高管股权激励及其合约特征对现金持有的影响

发布时间：2018-08-27 20:45

【摘要】：现金持有是公司重要的财务决策,现金持有水平的高低直接影响企业的经营效率。现金持有水平过低,企业将难以把握良好的外部投资机会,也使得融资约束发生时不能及时筹集到足够的资金；现金持有水平过高又可能导致代理问题。近年来,高额现金持有的现象在国内外普遍出现,使得现金持有成为了热点议题。如果说正常的现金持有能够提升企业价值,那么超额现金持有或者剔除投资机会及融资约束后的现金持有将更多地由代理理论予以解释。倘若如此,作为解决委托代理问题的股权激励是否具有抑制过高现金持有的作用?其可能的影响路径是怎样的?本文基于代理理论阐释了高管股权激励计划及其合约特征对现金持有水平的影响机理,通过对我国沪深A股2009-2013年上市公司平衡面板数据的计量分析,实证结果表明：股权激励计划对公司现金尤其是超额现金具有减持作用：合约中设置股票期权与行权约束以及持续激励的公司表现出了增强效应,但有效期和激励强度的增效作用并不显著；股权激励计划对低投资机会和低融资约束公司现金的减持作用更为突出；高管股权激励的影响渠道主要是通过抑制过度投资和超额在职消费对现金持有的增持效应。本文阐释了现金持有的理论假说,揭示了股权激励对现金持有在不同情境中的效应,并梳理了股权激励合约的特征及其影响的差异,检验了股权激励通过抑制代理行为增持现金的作用路径,发现我国上市公司现金持有存在代理问题,股权激励计划能够发挥一定的抑制效应,这些都为公司现金管理和高管股权激励合约设计提供了借鉴。
[Abstract]:Cash holding is an important financial decision of a company, and the level of cash holding directly affects the operating efficiency of an enterprise. If the cash holding level is too low, it will be difficult for the enterprise to grasp the good external investment opportunities, and the financing constraint will not be able to raise enough funds in time. The excessive cash holding level may lead to the agency problem. In recent years, the phenomenon of high cash holding has been widely appeared at home and abroad, making cash holding a hot topic. If the normal cash holding can enhance the enterprise value, then the excess cash holding or the cash holding after excluding the investment opportunity and the financing constraint will be explained more by the agency theory. If so, does equity incentive, as a solution to the principal-agent problem, play a role in restraining excessive cash holdings? What is the possible impact path? Based on agency theory, this paper explains the influence mechanism of executive equity incentive plan and its contract characteristics on cash holding level, and analyzes the balance panel data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2009-2013. The empirical results show that the equity incentive plan can reduce the company's cash, especially the excess cash. But the effect of validity period and incentive intensity is not significant, the equity incentive plan has more prominent effect on the low investment opportunity and the low financing constraint company's cash reduction. The influence channel of executive equity incentive is mainly through restraining excessive investment and excess on-the-job consumption to increase the cash holding effect. This paper explains the theoretical hypothesis of cash holding, reveals the effect of equity incentive on cash holding in different situations, and combs the characteristics of equity incentive contract and the difference of its influence. This paper examines the mechanism of equity incentive through restraining agency behavior to increase cash holding, and finds out that there is agency problem in cash holding of listed companies in China, and equity incentive plan can play a certain inhibitory effect. All these provide a reference for the company's cash management and executive equity incentive contract design.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

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