基于终极控制的上市公司融资结构与非理性投资研究

发布时间：2018-01-17 01:15

本文关键词：基于终极控制的上市公司融资结构与非理性投资研究　出处：《郑州大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在企业正常经营过程中,融资与投资是其最基本的两项财务活动。投资给企业带来收益的同时也带来了风险,是企业正常经营,保证盈利的最基本的活动。融资则解决了投资资金的来源问题,是企业投资的前提。两者既相互独立的,又存在着必不可少的联系。上世纪80年代,许多学者都提出了股权适度集中是普遍存在的,即便是美国这种市场化程度极高的国家,也存在此类现象。事实证明,我国的股权结构也是相对集中的,尤其是一些国有上市公司和家族企业,“一股独大”,所有权与控制权分离的现状十分显著。在此情况下,不可避免会存在控制股东和中小股东之间的利益冲突,出现一系列的非理性的投资状况。例如：投资效率低下、盲目过度投资、资金严重闲置等等。此外,我国目前仍处于转轨时期,资本市场还不完善,企业所需要的资金除了从资本市场融资外,还有一大部分需要从银行借款,银行信用融资是其资金来源的重要组成部分。但是,目前我国企业的负债融资对于公司治理的积极作用并未充分发挥,反而由股东和债权人之间的代理问题产生了诸多的利益冲突,也引发了企业的非理性投资行为。本文从企业终极控制人的所有权和控制权出发,研究了我国上市公司的终极控制人股权结构、负债融资结构和非理性投资之间的关系,建立了多元回归模型,对三者之间的相互关系进行了分析。采用中国沪深股市上市公司的数据进行了验证,结果表明：企业终极控制人的所有权和控制权与企业过度投资存在二次函数关系。融资结构中银行信用融资和长期借款融资容易导致过度投资问题；商业信用融资能够有效抑制过度投资问题,但会由此带来投资不足；短期负债融资在理论上可以同时减弱过度投资和投资不足问题,但本文的实证检验并不显著。企业终极控制股东所有权越高,越容易引发过高的资产负债率,并且使企业更倾向于银行信用融资和长期借款；在股权集中的情况下,公司的终极控制人控制权和所有权的偏离度越高,越容易选择商业信用融资和短期借款融资,相反,两权偏离度越低,企业越容易选择银行信用融资和长期借款融资。最后,本文提出了从股权结构和债券监督两个方面来解决非理性投资的对策。
[Abstract]:In the normal operation of enterprises, financing and investment are the two most basic financial activities. Investment not only brings profits to enterprises, but also brings risks, which is the normal operation of enterprises. Financing solves the problem of the source of investment funds and is the premise of enterprise investment. Both of them are independent and indispensable. -20s. Many scholars have pointed out that moderate concentration of equity is universal, even in countries with a high degree of marketization such as the United States. Facts have proved that the ownership structure of our country is relatively concentrated. In particular, some state-owned listed companies and family enterprises, "one share alone", the separation of ownership and control is very significant. In this case. There will inevitably be conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and a series of irrational investment conditions will emerge, such as: low investment efficiency, blind overinvestment, serious idle funds and so on. In addition, our country is still in the transition period, the capital market is not perfect, enterprises need funds from the capital market in addition to financing, there is also a large part of the need to borrow from banks. Bank credit financing is an important part of its source of funds. However, at present, the positive role of corporate debt financing for corporate governance has not been fully brought into play. On the contrary, the agency problem between shareholders and creditors causes a lot of conflicts of interest, and also leads to irrational investment behavior of enterprises. Based on the ownership and control of the ultimate controller, this paper studies the relationship among the ownership structure of ultimate controller, debt financing structure and irrational investment of listed companies in China, and establishes a multivariate regression model. The relationship between the three is analyzed. The data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are used to verify. The results show that there is a quadratic function relationship between the ownership and control rights of the ultimate controller and the overinvestment of the firm, and the bank credit financing and the long-term borrowing financing in the financing structure can easily lead to the overinvestment problem. Commercial credit financing can effectively curb the problem of excessive investment, but it will lead to underinvestment; Short-term debt financing can reduce both over-investment and underinvestment in theory, but the empirical test in this paper is not significant. The higher the ownership of the ultimate controlling shareholders, the more likely to lead to excessive asset-liability ratio. And make enterprises more inclined to bank credit financing and long-term borrowing; In the case of concentrated equity, the higher the deviation between the control and ownership of the ultimate controller of the company, the easier to choose commercial credit financing and short-term loan financing, on the contrary, the lower the deviation between the two rights. It is easier for enterprises to choose bank credit financing and long-term loan financing. Finally, this paper puts forward some countermeasures to solve the problem of irrational investment from two aspects: equity structure and bond supervision.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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