基于LRP体系的中小企业贷款合同设计研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 03:15

本文关键词：基于LRP体系的中小企业贷款合同设计研究　出处：《天津财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国经济的不断发展,中小企业不仅在数量上占绝对优势,而且在扩大就业、改善民生等方面更是起到了无可替代的作用。但中小企业获得的资金支持与对社会所做的贡献严重不匹配,使得中小企业融资问题成为世界性难题。团体贷款的出现在一定程度上缓解了中小企业融资难的困境,但是由于团体贷款自身的社会约束机制和横向监督机制的可行性和即时性受到了现实的挑战,再加上中国特殊的经济环境,使得团体贷款在中国的发展受阻。为了进一步推广团体贷款在中国的发展,有必要探究团体贷款在中国实施的新途径。忠诚度奖励计划(LRP)体系,是以积分优惠来刺激消费者重复购买的动机而实施的一种奖励计划体系,最大的优点是依据数据库的顾客信息能够对体系内的加盟企业进行时时跟踪,而且可以随时取消企业或会员的资格。鉴于LRP体系的上述优点,结合团体贷款在机制方面的缺陷,将中小企业融入LRP体系之中,将企业分为主办型中小企业和加盟型中小企业,研究基于LRP体系的中小企业团体贷款合同设计问题。本文主要通过由主办型中小企业、加盟型中小企业和银行组成的委托一代理模型,分别研究了完全信息和不完全信息情况下,基于LRP体系的银行贷款合同设计问题,研究结果表明,贷款合同的形式取决于最小投资额、抵押品的价值及两代理人的还款意愿之间的大小关系。当代理人之间的权力关系相对平等时,对称的团体贷款合同最优。当代理人之间的权力关系相对不平等时,仅为弱代理人提供贷款的合同是最优的。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of our economy, small and medium-sized enterprises not only occupy an absolute advantage in quantity, but also expand employment. Improving people's livelihood and other aspects has played an irreplaceable role. But the financial support received by SMEs and the contribution made to the society are seriously mismatched. The emergence of group loans to a certain extent alleviates the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, the feasibility and immediacy of the social constraint mechanism and horizontal supervision mechanism of group loan are challenged by reality, plus the special economic environment of China. In order to further promote the development of group loans in China, it is necessary to explore a new way to implement group loans in China. It is a reward plan system which is implemented to stimulate the motivation of consumers to buy repeatedly by means of credit preference. The biggest advantage is that according to the customer information of database, it can keep track of the joining enterprises in the system from time to time. In view of the above advantages of the LRP system, combined with the defects in the mechanism of group loans, SMEs will be integrated into the LRP system. The enterprises are divided into sponsored SMEs and allied SMEs, and the design of group loan contracts for SMEs based on LRP system is studied. The principal-agent model of joining SMEs and banks is used to study the design of bank loan contracts based on LRP system under the condition of complete information and incomplete information respectively. The results show that. The form of a loan contract depends on the size of the relationship between the minimum amount of investment, the value of the collateral, and the willingness of the two agents to repay. When the power relationship between the agents is relatively equal. When the power relationship between agents is relatively unequal, the contract that only provides loans to weak agents is optimal.
【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.4

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