股票回购、盈余管理与市场反应：源自案例研究的证据

发布时间：2018-01-07 05:46

本文关键词：股票回购、盈余管理与市场反应：源自案例研究的证据　出处：《哈尔滨商业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股票回购作为公司资本运营中的财务手段,本应起到平衡股东之间、股东与公司之间的利益,保护中小股东的合法权益的作用,但是有些股票回购存在盈余管理行为,在发布回购公告前,负向调低利润,给广大股民公司经营不善的假象,使股价降低,然后发布回购消息,增强股民的信心,使少部分知情人赚取差价获利,这不利于我国股票市场的健康发展,甚至损害了中小股民的利益。因此若是投资者能及时发现企业会计报告中的盈余管理,作出理智的判断,准确的决策来影响股票的价格,有利于监管部门对证券信息的披露实施有效调查和监督,有利于完善有关法律,规范证券行业健康发展。以股票回购为切入点,回顾了股票回购动机的有关假说、股票回购的市场反应、股票回购与盈余管理的关系等理论基础。根据公司是否真正回购股票,将股票回购分成"假回购"和"真回购"两种情况探讨。产生这两种情况,一方面是由于股民对企业回购的决策缺少理智的判断,对股票回购的理解还仅仅停留在"公司股价被低估"浅显层面上;另一方面是由于股票回购允许企业自主选择回购的时机,当股民盲目反应哄高股价后,企业很可能放弃实施回购。根据公司在股票回购前后的盈余管理行为,又分别从"应计盈余管理"和"真实盈余管理"两方面进行研究,通过盈余管理模型进行数据分析,根据真实与应计盈余管理数值,判断公司盈余管理程度。虽然公司发出股票回购的公告后,在短期内股价都有所提升,但从长期的市场反应看,真、假回购的反应完全不同。所以,对于存在盈余管理的股票回购,还是可以通过分析加以判断,本文分别选取了 "真回购"和"假回购"两个案例,分析两个案例的盈余管理数值,分析其股票回购后的市场反应,发现存在盈余管理的股票回购与真实股票回购的区别,帮助股民加以辨认,以期为完善该制度贡献自己微薄之力。
[Abstract]:As a financial means of capital operation, stock repurchase should balance the interests of shareholders, shareholders and companies, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders. However, some stock repurchase exists earnings management behavior. Before issuing the repurchase announcement, the profits are reduced negatively, which gives the vast number of shareholders the false impression of poor management, which makes the stock price lower, and then issues the repurchase news. To enhance the confidence of the shareholders, so that a small number of insiders to earn profits from the difference, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the stock market in China. Therefore, if investors can find the earnings management in the accounting report in time, make rational judgment, and make accurate decisions to affect the stock price. It is beneficial for the supervision department to carry out the effective investigation and supervision on the disclosure of securities information, to perfect the relevant laws, to standardize the healthy development of the securities industry, and to take stock repurchase as the starting point. This paper reviews the hypothesis of stock repurchase motivation, the market reaction of stock repurchase, the relationship between stock repurchase and earnings management and so on. This paper discusses how to divide stock repurchase into two kinds: false repurchase and real repurchase. On the one hand, these two situations are caused by the lack of rational judgment on the decision of enterprise repurchase. The understanding of stock repurchase is only on the superficial level of "undervalued share price of company"; On the other hand, because stock repurchase allows enterprises to choose their own time to buy back, when the stock owners blindly react to coax the stock price, the enterprise may give up the implementation of the repurchase, according to the earnings management behavior of the company before and after the stock buyback. The author also studies the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management separately, and analyzes the data through the earnings management model, according to the real and accrual earnings management value. Judging the degree of earnings management. Although the company issued a stock buyback notice, the stock price has improved in the short term, but from the long-term market reaction, true, false repurchase response is completely different. For stock repurchase with earnings management, it can be judged by analysis. This paper selects two cases of "true repurchase" and "false repurchase" to analyze the earnings management value of the two cases. This paper analyzes the market reaction after stock repurchase, finds out the difference between the stock repurchase with earnings management and the real stock repurchase, and helps the stockholders to identify it in order to contribute to the perfection of the system.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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