节税驱动下的期权行权日操纵行为及其经济后果研究

发布时间：2019-04-27 00:14

【摘要】：本文对高管在最小化股票期权薪酬个人所得税驱动下的股票期权行权日操纵行为进行研究。以2006年至2014年底实施股票期权激励的全部184次非自主统一行权为研究对象,通过事件研究法,我们找到了行权日位于股价低位的经验证据,并发现该操纵行为是通过事后的倒签行权日而非事前的信息披露时间操纵股价实现。最小化股票期权激励的个人所得税是高管倒签股票期权行权日的驱动因素,潜在的节税收益越大,股票期权行权日被倒签的可能性越大。控股股东和高管的权力越大,股票期权行权日被倒签的可能性也越大;董事会特别是其下设薪酬考核委员会的独立性能抑制倒签行为的发生;而机构投资者治理不能对倒签行为进行有效约束。进一步的研究表明,股票期权行权日的倒签行为会损害公司的价值,在股票期权成本费用可以在企业所得税前列支的规定出台后,高管会通过真实经营活动活动和真实投资活动盈余管理掩盖其倒签股票期权行权日导致的公司所得税现金流出损失。
[Abstract]:In this paper, we study the daily manipulation behavior of executive stock options driven by minimizing individual income tax on stock option compensation. Taking all 184 non-autonomous unified exercises of stock option incentive from 2006 to the end of 2014 as the object of study, through the event study method, we find the empirical evidence that the exercise day is low in the stock price. It is found that the manipulation is achieved by manipulating the stock price after the countersign right day rather than the prior disclosure time. Minimizing the personal income tax of stock option incentive is the driving factor of executive countersign stock option execution day. The greater the potential tax-saving income, the greater the possibility that stock option execution day will be countersigned. The greater the power of controlling shareholders and senior executives, the greater the possibility that stock options will be countersigned on the day of execution, and the independent performance of the board of directors, especially the compensation assessment committee under it, will restrain the occurrence of the countersign behavior. And institutional investor governance can not effectively restrict the countersign behavior. Further research shows that the countersign behavior on the day of execution of stock options will damage the value of the company, and after the introduction of the regulation that the cost of stock options can be charged in advance of the enterprise income tax, Senior executives cover up the loss of cash outflow from corporate income tax caused by real business activity and real investment activity earnings management.
【作者单位】：上海对外经贸大学会计学院;上海财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“以价值为基础、以战略为导向的中国企业管理会计研究”(71032005) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“上市公司股权激励中的高管机会主义行为研究”(13YJC630201) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题“大股东-高管权力博弈、股权激励与公司非效率性投资行为研究”(编号2015BGL004) “上海市高校085工程项目、高原高峰学科”的资助
【分类号】：F275;F271

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