审计合谋的博弈分析及其防治对策

发布时间：2018-03-18 03:15

本文选题：财务舞弊　切入点：审计合谋　出处：《中国政法大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2002年至2011年十年间，我国平均每年约有100家上市公司因为违规购买股票、虚构利润、虚列资产、擅自改变资金用途、推迟披露、虚假陈述、重大遗漏、违规出资、操纵股价、欺诈上市、违规担保等违法违规事项被监管机构处罚。为什么经过审计的上市公司报表还会出现如此重大的纰漏？审计师们在这些案件中扮演了怎样的角色？一系列让人震惊的数据和曝光的财务造假丑闻无不警示我们：舞弊并未远离，合谋仍在继续。审计合谋不仅关系到众多投资者的经济利益、注册会计师的职业形象，更影响到证券市场的健康运行和社会诚信机制的构建。认清合谋的实质从而找出解决之道势在必行。由于审计合谋问题的隐蔽性，无法用经验数据进行直接研究，因此本文采用构建博弈模型结合描述性统计数据的方式进行分析论证。本文按照发现问题、分析问题和解决问题的思路分为五个部分。引言部分主要介绍了选题背景和意义、国内外研究状况、研究对象和研究方法等。第一章探讨审计合谋形成的原因。借鉴“舞弊三角”理论将原因梳理为动机理论、现实压力和机会诱导三方面。第二章是审计合谋的博弈分析过程。首先根据中国审计市场的情况构建一个初步博弈模型，，目的是理顺博弈双方的利益诉求和整个博弈过程，并寻找一个管理层更倾向于真实披露且注册会计师更愿意保持独立的利益均衡状态。其次增加中国审计市场缺乏的或者是尚不完善的变量，如声誉回报、民事诉讼机制等，对此扩展博弈进行分析，以说明这些因素对博弈双方策略选择的影响。第三章针对学术界提出的四种防治审计合谋的措施进行有效性探讨，这些措施包括审计收费最低限价管制、审计委托模式重构、引入第二个审计师和加大行政处罚力度。第四章是在前三章的基础上提出审计合谋的治理建议。这些措施有：完善上市公司和会计师事务所的组织管理体制，建立有效的经理人和事务所竞争市场，明确注册会计师的法律责任，积极接受媒体和公众监督，以及明确政府部门的审计监督职责。
[Abstract]:During the 10 years from 2002 to 2011, on average, about 100 listed companies in China bought shares illegally, made up profits, listed assets, changed the use of funds without authorization, delayed disclosure, misrepresented statements, significant omissions, illegally financed and manipulated stock prices. Fraudulent listing, illegal guarantee and other illegal matters were punished by the regulatory authorities. Why can the audited listed companies' statements still have such significant flaws? What role do auditors play in these cases? A series of shocking data and financial fraud scandals have warned us that fraud is not far away and collusion is continuing. Auditing collusion is not only about the economic interests of many investors, but also about the professional image of certified public accountants. It also affects the healthy operation of the securities market and the construction of social credit mechanism. It is imperative to recognize the essence of collusion and find out the solution. Because of the concealment of audit collusion problem, the empirical data can not be directly studied, so this paper adopts the way of constructing game model combined with descriptive statistical data to analyze and prove it. This paper is divided into five parts according to the ideas of problem finding, problem analysis and problem solving. The introduction mainly introduces the background and significance of the topic, the research situation at home and abroad. The first chapter discusses the causes of audit collusion. The second chapter is the game analysis process of audit collusion. Firstly, according to the situation of China's audit market, a preliminary game model is constructed, the purpose of which is to straighten out the interests of both sides of the game and the whole process of the game. And looking for a management more inclined to true disclosure and CPA is more willing to maintain an independent balance of interests. Secondly, increase the lack of audit market in China or is not yet perfect variables, such as reputation returns, civil litigation mechanisms, etc. In order to explain the influence of these factors on the strategy choice of both sides of the game, the third chapter discusses the effectiveness of four kinds of measures to prevent and cure audit collusion put forward by academic circles. These measures include the control of the minimum price of audit fees, the reconfiguration of the audit entrustment model, The second auditor is introduced and the administrative penalty is increased. Chapter 4th puts forward the governance suggestions of audit collusion on the basis of the first three chapters. These measures include: perfecting the organization and management system of listed companies and accounting firms, To establish an effective competitive market for managers and firms, clarify the legal responsibilities of CPA, actively accept media and public supervision, and clarify the audit supervision responsibilities of government departments.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F239.2;F224.32

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