中国股票市场非均衡发展的制度成因及其治理思路

发布时间：2018-01-02 09:14

本文关键词：中国股票市场非均衡发展的制度成因及其治理思路　出处：《福州大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：多年来,我国股票市场的规模逐渐壮大,但质量却没有得到相应提高,主要表现在股票市场与实体经济呈现出较长时间的背离,股市功能紊乱、系统性风险攀升、投资者利益保护不足等问题不断引起人们的关注。这种现象不得不让我们思考：中国股票市场在其发展过程中究竟出了什么问题?在阅读大量文献的基础上,本文发现我国股票市场在其发展过程中出现以下四个非均衡问题：(一)政府介入的非均衡,即我国政府对股票市场的调控出现“推动融资、忽视投资,注重发展、逃避责任,分享收益、推诿后果”的非均衡。(二)股市功能发挥的非均衡,如融通资金、调剂余缺、风险分散和投资等功能出现失衡。(三)制度创新收益与成本的非均衡,即制度创新阻力过大,预期收益小于所需成本,导致新制度创新受阻。(四)股市参与者利益分配的非均衡,即普通投资者与政府、上市公司和中介机构之间的利益分配存在较大差距。文章从国家赶超发展意志和赶超发展战略角度出发,探寻中国股市发展过程中政府行为的产生及其演变。并采用新制度经济学国家理论的“掠夺之手”模型、利益集团理论、“寻租之手”模型和掠夺型制度等分析方法,寻找中国股市非均衡发展的原因。文章论述到,国家赶超发展意志是一种以赶超先进、后来居上的发展偏好或倾向,它决定了赶超发展战略的内容,我国股市中国家赶超发展战略的本质就是有效动员融资资源,快速获得资本支持。所以,中国股市形成了以融资为主的目标定位,在追求目标利益最大化的过程中,当政府权力过度使用(即政府对市场控制的资源多、干预的频率大、管制的事项多),且缺乏有效约束时,“掠夺之手”便产生了,这只手在股市上倾向于保护融资方利益,掠夺广大投资者的财富。政府对市场的管制和干预给利益集团俘获政府官员创造了机会和条件,比如上市公司(特别是国有企业及其控股公司)的“寻租之手”为了获取利益主动伸向政府及政府官员。政府和利益集团相互交换效用函数,利益集团通过寻租获得进入规制、内部信息、市场价格等,政府官员收取相应的租金、并尽量控制更多资源,掠夺性色彩较为浓厚的制度结构便在这时产生了。文章最后根据非均衡发展的制度原因,提出切实转变观念,建立约束机制、激励机制和互惠共享机制等治理思路,希望为股票市场的良性发展提供某些帮助,也期待能为国家理论与中国经济社会实践更好地结合提供重要素材。
[Abstract]:Over the years, China's stock market scale expands gradually, but the quality has not been improved, mainly in the stock market and the real economy has shown a departure from a longer period of time, the stock market dysfunction, systemic risk rise, lack of investor protection problem has aroused people's concern. This phenomenon makes us have to think: Chinese the stock market in the course of its development, what exactly is the problem? In a large number of literatures, we found that China's stock market following the four non equilibrium problems in its development process: (a) the non balanced government intervention, namely our country government regulation of the stock market "to promote financing, ignore investment, focus on development, evading responsibility, sharing of benefits and non balanced prevarication consequences". (two) the non balanced stock market functions, such as financing, adjust more than lack of risk diversification and investment, etc. The function of imbalances. (three) the non balanced income and cost of system innovation, system innovation is the resistance is too large, the expected return is less than the cost, resulting in new institutional innovation is blocked. (four) the non balanced distribution of benefits that the stock market participants, ordinary investors and the government, a large gap exists between the distribution of interests between listed companies and intermediaries the article from the country. To catch up with the development and will catch up with the development of a strategic point of view, to explore the emergence and evolution of government behavior during the development of China stock market. And the new institutional economics theory of the state of the "grabbing hand" model, interest group theory, the "rent-seeking hand" model and predatory system analysis, find the reasons Chinese stock market non balanced development. In this paper, the state will catch up with the development of is a way to catch up with the advanced, the development tendency of preference or catch up from behind, it was decided to catch up development strategy The content, essence of China's stock market Chinese home to catch up with the development strategy is the effective mobilization of financial resources, rapid access to capital support. Therefore, the stock market Chinese formed the target positioning to financing, in pursuit of the goal of maximizing the interests of the government power, when excessive use (i.e. the government control on the market resources, the frequency of intervention large, control), many matters and the lack of effective constraints, the "grabbing hand" is generated, the tendency of hand to protect the interests of financing in the stock market, investors looted wealth. Regulation and government intervention to market to create conditions and opportunities to capture the interests of government officials, such as listed companies (especially the state-owned enterprises and their holding company) of the "rent-seeking hand" in order to obtain benefits to the active government and government officials. The government and interest groups to exchange interest groups through rent-seeking utility function. Get into the regulation, internal information, such as market prices, government officials to collect the rent, and try to control more resources, the system structure of the predatory color more intense has produced at this time. Finally, according to the institutional reasons of unbalanced development, put forward to change the idea, establish the restriction mechanism, incentive mechanism and benefit sharing mechanism etc. the idea of governance, hoping to provide some help for the healthy development of the stock market, but also look forward to the national economic and social China theory and practice better combination provides important material.

【学位授予单位】：福州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51

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