内部控制质量、管理层权力对真实盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-25 16:21

本文关键词： 真实盈余管理管理层权力内部控制质量　出处：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：盈余管理一直以来都是理论界和实物界研究的热点,近年由于经济体和资本市场的发展,相较于操控非正常应计项目(应计盈余管理),管理者们则更倾向于利用真实盈余管理来达到操纵利润的目的。真实盈余管理行为对企业的后续可持续发展产生损害,而其产生的危害相较于应计盈余管理更大且很难被监管者发现,因此为避免监管者发现,采用真实盈余管理行为进行利润操控成为管理层的首选方式。近年随着我国内部控制制度体系的不断完善,关于内部控制质量的高低能否对企业的真实盈余管理行为产生影响成为了学者们研究的重点,而有关管理层权力的大小能否对企业的真实盈余管理行为产生影响却研究甚少。本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号传递理论以及管理层权力理论,采用实证研究的方法剖析了内部控制质量、管理层权力和真实盈余管理三者之间的内在关系。以期进一步充实内部控制质量、管理层权力和真实盈余管理的实证研究证据,促进会计信息传递的真实可靠。本文首先对国内外真实盈余管理、内部控制质量与真实盈余管理、管理层权力与真实盈余管理的相关文献进行梳理,详细阐述了国内外相关文献研究现状,并基于以上的理论分析提出研究假设。采用2012—2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,将理论分析与实证研究相结合。研究结果表明:(1)内部控制质量与真实盈余管理呈显著负相关关系,即提高内部控制质量,可以降低企业真实盈余管理行为;(2)管理层权力与真实盈余管理呈显著正相关关系,即扩大管理层权力,会增加企业的真实盈余管理行为;(3)内部控制质量的提升会削弱管理层权力与真实盈余管理的正相关关系。最后对以上研究结论进行稳健性检验且一致通过,进一步验证了结果的可靠性。基于以上结论,本文提出了相关的政策性建议对于提高内部控制质量,降低管理层权力,减少企业的真实盈余管理行为具有一定的借鉴意义。但本文仍存在不足之处,研究样本的选择仅限于2012年—2015年沪深两市A股上市公司,是否适用于其他样本还需进一步检验。
[Abstract]:Earnings management is always a theoretical and real research hotspot, in recent years due to the development of economy and the capital market, compared to the control of abnormal accruals (accrued earnings management), managers tend to use real earnings management to achieve the purpose of profit manipulation. The real damage behavior of earnings management the enterprise's sustainable development, and its harm compared to the accrual earnings management more large and difficult to be found so as to avoid the regulators, regulators found that the real earnings management behavior of profit manipulation become the preferred way of management. In recent years, with China's continuous improvement of internal control system, on the level of internal the quality control of enterprises can affect the real earnings management has become the focus of the scholars, and the management of power enterprises can really size The influence of management behavior more than Suyin but little studied. In this paper, based on the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, signal transmission theory and managerial power theory, using the methods of empirical research analyzes the relationship between the quality of internal control and management of power and real earnings management three. In order to further enrich the quality of internal control, evidence management an empirical study of management power and real earnings management, the promotion of accounting information transmission is reliable. Based on the domestic and foreign real earnings management, the quality of internal control and real earnings management, the management authority and the relevant literature tube real earnings management analysis, elaborated the related literature at home and abroad research status, and the above theoretical analysis based on the research hypothesis. From 2012 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as research samples, the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research. The results show that: (1) there was a significant negative correlation between the quality of internal control and real earnings management, improve the quality of internal control, can reduce the enterprise's real earnings management behavior; (2) showed a significant positive correlation between the power and real earnings management, expand the management power, will increase the company's real earnings management; (3) improve the quality of internal control will weaken the positive correlation between the managerial power and real earnings management. Finally, the above conclusions are robust and consistent through the inspection, further verify the reliability of the results. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for improving the quality of internal control, reduce management power, reduce the enterprise's real earnings management has a certain significance. But there are still shortcomings, the study sample selection is limited to 2012 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen two Whether the city's A - share listed companies are applicable to other samples needs further inspection.

【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】