基于委托—代理关系的注册会计师审计质量研究

发布时间：2018-02-24 17:17

本文关键词： 注册会计师审计审计质量委托-代理关系博弈　出处：《北京林业大学》2008年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 目前,上市公司的委托-代理问题以及与审计质量的关系问题,已成为我国理论界、资本市场、政府监管部门及公司治理所关注的重大课题。本文主要探索了影响注册会计师审计质量的内在因素和环境因素,为用委托代理模型和博弈模型分析审计质量提供了理论基础。本文采用规范研究的方法,依托行为理性的基本假设,基于委托-代理视角研究当前我国注册会计师审计质量低下的原因。针对研究主题,提出了两个问题:一是审计过程中,股东(委托人)、被审计单位与注册会计师之间的委托-代理关系发生扭曲的内在机制;二是用博弈论的分析方法对审计委托-代理关系中的相互作用机制做了数理证明。针对这些问题,根据建立委托人和注册会计师的博弈模型,揭示了注册会计师审计质量的经济学根源,提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:At present, the principal-agent problem and the relationship between the principal-agent problem and audit quality of listed companies have become the theoretical circle and capital market of our country. This paper mainly explores the internal factors and environmental factors that affect the audit quality of certified public accountants, which provides a theoretical basis for the analysis of audit quality by principal-agent model and game model. Based on the basic hypothesis of behavioral rationality and the perspective of principal-agent, this paper studies the causes of the low audit quality of CPA in China. Two problems are raised: one is the internal mechanism of the distortion of the principal-agent relationship between the audited unit and the CPA in the audit process; The second is the mathematical proof of the interaction mechanism in the audit principal-agent relationship with the method of game theory. In view of these problems, the game model between the principal and CPA is established. This paper reveals the economic root of CPA audit quality and puts forward some policy suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：北京林业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.4;F224.32

【引证文献】