
(3) there is no comparative analysis on the stock ownership of institutional investors. This paper analyses the situation of institutional investors with institutional investors for more than one year. The conclusion remains to be further verified.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

【参考文献】