基于博弈论视角的企业财务舞弊的外部防范与治理

发布时间：2018-01-01 22:34

本文关键词：基于博弈论视角的企业财务舞弊的外部防范与治理　出处：《兰州大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：财务舞弊是指上市公司及其管理当局为了达到他们的特殊目的,将对外公开报出的财务报告进行故意的错报、瞒报、修饰和虚假披露或者披露信息不完全,导致信息使用者做出错误的决策,以谋取非法利益。资本市场的运行程度是否良好直接受到在资本市场上进行披露的信息质量的影响。上市公司对外公开披露的财务报告所传达的信息对投资者、债权人等利益相关者的决策具有非常重要的影响。在过去的十多年间,我国上市公司及其管理者财务舞弊的现象接连不断地发生,上市公司及其管理者通过进行故意的错报、瞒报、修饰和虚假披露或者披露信息不完全,利用扭曲的财务信息误导信息使用者做出错误的决策,从而谋取非法利益。这些财务舞弊行为不仅给公司或者企业的利益相关者带来严重的损失,还扰乱了经济运行的正常次序给社会造成了不良的后果,并且严重影响了资本市场的资源配置功能的发挥,破坏了“公平、公正、公开”这一资本市场赖以生存的原则的运行。鉴于这种情况,怎么样有效防治和治理上市公司的财务舞弊行为,一直以来都被学术界重点对待。财务舞弊现象的频繁发生暴露了我国目前的资本市场极度缺乏一套完善高效的外部监督机制。既存在着监管部门对上市公司及其管理当局监管不到位的情况,也说明外部审计没有充分发挥其经济警察的作用。根据博弈论的定义,公司经理层与外部审计之间,始终存在着博弈：为了自己个人和公司集体利益公司管理当局有进行财务舞弊的动机,而承担审计业务的注册会计师和其他审计人员的专业技能和经验、职业素养以及努力程度对审计质量的高低起到关键的作用,也会对公司管理者的行为策略有影响。在这个研究背景下,本论文以舞弊治理为落脚点,基于一系列基本假设,构建关于上市公司管理者与外部审计的不完全信息动态博弈模型。在不完全信息动态博弈模型的基础上,合理设计外部审计和管理层的效益函数,并进行纳什均衡的求解,对该纳什均衡解进行分析与讨论,分析公司管理者和外部审计的最优选择行为策略的影响因素,从而站在监管部门和外部审计两个角度提出有关财务舞弊的外部防范与治理的建议。目前我国的上市公司内部审计制度不完善,内部治理也不合理,在这种情况下,可以通过财务舞弊的外部防范与治理来降低上市公司管理者的舞弊可能性。
[Abstract]:Financial fraud refers to listed companies and their management in order to achieve their special purpose, the financial reports reported to the public are deliberately misreported, hidden, modified and false disclosure or disclosure of information is incomplete. Causes the information user to make the wrong decision. Whether the degree of operation of the capital market is good or not is directly affected by the quality of the information disclosed in the capital market. The decision of creditors and other stakeholders has a very important impact. In the past ten years, the phenomenon of financial fraud of listed companies and their managers in China has occurred one after another. Listed companies and their managers use distorted financial information to mislead information users by deliberately misreporting, concealing, modifying and false disclosing or disclosing incomplete information. These financial fraud not only brings serious losses to the stakeholders of the company or enterprise, but also disturbs the normal order of economic operation. And has seriously affected the capital market resources allocation function display, has destroyed "fair, just, open" this capital market survival principle movement. In view of this situation. How to effectively prevent and control the financial fraud of listed companies. The frequent occurrence of financial fraud has exposed the extreme lack of a set of perfect and efficient external supervision mechanism in China's capital market. Inadequate regulatory oversight by management. Also shows that the external audit does not give full play to its economic police role. According to the definition of game theory, there is always a game between the company manager and external audit: the corporate management has the motive of financial fraud for its own personal and corporate collective interests. The professional skills and experience, professional accomplishment and the degree of effort of the CPA and other auditors who undertake the audit business play a key role in the audit quality. In this research background, this paper takes fraud governance as the foothold, based on a series of basic assumptions. Based on the incomplete information dynamic game model of listed company managers and external audit, the benefit function of external audit and management is designed reasonably. The solution of Nash equilibrium is analyzed and discussed, and the influencing factors of optimal choice behavior strategy of managers and external audit are analyzed. From the perspective of supervision and external audit, this paper puts forward some suggestions on external prevention and governance of financial fraud. At present, the internal audit system of listed companies in our country is not perfect, and the internal governance is not reasonable. In this case, the external prevention and governance of financial fraud can reduce the possibility of fraud of listed company managers.
【学位授予单位】：兰州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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