中国上市公司违规行为研究：1992～2011

发布时间：2018-01-01 17:11

本文关键词：中国上市公司违规行为研究：1992～2011　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国证券市场经历20多年的发展后,上市公司数量不断增加,其总市值也在以超乎常规的速度递增。但在快速发展的过程中,证券市场中层出不穷的违规事件,不仅使得投资者遭受极大的损失,而且严重妨碍了证券市场资源配置功能的发挥,同时也不断敲击着监管部门脆弱的神经,使得公司违规成为各方关注的焦点。面对这一重要问题,学者们从不同角度,采用不同的数据及研究方法研究公司违规行为,希望能找出影响公司违规的最根本原因。作为市场重要参与者的市场监管方,一方面力图通过相关法律法规来约束上市公司违规行为,另一方面通过呼吁各方(包括媒体、投资者)加强对上市公司行为的监督,对出现有违规行为的公司予以坚决处罚,希望以此通过严厉的处罚措施增加上市公司违规成本,以此达到降低上市公司违规的目的。虽然监管方为彻底制止公司违规绞尽脑汁,但中国证券市场中上市公司违规却并未得到有效的遏制,甚至在相当长的一段时间内,上市公司违规比例呈现出逐年增加的态势,以至于到2001年的时候,公司违规比例竟高达10%左右。即使在这以后,公司违规比例出现一定程度的下降,但与欧美发达国家相比,中国上市公司每年出现违规的比例仍然较高；同时,中国上市公司中股东违规从无到有,且其违规比例呈现出逐年增加的新趋势。面对这样的现实状况,我们不仅要思索,到底是市场监管不力,还是公司治理不完善,抑或是其他原因所导致。本文以沪深两市A股市场1992-2011共计20年全样本数据,依据相关研究的理论分析,重点采用2003-2009年的面板数据进行实证研究。首先,从终极控制人角度出发,研究终极所有权、分离度对公司违规行为的影响,重点分析终极所有权、分离度在终极控制权-终极所有权发生分离与否条件下,分别对经营层违规、股东违规的影响,不仅实现了对第一类和第二类委托代理理论进行实证检验的目的,且结论为相关政策的制定提供了极其重要的参考依据。其次,以董事会为核心的公司治理机制作为缓解委托代理问题重要的工具,以往的研究大多集中于研究其变量对公司违规的影响,从既有的研究来看,对公司治理机制与违规的研究缺乏深入研究,本文不仅研究以董事会为核心的公司治理机制对公司违规行为的影响,同时在多个模型中间接实现对其稳健性的检验,使最终得到的公司治理机制与公司违规关系的结论才更能经得起考验。再次,制度环境作为公司经营所在地环境变量,在一定条件下能对公司起到治理的作用,从既往的相关研究文献来看,研究制度环境对公司违规的影响缺乏深入剖析,鲜有同一文献研究多种外部环境变量对公司违规的影响；本文选取的制度环境变量不仅包括有经营所在地现代的经济发展水平,同时包括有市场化进程总指数、市场法律制度环境、政府干预程度。以此研究制度环境对公司违规的影响,有助于达到对制度环境治理作用的全面而且深入的研究。为此从问题的提出→研究背景及其回顾→理论分析及研究假设→计量结果及其分析→研究结论,几个层面逐步展开相关研究。第1部分“引言”明确提出了本文所研究的问题,并对所研究问题进行了陈述,详细说明了本文的研究方法及结构。第2部分“文献综述及评析”,回顾终极控制人终极所有权及分离度与公司经营行为、以董事会为核心的公司治理机制及制度环境与公司违规的相关文献研究,梳理了这几方面已有的研究成果,并对相关的研究给出了述评,这为本文进一步研究奠定了坚实的理论基础。第3部分“研究的市场背景及其现状”,详细列举了中国证券市场上公司严重违规事件及其最终处罚结果,并通过图表的方式详细展示了中国上市公司整体违规比例、违规类型、违规程度、违规主体的变化趋势及现状；对中国证券监管的发展做了详细的描述,并对中国上市公司治理机制的变化及改进进行了细致的梳理。第4部分“理论分析及研究假设”,在结合相关研究文献的基础之上,对本文的几个方面的研究,进行了理论分析,并对相关变量与公司违规之间的关系提出了相关假设研究。第5部分“研究设计”,详细说明了本文研究所用数据的来源,及重要数据的获取方式；对文章研究所涉及到的每一个变量进行了具体的定义与测度；给出了在每一个具体研究问题中,所用到的计量模型。第6部分“计量结果及其分析”,首先对本文研究中所涉及的终极控制人终极控制权、终极所有权、终极控制权-所有权分离度,以董事会为核心的公司治理机制变量、制度环境中的各个变量进行了描述性统计分析；其次研究了终极所有权、分离度,公司治理机制变量及制度环境变量与公司违规之间的关系；重点研究了终极所有权、分离度与经营层违规、股东违规之间的关系,并对相关模型结果进行分析,针对论文所提出的研究假设进行验证。第7部分“结论”,主要包括本文研究的结论及政策涵义,研究的局限及进一步研究的方向。通过上述的研究,本文主要得到以下结论： (1)终极控制人所有权、分离度均对公司违规起到遏制作用,但终极所有权比例的作用更明显；终极控制人的性质对公司违规行为没有显著的影响,而公司的行业属性是影响公司治理机制的重要原因,在竞争性行业中,终极控制人所有权比例、分离度与公司违规均显著负相关,但在行政性垄断行业中,终极控制人所有权比例、分离度与公司违规均不显著。 (2)终极控制权与终极所有权的分离,明显弱化了终极控制人所有权比例对上市公司经营层违规概率的影响；终极控制人控制权与终极所有权的分离度加剧了企业股东违规概率,而终极控制人所有权比例对股东违规概率的的作用则不明显,同时在此条件下公司治理未能发挥应有的作用。 (3)从公司层面分析,公司治理机制变量中第一大股东持股比例能对公司违规起到抑制作用,其余的以董事会为核心的公司治理机制并未发挥应有的作用,表现出与公司违规行为不相关。 (4)公司经营所在地的部分制度环境变量对公司违规行为具有显著的遏制作用,经济发展水平越高对公司违规概率有显著抑制,而市场化指数、市场法律制度、政府干预程度对公司违规行为影响不显著。 (5)通过进一步的分析发现,在国有控制的上市公司中,特别是行政垄断性行业的上市公司,控制性股东持股比例过高是影响公司治理机制作用发挥的决定性因素。通过相关的分析,本文的创新之处主要有： (1)采用中国证券市场20年全样本数据,全面展示了中国上市公司违规行为变化趋势及现状,并从终极控制人角度出发,重点应用了2003-2009年共7年面板数据,研究公司违规行为与终极控制权、终极所有权及分离度之间的关系,弥补了相关研究的不足。 (2)首次对公司违规按违规主体进行划分,将其分为经营层违规与股东违规,进一步研究终极控制人所有权比例、终极控制权-所有权分离度与经营层违规及股东违规之间的关系；重点研究了在两权发生分离与否条件下,终极所有权、分离度分别对经营层违规、股东违规的影响,并为研究终极控制人与管理层(经营层)之间的第一类委托代理问题(激励效应),终极控制人与中小股东的第二类委托代理问题(壁垒效应)提供了机制性的实证检验,并对相关模型进行了稳健性检验,使所得结果更具有说服力。 (3)通过进一步深入研究,挖掘出了最终影响中国上市公司治理机制构建及作用发挥的原因,为从根本上解决中国上市公司治理问题提供了新的证据。本研究虽经作者认真努力,但由于自身能力和客观条件的限制,本研究尚存在一定的局限性： (1)尽管本文的研究想以自中国证券市场成立到2013年底的所有上市公司为样本,但由于从公司违规到被监管层发现、处罚,到最后做出处罚公告,在这过程中存在有时间延迟,使得我们从数据库能获得的最新公司违规数据仅到2011年,迫使我们不能对最近几年公司违规情况做出一个比较清晰了解。 (2)在研究中,由于数据收集及样本大小的关系,对于那些在一个会计年度内出现2次及以上违规的公司,我们并没有对其进行更细致的单独研究,也没有进一步研究其与只发生一次违规行为公司之间的关系。 (3)公司治理数据的收集,从数据库获得的最早公司治理数据是从2000年开始,同时终极控制人所有权、分离度的数据从2003年才开始有完整数据,市场化指数最新数据仅到2009年,这使得我们的相关研究仅能采用2003-2009年7年的面板数据,因此本文的研究样本还应该在更大样本下继续进行研究,这样得到的结论说服力将会更强。
[Abstract]:Chinese stock market experienced 20 years of development, the number of listed companies is increasing, the total market value is also in more conventional speed increasing. But in the process of rapid development, illegal events emerge in an endless stream in the stock market, not only make investors suffer a great loss, but also hinder the resource allocation function of securities markets at the same time, knocking regulators fragile nerves, making companies become the focus of attention. In the face of this problem, scholars from different angles, using different methods of data and research the illegal behavior of the company, hoping to find the most fundamental reasons affect the company's violations. As an important participant in the market market regulators on the one hand, trying to control the listed company violations by the relevant laws and regulations, on the other hand, called on all parties (including the media, to strengthen the investment) The supervision of the company's behavior is punishments for the companies that have committed irregularities, hoping to increase the violation cost of the listed company through severe punishment measures, so as to reduce the purpose of the violation of the listed company.
Although regulators for the company to stop illegal but Chinese brains, securities market irregularities of listed companies has not been effectively curbed, even in quite a long period of time, the proportion of listed companies shows a rising trend, so that when in 2001, the company in violation of the ratio was as high as 10%. Even in after this, the proportion of companies decreased to some extent, but compared with the developed countries, there is still a high proportion of violations Chinese listed companies each year; at the same time, Chinese listed company shareholders violations from scratch, and the illegal ratio shows a new trend has increased year by year. Facing this situation, we should not only think in the end, the market is the lack of supervision, and the imperfect corporate governance, or other causes.
In this paper, the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen two city stock market A 1992-2011 a total of 20 years, based on the analysis of the related theories, focusing on empirical research using panel data for 2003-2009 years. First of all, starting from the perspective of the ultimate controller, the degree of separation of ultimate ownership, impact on corporate behavior, focus on the analysis of ultimate ownership, separation or not in the condition of ultimate control rights - the ultimate ownership, management of violations, violations of the influence of shareholders, not only the first and the second kind of principal-agent theory for empirical test purpose, provide the important reference for the development and conclusion of related policy. Secondly, the board of directors as the core the mechanism of corporate governance as an important tool to alleviate the agency problem, most previous studies focused on the variables impact on the company's violations of the existing research, from the point of view Study, research on corporate governance mechanism and the lack of regulations, this paper not only on the board of directors as the core of the corporate governance mechanism affects the illegal behavior of the company, at the same time in the middle of a model to test the robustness of the system, so that the final violations of corporate governance and corporate relations conclusion can only stand the test again, as the company's operating system environment where environmental variables, to the role of governance for the company under certain conditions, from the relevant previous research literature, research on the institutional environment the lack of in-depth analysis on the impact of the company's violation of the same few literature research a variety of external environmental factors on the violation of the company; the system of environmental variables including not only operates the modern level of economic development, at the same time, including the process of marketization index, market legal system environment, government In order to study the impact of institutional environment on corporate irregularities, it will help to achieve a comprehensive and in-depth study of the role of institutional environment governance.
Therefore, from the problem put forward the research background and review, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, measurement results and analysis, the conclusion of the study, several levels gradually related research. The first part is "the introduction" clearly put forward the research problem, and to carry on the statement, research methods and structure of this paper are illustrated in detail the second section "the literature review and analysis, review of management behavior of ultimate ownership and ultimate control and the degree of separation of the company, the board of directors as the core of corporate governance mechanism and the institutional environment and the companies of Xiang Guanwen offered research, combing the research results of these aspects and the existing research, given the relevant comments, which lay a solid theoretical basis for further research in this paper. The third part" the background and current situation of market research, a detailed list of the China stock market serious violation of company Random events and the final penalty results, and by way of the chart shows the details of the overall proportion of violations, violations of listed companies Chinese type, the degree of violation, change trend and current situation of the development of the subject of non-compliance; China securities regulation made a detailed description and detailed analysis of changes China governance mechanism of listed companies and the improvement of. The fourth part is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, based on the relevant research literature, several aspects of the study of this paper, theoretical analysis was carried out, and the related research hypothesis put forward on the relationship between related variables and companies. The fifth part is the research design, a detailed description of the data sources used in this paper, and access to important data; each of the variables involved in the research of the definition and measure of concrete; given in every body. The problems in the use of econometric model. The sixth part is "the measurement results and analysis, firstly, the ultimate control of ultimate controller involved in this study and the right of ultimate ownership, ultimate control rights - ownership separation, will variables of corporate governance mechanism as the core to the board of directors, each variable in the system environment of the descriptive statistical analysis; followed by the study of the ultimate ownership, separation, corporate governance variables and system environment variables and the relationship between the company regulations; focus on the ultimate ownership, and the degree of separation of management irregularities, the relationship between the East illegal shares, and the results were analyzed to verify the model, according to the research hypothesis proposed. The seventh part is conclusion, mainly including the conclusion and policy meaning of this study, the limitations of the study and direction of further research. Through the research above, this paper The following conclusions should be obtained:
(1) the ultimate control of ownership, separation of companies to curb the role, but the role of the ultimate ownership proportion is more obvious; the nature of the ultimate controller has no significant effect on the illegal behavior of the company, and the company's property industry is the important reason influencing the corporate governance mechanism, in competitive industries, the ultimate control of ownership the proportion and the degree of separation of companies were significantly negatively correlated, but in the administrative monopoly industries, the ultimate control of the proportion of ownership, and the degree of separation of companies were not significant.
(2) the separation of ultimate ownership and ultimate control, obviously weakens the influence of ultimate ownership proportion management violation probability of the listed company; the control right of the ultimate controller and the degree of separation of ultimate ownership increased the probability of illegal corporate shareholders, and the role of the ultimate controller ownership proportion of shareholders violation probability is not obvious, at the same time under this condition, management failed to play its due role.
(3) from the company level, the proportion of the largest shareholder in the corporate governance mechanism can inhibit the company's violation. The rest of the corporate governance mechanisms based on the board of directors do not play their due role, showing no correlation with the company's irregularities.
(4) part of the institutional environment variables company's containment has significant effects on the illegal behavior of the company, the higher the level of economic development of the company has significantly inhibited the probability of illegal, and the market index, the market legal system, government intervention to corporate behavior influence is not significant.
(5) through further analysis, it is found that in the state-owned controlled listed companies, especially the listed companies in the administrative monopoly industries, the controlling shareholder's share proportion is too high, which is the decisive factor affecting the performance of the corporate governance mechanism.
Through the related analysis, the main innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) the Chinese stock market 20 years of full sample data, a comprehensive display of the trend and current situation changes China violations of listed companies, and from the point of view of the ultimate controller, based on the 2003-2009 7 years of panel data, the illegal behavior of the company and the ultimate ownership and ultimate control right, the relationship between the degree of separation, make up the lack of relevant research.
(2) for the first time, divided according to the illegal violation of the subject, which is divided into management and shareholder illegal violations, to further study the ultimate controller ownership proportion, the relationship between ultimate control rights and the degree of separation of ownership - management irregularities and violations of the shareholders; focus on the separation and conditions in the two rights, ultimate ownership the degree of separation, respectively on management irregularities, violations of the shareholder, and for the study of the ultimate control and management (Management) first class (the principal-agent problem between the incentive effect), the ultimate controller and minority shareholders second kinds of principal-agent problem (barrier effect) provides an empirical test of the mechanism, and the related the model to test the stability, make the results more convincing.
(3) through further research, we find out the reasons that ultimately influence the construction and function of China's listed company governance mechanism, and provide new evidence for solving the governance problem of Chinese listed companies fundamentally.
In spite of the serious efforts of the author, the study still has some limitations due to the limitations of its own ability and objective conditions.
(1) although this research would like to Chinese since the establishment of the securities market to all listed companies at the end of 2013 as a sample, but because from the company's violations to the regulators found that punishment, to finally make the punishment announcement, there is a time delay in the process, we made illegal data obtained from the data base to the latest the company only to 2011, we can't force in recent years the company violations make a clearer understanding.
(2) in the study, the relationship between data collection and sample size, for those 2 and over violations of the company within a fiscal year, we are not alone for a more detailed study of the no further research on the relationship between the one and only violations of company.
(3) corporate governance data collection, the earliest corporate governance data obtained from the database is from the beginning of 2000, and the ultimate controller ownership, the degree of separation of data from 2003 began to have complete data, the market index of the latest data only to 2009, which makes the related research we can only use panel data of 2003-2009 7 years, so the sample of this study should also continue to study in a larger sample, so the conclusion of persuasion will be stronger.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6

【参考文献】