上市公司关联交易的公平性分析及其监管研究

发布时间：2018-01-27 10:29

本文关键词： 关联交易公平性监管上市公司　出处：《陕西师范大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：目前,在我国市场经济快速发展的带动下,证券市场也迅速发展起来,关联交易已经成为我国上市公司一种常见的交易方式。近些年来,上市公司关联交易的方式和种类也不断变化,从关联购销发展到资产置换和股权转让,还从有形资产交易发展到无形资产交易,委托经营作为过去很少发生的交易类型现在也开始普遍。关联交易实际上是一种中性的经济范畴,公平的关联交易可以有效降低企业交易成本,提高企业的运营效益,加强市场竞争能力,而且集团企业只要在内部做出适当的交易安排,就有助于集团企业实现利润最大化和整体战略的目标。但是由于交易双方之间的利益关系,导致关联交易会产生不规范行为,例如上市公司降低关联交易中的信息披露透明程度,比如公开报表中的盈余信息；或者在股东董事等内部中,利用关联交易在相关企业之间进行不正当的资产转移的现象；还有关联交易中的交易价格问题,这些行为都会造成不公平的关联交易,也称作“非公允关联交易”,伤害中小股东和债权人的利益。上市公司“一股独大”的股权结构形式使得控股股东掌握了上市公司的实际控制权,对其经营决策有重要影响,控股股东出于追求利益最大化的目的,操纵上市公司进行关联交易。不公平的关联交易侵占了中小投资者的利益,阻碍公司的长期发展,也影响整个证券市场和资本市场公平、公正的市场秩序,危及国民经济发展。所以对于关联交易的监管和治理就显得尤为重要,加强对上市公司及其利益关联方行为的规范和监管,有利于广大中小投资者合法权益的保护,并且维护市场秩序的健康发展。解决上市公司关联交易中不公平交易问题的基础是判定关联交易的公平性。现有的国内外研究中对关联交易的界定主要是从法学的角度研究,由于涉及的法律种类较多,所以并没有一个统一的得到广泛认可的界定。本文则从经济学角度出发,提出一个可以普遍适用的,可以判断关联交易公平性的方法,也就是根据现金流收益和控制权收益占总收益比例的大小来判断交易公平与否。运用博弈论的方法分析关联交易中利益相关者之间的利益关系,发现监管部门监督以及次大股东制衡对于不公平关联交易的监管效果明显,而中小股东的监督作用较小,为关联交易的监管提供理论支撑。
[Abstract]:At present, with the rapid development of China's market economy, the securities market has also developed rapidly, related party transactions have become a common trading mode of listed companies in China in recent years. The ways and types of related party transactions of listed companies are also constantly changing, from associated purchase and sale to asset replacement and equity transfer, but also from tangible assets transactions to intangible assets transactions. As a kind of transaction that rarely happened in the past, entrustment operation is becoming more and more common. In fact, affiliated transaction is a kind of neutral economic category, and fair related party transaction can effectively reduce the transaction cost of enterprises. Improve the efficiency of the operation of enterprises, strengthen market competitiveness, and the group enterprises as long as the appropriate transaction arrangements. It is helpful for group enterprises to achieve the goal of profit maximization and overall strategy. However, due to the interest relationship between the parties to the transaction, related transactions will produce non-standard behavior. For example, listed companies reduce the transparency of information disclosure in related party transactions, such as earnings information in public statements; Or in the shareholders, directors and other internal, the use of related transactions in the relevant enterprises between the phenomenon of improper transfer of assets; There is also the issue of transaction price in related party transactions, which can result in unfair related party transactions, also known as "unfair related party transactions", which harm the interests of minority shareholders and creditors. The ownership structure of the listed company makes the controlling shareholder master the actual control right of the listed company, which has an important influence on the management decision, and the controlling shareholder pursues the goal of maximizing the profit. Unfair related party transactions encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized investors, hinder the long-term development of the company, but also affect the entire securities market and capital market fair and just market order. Endanger the development of the national economy. So the supervision and governance of related party transactions is particularly important, strengthen the behavior of listed companies and their related parties to regulate and supervise. It is conducive to the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and the healthy development of the market order. The basis of solving the problem of unfair transaction in related party transactions of listed companies is to judge the fairness of related party transactions. The definition of related party transactions in existing domestic and foreign studies is mainly from the perspective of law. Because there are many kinds of laws involved, there is not a unified and widely accepted definition. This paper, from the perspective of economics, puts forward a universally applicable one. The method that can judge the fairness of related party transaction. That is, judging whether the transaction is fair or not according to the proportion of cash flow income and control income to the total income. Using the method of game theory to analyze the interest relationship between the stakeholders in the related party transactions. It is found that the supervision of supervision and the checks and balances of minor shareholders have obvious effect on the supervision of unfair related party transactions, while the supervision of small and medium-sized shareholders has little effect, which provides theoretical support for the supervision of related party transactions.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.6;F275;F832.51

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