股权激励契约设计与公司盈余管理行为

发布时间：2018-10-10 19:16

【摘要】：以2006年公告股权激励方案的上市公司为研究对象,运用其股权激励方案公告后3年的相关数据,基于应计项目与线下项目盈余管理的双重计量视角,实证分析股权激励契约的设计对激励后公司盈余管理方式与强度的影响。研究发现:股权激励方案公告后,相关公司应计项目和线下项目的盈余管理都存在,且公司管理层倾向于实施应计项目盈余管理方式。相对于实施业绩股票模式的公司,实施股票期权模式公司的线下项目盈余管理会显著减少,而应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。激励规模越大,行权条件设计的越严格,无论是应计项目还是线下项目盈余管理均会增强。激励计划的有效期设计的越长,线下项目盈余管理会显著减少,应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。
[Abstract]:Taking the listed companies that announced the equity incentive scheme in 2006 as the research object, using the relevant data of three years after the announcement of the equity incentive scheme, based on the dual measurement perspective of accrual items and offline items earnings management. This paper empirically analyzes the influence of the design of equity incentive contract on the earnings management mode and intensity of the company after the incentive. It is found that the earnings management of accrual items and offline items exist after the announcement of equity incentive scheme, and the management of the company tends to implement the accrual item earnings management mode. Compared with the companies implementing the performance stock model, the offline project earnings management of the companies implementing the stock option model will be significantly reduced, but the accrual item earnings management reduction will not be obvious. The larger the incentive scale, the more strict the design of exercise conditions, both accrual items and offline items earnings management will be strengthened. The longer the period of validity of incentive plan is designed, the less the earnings management of offline items will be, and the less earnings management of accrual items will be.
【作者单位】：苏州大学商学院;南通大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJC630176) 江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2013SJB790046) 南通市社会科学基金项目(2013CNT0021)
【分类号】：F275;F224

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