审计关系人利益均衡导向下的审计合谋治理研究

发布时间：2018-03-01 07:45

本文关键词： 审计合谋治理审计关系人审计合谋利益关系主体利益均衡　出处：《湖南大学》2008年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 现实审计环境的复杂性,导致了审计关系人的现实角色与理想角色的错位和扭曲,审计关系人的正当利益失去应有的保护,进而导致了审计合谋的产生,而审计合谋又进一步加剧了审计关系失衡。审计合谋之所以一直未能得到有效的治理,究其原因关键还是在于审计关系人利益分割不公平或不合法及其权责利不明晰。审计合谋治理是一个世界性的难题。因此,研究审计合谋治理在理论上和实务上都具有重要意义。本文以信息不对称理论、有限政府理论、审计合谋共生理论和投资者保护的法律论等作为研究的理论基础。本文首先对审计关系人的范畴予以重新界定,将预期审计报告使用者纳入审计关系人范畴以取代传统审计关系下的委托者。并且将作为监管者的政府与新审计关系人一同纳入审计合谋利益关系主体的范畴。认为当审计合谋泛滥时,作为监管者的政府应当承担政策失误和监管无效的社会责任和行政责任。然后,结合我国的国情分析了审计关系人利益失衡的原因和审计合谋机理,认为审计关系人的经济人特性和审计环境的复杂性决定了审计合谋是各方利益主体之间的一个长期共存和博弈的过程,并对此进行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被审计者的信息权优势决定了其相对于审计者而言应当为审计合谋的后果承担更大的责任,同时认为预期审计报告使用者拥有获取真实而完整的审计信息的权力和投资损失的有限求偿权。本文通过利益均衡分析,最后立足于国情提出审计合谋治理应当遵循的思路是:被审计者和审计者有效自我约束、委托者有效监督、政府有效监管和投资者有效信赖。并提出审计合谋的“三维治理观”,即动机诱正、过程控制以及结果的监督和惩戒。
[Abstract]:The complexity of the reality of audit environment, leads to the reality of the role of the auditors and the ideal role of dislocation and distortion of the legitimate interests of the auditors lose their protection, which led to the audit collusion, and audit collusion and further aggravate the imbalance of audit relationship. The audit collusion has not been effective governance, the key the reason is that the audit stakeholder segmentation of unfair or unlawful power and responsibility are not clear. Audit collusion is a worldwide problem. Therefore, research on the governance of audit collusion in theory and practice are of great significance.
Based on the information asymmetry theory, the theory of limited government, audit collusion symbiosis theory and investor protection law theory as the theoretical basis for research. This paper first category to redefine the relationship between the audit, the audit report users into the expected auditrelationshipparties category to replace the traditional auditing relationship under the client and will serve as the people. The relationship between the government and the new audit regulators into the audit subject interests collusion category. It is thought that when the audit collusion flood, the government as the regulator should undertake policy mistakes and non effective supervision of social responsibility and administrative responsibility. Then, combined with China's national conditions and analyzes the causes and mechanism of audit collusion audit stakeholder imbalance. That the complexity of the economic characteristics of people and the relationship between the audit environment audit determines the audit collusion is a long-term between the main interests of all parties The process of coexistence and game theory, and analyzes this game analysis and case. Put forward the audit information advantage of the right to determine its relative to the auditors should take greater responsibility for audit collusion, at the same time that the expected audit report users have access to real and complete the limited audit information of power and investment losses right. Through the interest equilibrium analysis, finally put forward based on the audit collusion governance should follow the ideas on the situation is: the audit and audit effective self-discipline, entrust the effective supervision, government supervision and effective investors trust. And put forward the "three audit collusion governance view, namely incentive, supervision and process control and the results and punishment.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.0;F224

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